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Abstract 
The South African National Parks (SANParks) initiated this study in order to provide 
a policy framework for integrating national parks with the development needs of local people 
living adjacent its national parks. However, based on the selection of case studies and the 
changing legal framework in the post-apartheid era, the study extended to cover all state 
protected areas (PAs). Indeed, the transformation of state agencies following the post-
apartheid election of April 1994, in part, drove the need for this integration. Given the history 
of land alienation during apartheid rule, the relationship between land tenure rights, various 
levels of ownership, and PAs formed the central hypothesis of this study. Hence, case studies 
with tenure arrangements ranging from weak, through intermediate, to strong ownership, were 
selected to test the attitudes of beneficiaries towards PAs. 
To set the study in its widest context, obstacles and challenges surrounding 
biodiversity loss, the key motive behind conservation efforts, were analysed (Chapter 1). The 
review concluded that governance in conservation and development initiatives (CDIs) could 
enhance the accountability of key role players involved, i.e., the state, private sector and local 
people within the context of institutions (Chapter 2). Based on the South African context, case 
studies were selected (Chapter 3). The results of this study demonstrated that strong ownership 
out- performed lesser ownership levels on short-term and medium-term benefits arising from 
PAs (Chapter 4). Thus, lesser ownership cannot secure biodiversity in PAs in times of 
pressing social needs. The study limitation is that relatively wealthy individuals of strong 
ownership were compared to relatively poor individuals of lesser ownership. The influence of 
conservation agencies on the attitudes of local people to PAs under different provincial 
contexts and philosophical approaches was somehow important only if it could be sustained 
(Chapter 5). For lesser ownership, combinations of explanatory variables acting together on 
medium and long-term benefits co-deterrnined the attitudes of respondents to different 
benefits arising from PAs (Chapter 6). Of these combinations the most important were: the 
conservation agency in charge, the age and the ownership of respondents for they acted across 
medium and long term time frames. 
In the post-apartheid era, the challenges to transform conservation agencies in order to 
achieve the developmental imperatives under the 1996 Constitution are fraught with 
difficulties. Using SANParks as a case study (Chapter 7), it became clear that without good 
leadership with well-articulated desired outcomes, technocrats could scupper transformation 
efforts. Given all the challenges, the new legal framework for PAs, rural development, and 
policy guidelines is outlined (Chapter 8), and thereafter recommendations and conclusions of 
the study are presented (Chapter 9). 
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Biodiversity conservation narratives 
1.1. Introduction 
This study provides the basis for developing a policy framework that would ensure the 
support oflocal people to protected areas (PAs) that are mainly under the management 
authority of South African National Parks (SANParks). As a policy study, the key 
question is: what do we generally know about involving local people in biodiversity 
conservation, and how can the present study assist SANParks to design sound policy 
guidelines that can meet both its conservation and rural development goals? In order to 
answer this question, I examine relationships between biodiversity conservation, PAs 
and rural development in the democratic South Africa (Appendix 1). To set the study 
in its widest context, I assimilate and distil narratives of biodiversity loss, economic 
development, and participation by local people in conservation and development 
initiatives, because these are core to the conservation and development paradigm. 
The biggest challenge facing planet earth's most prolific and pan-dominant mammal 
species, Homo sapiens or humans, is to strike a balance between the two contested 
issues of conservation and development. Efforts to link conservation to development 
globally range from broad environmental movements, such as the Earth Summit and 
the World Parks Congress (WPC), to specific instruments such as the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, and various other international treaties. The global solution to 
this dilemma is illusive, and remains a daunting task for the new millennium. Equally, 
national or local solutions to this dilemma are unclear, and do not provide workable 
models. Therefore, managers of PAs are often tossed between conflicting conservation 
and development narratives. Since one or more combinations of narratives inform 
conservation and development initiatives, a good understanding of narratives and their 
underlying assumptions is important. 
The nub of this introductory overview is that curbing biodiversity loss, or at least 
maintaining current levels of biodiversity, is the central issue to linking PAs with both 
economic development and local people. As with all overviews, the big picture is the 
key focus here because details are in specialised literature. 
Accordingly, this overview is structured as follows: 
• Section 1.1 sets the stage for the overview; 
• Section 1.2 provides a brief account of the historical creation of PAs; 
• Section 1.3 outlines obstacles to biodiversity conservation; 
• Section 1.4 highlights the main challenges to biodiversity conservation; and 
• Section 1.5 concludes the overview. 
The remaining chapters of this study are organised to test a tight research hypothesis: 
that some level of ownership influences the attitudes of local people, or the intended 
beneficiaries, to various benefits arising from PAs, and ultimately to achieving long-
term goals of biodiversity conservation. Correspondingly, I review the importance of 
institutions in biodiversity conservation (Chapter 2), because they are often posited as 
incentive and disincentives for conservation. Thereafter, I provide a brief outline of 
South Africa's socio-political history and its current political dispensation as further 
background to the study design; selection of study areas, and general methodologies 
(Chapter 3). In fact, SANParks commissioned this study because of changes in the 
country's political landscape, which in turn strongly influenced the formulation of the 
research hypothesis. 
In the main body of this study, I present and discuss the study results (Chapters 4-6), 
and the extent to which they test the research hypothesis. To broaden the application 
of the study to SANParks, I outline how the post-apartheid political landscape forced 
the national conservation agency to adjust its operational strategies (Chapter 7). Since 
state agencies need legal mandates, I outline the country's environmental law reform 
programme as a background to the proposed policy framework for linking PAs with 
rural development, and thereafter make study recommendations for further various 
actors and conclusions (Chapter 8). 
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1.1.1. Biodiversity as top priority 
Biodiversity is the sum totals of all living things on earth, taking into account all their 
variation in structure, function, and composition (Wilson 1988; Noss 1990; Swingland 
1993; La Riviere 1994). Apart from a few semantic differences (Gaston 1996) and 
differences in breadth (Swanson 1997), this definition expresses variability between 
all living organisms and the variety of ecological complexes in which they occur. This 
variation occurs at the genetic, species and ecosystems levels (Gaston & Spicer 1998; 
Kamppinen & Walls 1999). Given its elasticity, ecologists of different persuasions limit 
the application of the concept to fit their own narrow disciplines. Similarly, many 
conservation ecologists describe biodiversity within the productivity of undisturbed 
natural processes and often have little, or no, interest in agricultural diversity. In this 
overview, biodiversity is defined and discussed within the controversial context of 
natural landscapes. 
Considerable debate continues on how biodiversity should be conserved. However, the 
main debate for its future conservation is: who appropriates it; how is it appropriated; 
and how does its appropriation affect others and the resources in question? This is 
because biodiversity loss is driven by human-induced activities such as habitat loss, 
invasive alien species, and overexploitation of high value species. In fact, biodiversity 
loss is the key motivation behind many conservation efforts (Frankel & SouIe 1981). It 
is often portrayed as a 'crisis discipline' (Soule 1985) that urges some ecologists to 
use emotive rhetoric in defence of biodiversity conservation, believing that such 
utterances will inspire others to join in their cause (Soule 1987). In support of this 
position, the world's biodiversity is now more at risk than at any time since the 
extinction of the dinosaurs 65 million years ago (Wilson & Peter 1988). 
Humans are precipitating an event that may rival the Big Five mass extinctions of the 
geological past (Balmford et al. 1998). Accordingly, biodiversity loss is the dialectic 
of catastrophe. Based on this dialectic, things are so bad that the solution must be at 
hand, and be absolute (Myerson & Rydin 1996), otherwise species-rich habitats will 
be destroyed (Pimm & Raven 2000). The unprecedented biodiversity loss is presented 
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as a battle, but at times there is non-census on whether the crisis really exists. Some 
scientists argue that, unless we act, posterity will be helpless to do so (Frankel & 
Soule 1981). Others argue that unless we hurry to acquire knowledge on which a wise 
policy of conservation and development can be based for centuries to come (Myers 
1988, Wilson 1988; Western 1989), the battle is lost (Ehrlich 1988) and the ark is 
sinking (Myers 1979; McNeely 1992). Some believe that it is in our hands to save our 
one earth at the time when much of it is on the brink of terminal threat (Myers 1994). 
The impression given is that if the earth is about to break, we must respond to this 
biodepletion crisis (Myerson & Rydin 1996). Although this crisis is well articulated, 
there is no consensus on how we should act, and this causes tension and conflict. 
It is generally accepted that biodiversity per se is a good thing; that its loss is bad, and 
therefore that something must be done to maintain it (Gaston 1996). In fact, unless 
humanity is suicidal, it should want to preserve, at the minimum, the key natural life 
support systems and processes required to sustain our own existence (Daily 1997). As 
a result, biodiversity can be construed as a 'buzzword', a 'bandwagon', a global 
resource, a political slogan, or a story of a construction of a social problem (Gaston 
1996; McNeely 1998; Haila 1999). Consequently, the agenda, disguised or blatant, is 
that biodiversity conservation should assume top priority while development paths 
based on massive land conversions should receive less priority (Magome 2000). 
The paradox is that, while improving and maintaining human life is the key motive 
behind most development efforts, achieving this requires biodiversity conservation. In 
practice, biodiversity conservation is a strategy of limitation of resource use against 
ongoing human population increases (Bell 1987; Swingland 1998). Failure to integrate 
biodiversity conservation with development is mostly associated with uncertainty over 
achieving biodiversity goals in the face of achieving development goals. In many 
contexts development goals assume that modernisation should be replicated globally 
(Swanson 1997, 1999). However, development is often framed within narrow views of 
what is the desired outcome of project d~sign. Modernisation is often seen as a threat 
to both nature and 'traditional' lives of rural people, and it is driven by texts ranging 
from humanitarian tracts to national development plans (Adams & Hulme 2001 a). 
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1.1.2. Paradigm shift 
In his classic book The structure o/scientific revolutions, Thomas Kuhn (1962) noted 
that as understanding in a field is advanced, a point is reached where existing theory is 
inadequate to explain reality, and this calls for a paradigm shift. A paradigm is the 
worldview shared by a discipline (Kuhn 1972). However, a discipline is not a logical 
construct. Instead, it is a social crystallization that occurs when a group of people 
agree that association and discourse serve their interests (Soule 1986). Therefore, a 
paradigm is a set of theories that undetpin a discipline (Pickett et al. 1992); underlie 
the approach taken to a discipline, its basic assumptions; and, guide the practitioners 
ofthat discipline (Meffe & Carroll 1994; Bennett 1999). 
Similarly, when presented as a theory of doom, biodiversity loss failed to garner the 
public support required to reduce its loss, and this precipitated a shift to alternative 
theories/narratives such as 'environmental economics', 'ecotourism' and 'participation 
by local people'. As opposed to the theory of doom, the attraction of the new theories 
or narratives is their positive image rather than their accuracy. These narratives are 
derivatives because they rely heavily for most of their approach, content, and objective 
on the primary narrative of biodiversity loss. Nevertheless, secondary derivatives are 
often understood pejoratively as inferior and, therefore, not fully original. However, 
these secondary narratives are as durable as the primary narrative they serve. 
1.2. Evolution of the protected area paradigm 
The history of establishing PAs is well documented (Nash 1972; Runte 1979; Scherer 
& Attig 1983; Dixon & Sherman 1990; Beinart & Coates 1995). Briefly, protecting 
pieces of land for exclusive recreational and or cultural use by certain sectors of our 
society is as old as civilisation itself. Reserves for hunting were put aside for Assyrian 
noblemen as far back as 700 B.C., and for the ruling class in ancient Rome and also in 
Medieval Europe. In contrast, the practice of setting aside natural areas for the public 
good in order to protect resources they contain took off in the 20
th 
century. Today, 
PAs have become a major environmental movement that continues to redefine itself. 
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PAs are predominantly natural areas that are established, and managed through legal 
and other effective means for conserving biodiversity and cultural resources (see 
IUCN 1994). This broad definition is sufficient to cover a spectrum of categories from 
strict preservation, solely for nature conservation, to various combinations of multiple 
use areas (IUCN 1994; O'ConneIJ 1996). The importance of PAs in conserving 
biodiversity cannot be over-emphasised. However, that they represent the single most 
important method of conserving biodiversity (Wells 1992) is greatly exaggerating the 
facts. Many of the existing PAs were originally established for aesthetic, political and 
socio-economic reasons, and thus received little or no scientific input in their design 
(Leader-Williams et al. 1990; Pressey 1994). Some of the world's biologically rich 
areas are either still unprotected or inadequately protected, and the level of protection 
for existing PAs varies widely from site to site (Rodrigues et al. 2003) while many 
threatened species remain outside PAs (Rodrigues et al. 2004). 
It is an accepted narrative that the first national park (NP) to have been declared is 
Yellowstone (1872), although Yosemite NP (1864) was the first to be established. The 
difference between Yosemite and Yellowstone could have been that the former was 
first established as a 'Park' for the state of California, while the latter was, from the 
onset, established as a NP because at the time no state existed in the Yellowstone 
region (Jeffrey 1999). These two NPs were set aside for their exceeding scenic beauty 
and not for their biodiversity value. They therefore epitomised monumental ism as 
opposed to environmentalism, and were proclaimed to prevent private exploitation and 
to keep them for public recreation (Runte 1979). In fact, the US government wanted to 
avoid mistakes that led to uncontrolled development of the Niagara Falls, of which its 
scenic beauty had been destroyed, subjecting the government to severe criticism (Huth 
1972; Runte 1979; Coates 1992). 
Closer inspection of the US NP legislation unravels the evolution of the so-called NP 
concept. With Yosemite, the NP legislation (1864) stated that: the park premises shall 
be held for public use, resort and recreation; and, shall be inalienable for all time, but 
leases not exceeding ten years may be granted for portions of its premises. However, 
with Yellowstone, the US NP legislation (1872) became stricter than Yosemite stating 
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that, with underlines for emphasis: 
The park is reserved and withdrawn from settlement, occupancy, or sale under the 
laws of the United States, and dedicated and set apart as a public park or 
pleasuring-ground for the benefit of the people and all persons who shall locate 
and settle upon or occupy the same. or any part thereof. except hereinafter 
provided. shall be considered trespassers and removed therefrom. 
The exclusion of people from Yellowstone could be the reason why it is often referred 
to as the first NP. However, Yellowstone was established in an area formerly occupied 
by, and already emptied of, Shoshone, Crow and Blackfoot Indians (Kemf 1993). The 
key element of the new NP was that no people, except for park staff, were allowed to 
live permanently inside, and this led to the removal of the few remaining indigenous 
people. The US model of an ideal NP allowing no human settlement grew steadily, 
and there are now many NPs globally that are modelled after Yellowstone, mostly 
within IUCN's Category II (see Table 1.1). In contrast to the US, formal conservation 
efforts by colonists in Africa began at the tum of the 20th century in response to 
declining large mammals due to 'big game hunting' and these efforts increased after 
World War II (Cumming 1993). In colonised countries, some threatened animals were 
declared 'royal game' or 'protected species' that could not be easily killed and certain 
lands were proclaimed as game reserves (McCracken 1987; Owen-Smith 1993). As 
momentum to create more game reserves increased, the residence of Africans in these 
areas, except for employees, was regarded as incompatible with nature conservation. 
The NP idea as we know it today did not emerge in its finished form; it evolved over 
time (Runte 1979). Thus, as the perceptions of people about the environment changed, 
gradually NPs became important for other purposes other than recreation, including 
scientific research, wilderness preservation and also biodiversity conservation. After 
World War II, NPs became national icons. When the IUCN (formerly the International 
Union for the Conservation Nature, now the World Conservation Union) was created 
in 1948, it came to be regarded as the world authority on nature conservation. As a 
result, many countries adopted the IUCN's 1974 definition of a NP, which is: 
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A relatively large area that is not materially altered by human exploitation and 
occupation, and where the highest competent authority of the country has taken 
steps to enforce aesthetic features which have led to its establishment, and where 
visitors are allowed to enter, under special conditions, for inspirational, cultural 
and recreational purposes. 
To accommodate different forms of nature protection, NPs form part of a broad array 
of PA categories, ranging from strictly protected NPs to watersheds, forests and other 
recreational mUltiple use areas (IUCN 1994, Appendix 2). To ensure common goals, 
three management goals are central to the creation of PAs (IUCN 1980). The first is to 
maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems such as soil, water, 
and the atmosphere. The second is to maintain representative biotic communities and 
genetic diversity. The third is to ensure sustainable use of species and ecosystems. As 
a result, these three goals are efforts to maintain human livelihoods. However, in many 
developing countries, PAs have been created on the model that was first pioneered at 
Yellowstone, leading to a strong protectionism that started to guide the management 
actions and strategies of PAs (Pimbert & Pretty 1995). As a result, a strong perception 
that people are incompatible with unregulated use nature begun to symbolise and to 
inform the creation of many PAs. 
The world's network of PAs is growing fast, indicating that there is worldwide support 
for protecting pieces of land (Table 1.1). For example, coverage for PAs has increased 
from 30,000 (Davey 1998), extending over 13.3 million km2 or about 10% of the 
earth's land surface (WCMC 2000, UNEP 2000), to 102,000 covering 18.8 million 
km2 or 12%, which represents an area slightly larger than China and India combined 
(IUCN 2003). While some 1,500 delegates attended the 1992 WPC in Caracas, 
Venezuela, 3,000 attended the 2003 WPC in Durban. The 'achievement' of 12% was 
welcomed with euphoria, and when Madagascar announced that it has decided to 
increase its PA coverage to 10%, the jubilation boarded on religious absurdity - akin 
to welcoming a new convert! However, increasing benefits beyond the boundaries of 
PAs to local people remains a daunting task because there are still multiple obstacles 
and challenges to overcome (Hutton & Leader-Williams 2003; Magome 2003a). 
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Table 1.1. Global number and extent of Protected Areas (PAs). 
Area covered In Proportion of total 
CateS°!l Number of sites % of all PAs kmz area covered % 
la 4,731 4.6 1,033,888 5.5 
Ib 1,302 1.3 1,015,512 5.4 
II 3,881 3.8 4,413,142 23.6 
III 19,833 19.4 275,432 1.5 
IV 27,641 27.1 3,022,515 16.1 
V 6,555 6.4 1,056,880 5.6 
VI 4,123 4.0 4,377,091 23.3 
Uncategorised 34,036 33.4 3,569,820 19.0 
Total 102,102 100% 18,763,407 19.0 
Source: IUCN (2003). 
1.3. Obstacles to biodiversity conservation 
Biodiversity conservation is largely based on the principles of ecology, sociology and 
economics, which are each exceedingly complex and often poorly understood by the 
general public (Bell 1984a-b). Furthennore, ecology, sociology and economics have, 
for a long time, operated as distinct disciplines. It is now accepted that our 
understanding of nature is infonned by science and society (Adams 1996). Thus, 
integrating ecology, sociology and economics into a single coherent discipline, is long 
overdue. However, reversing biodiversity loss requires changing patterns of human 
activity or moderating its impact on the environment (O'Connell 1996). Biodiversity 
conservation is not about trying to stop human impact on the environment, but is about 
negotiating impact, and this requires compromise or consensus (Adams 1996). 
The challenge facing policy makers is how to change or influence patterns of human 
behaviour that impact negatively on the environment. However, this is a daunting task 
as human behaviour is often characterised by complexity and resistance to change. To 
highlight this challenge, I will now unpack three key dilemmas facing biodiversity 
conservation, as most efforts to conserve biodiversity are affected by combinations of 
these managerial dilemmas. 
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1.3.1. Ecological dilemmas 
Human activities are at the core of ecological dilemmas facing PAs and, ultimately, 
biodiversity conservation. Humans are, and will continue to be, a part of both natural 
and degraded ecological systems, and their presence must be included in biodiversity 
conservation planning (Meffe & Carroll 1994). Biodiversity conservation efforts that 
attempt to exclude the human influence on ecosystems will ultimately fail to achieve 
desired outcomes. By analysing constraints on PAs, and by understanding ecosystem 
functioning, we can start to focus on priority areas. Indeed, many PAs are constrained 
by ecological dilemmas (Cumming 1993) because many species and habitats are not 
represented in the current network of PAs (Rodrigues et al. 2003, 2004). Incomplete 
ecosystems are a feature of many PAs. In fact, many PAs are too small to maintain 
unmanaged populations of many large mammals (Owen-Smith 1983), raising concerns 
of effective population sizes because fragmentation tends to reduce genetic diversity. 
In practice, PAs tend to be established in places that are not affected by threats to 
biodiversity loss (Leader-Williams et al. 1990; Pressey 1994). Effective biodiversity 
conservation efforts will require that priority for the protection of individual areas is 
based both on the contribution the area can make to representing overall biodiversity, 
and on the degree to which the area, in the absence of action, is vulnerable to loss of 
its biodiversity (Noss 1990; Faith & Walker 1996). This is important, given the fact 
that PAs are often small and widely scattered, and will not avoid future ecological 
haemorrhage when overtaken by a sea of humanity. While ecological criteria for 
effective biodiversity protection are well documented (Shafer 1990; Meffe & Carroll 
1994; Pimm & Lawton 1998), cultural, political and economic factors often determine 
where PAs will finally be located (Soule & Simberloff 1994; Soule & Sanjayan 1998). 
Ecological design dilemmas are, all over the world, central to reaching biodiversity 
conservation objectives. This difficulty led Ehrlich (1988) to conclude that the tactical 
success of the conservation movement can be appropriately evaluated against a 
backdrop of total and continuing disaster. Indeed, the knowledge of ecologists on 
many questions relating to effective biodiversity conservation is insufficient and in 
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some situations even lacking (Pimm & Gittleman 1992; Wilson 1992). Although there 
is concern about possible negative effects of human activities on biodiversity, there is 
often little quantitative evidence of postulated negative consequences of development 
(Solbrig et al. 1994). Therefore, there will be a time lag as data are analysed and 
before scientists know how ecological ecosystems function when their components are 
eliminated, whether as rivets popping from an aeroplane (Ehrlich 1988) or one by one 
(Roughgarden 1995). In the meantime, ecologists may have to act with incomplete 
data, while learning appropriate techniques along the way using adaptive management 
models. These data gaps make the process of policy-making, and of changing human 
activity even, more difficult. Correspondingly, placing emphasis on extensive studies 
in order to conserve biodiversity is equally risky. 
Ecosystems themselves often fail to signal the long-term consequences of losing their 
resilience, continuing to function in the short-term as resilience declines (Holling et al. 
1998). While ecologists contend that reliable knowledge is the only basis for sound 
decision-making, most admit that they have inadequate data about natural life cycles, 
relationships between ecosystem components, and the impact of various management 
regimes on biodiversity (McNeely 1996; Holling et al. 1998). Indeed, as summarised 
by Holling & Gunderson (2002:27): 
Ecosystems are moving targets, with multiple features that are uncertain and 
unpredictable. Therefore, management has to be flexible, adaptive, and 
experimental at scales compatible with the scales of critical ecosystem functions. 
In terms of global perspective, the IUCN does not specify how much biodiversity 
should be protected or how many PAs are required to achieve the desired levels apart 
from the now surpassed, historic 10% target of each country's surface area. Most 
countries assume that the more PAs they have the better, and this results in selective 
application of the IUCN criteria (Bell 1987). In practice, the global protection of 
biodiversity will depend on balancing ideal and real options (Leader-Williams et al. 
1990). Consequently, the ideal recommended percentage coverage of each country's 
surface area may become de facto ceilings of protection, implying these figures will 
prevent extinction (Soule & Sanjayan 1998). 
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In theory, large PAs make ecological sense by reducing extinction risks but, in 
practice, developing countries lack resources to protect valuable species from illegal 
exploitation (Leader-Williams & Albon 1988). Unless PAs occupy nearly the entire 
globe, there is little chance that they will adequately protect global biodiversity. There 
is, therefore, a worldwide crisis in biodiversity conservation (Holling et al. 1998). As 
a result, the world's species continue to face unprecedented levels of extinction caused 
by human fragmentation of ecosystems and habitat destruction. Currently, the number 
of species threatened with extinction (Hilton-Taylor 2000) far outstrips the financial 
resources available for conservation (Balmford et al. 2002), and this places a huge 
premium on identifying areas with the highest concentrations of endemic species. 
Prioritising those ecosystems with high need and large potential payoff from resources 
to safeguard their integrity can allow scientists to engage in systematic responses to 
large-scale extinctions (Myers et al. 2000). In practice, ecologists lose a sense of the 
big picture in their effort to understand parts of the system. However, 'biodiversity 
hotspots' should not 'trap' scientists into neglecting areas that are already protected by 
assuming that they are less important. Hence, Gunderson & Holling (2002) argue that 
an integrative theory must be developed so that we can understand the changes 
occurring globally. They point out that such changes are economic, ecological, social, 
and evolutionary. Correspondingly, the management of ecosystems must be dynamic, 
flexible, and adaptive to deal with such complex and interacting systems. 
1.3.2. Social and political dilemmas 
The social and political dilemmas facing biodiversity loss were long recognised by 
Aldo Leopold (1949) when he stated that, despite nearly a century of propaganda, 
. &&:orts sll'p two steps backward for each forward stride, with progress 
conservation eu' 
., I ely of letterhead pieties and convention oratory. These dilemmas arise 
conslstmg arg 
b th two P
illars of biodiversity conservation-altruism and posterity-are 
ecause e 
h d
· ed puzzles that do not fit with reality (Hardin 1977). Where biodiversity 
uman- eVls 
. . concerned there is a discrepancy bordering on the absurd because 
conservatIOn IS , 
words rarely match deeds (Martin 1984a). 
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Biodiversity conservation has serious implications for how people use land, a highly 
limited and finite resource, attracting potentially large opportunity costs (Swanson 
1994). Furthermore, the increasing human population, with its consequent need for 
more land, makes conflict inevitable. Biodiversity conservation is a long-term strategy 
that conflicts with short-term human interests, a clash of bio-economic theory. In 
practice, any programme that emphasises long-term communal benefits at the expense 
of short-term individual benefits usually faces resistance (Bell 1984a; 1987; Mentis 
1989). Biodiversity conservation holds the appeal of altruism I, that individuals must 
constrain their actions, to their own immediate detriment, for their later benefits, or for 
the benefits of posterity (Bell 1987; Mentis 1989; Pearce et al. 1990). However, many 
contemporary values, attitudes, and institutions militate against altruism (Caldwell 
1990; Miller 1992). In fact, the greatest honour is often accorded to demagogues who 
derive their power by appealing to the selfish interests of individuals (Hardin 1993). 
Human beings are, by nature, selfish and tend to have a high propensity for material 
consumption. However, this consumption is biased to developed countries, where one 
individual is estimated to consume an equivalent of 40 individuals in less developed 
countries (WCN 1980). It is generally accepted that 20% of the world's population 
consumes 80% of the world's resources and yet there is no sign of this imbalance 
being redressed (Barkham 1996; Daily & Ehrlich 1996). Ironically, the human desire 
for profit and for material consumption is stronger than the biodiversity conservation-
oriented philosophy of restrained use (Mentis 1989; Leader-Williams et a/.1990; 
Brubaker 1995; Barkham 1996; McNeely 1996). Indeed, the acquisition of material 
resources is given the utmost prominence in capitalist human societies. Accordingly, 
the pressure to acquire more and more material resources has never been greater, and 
marketing to achieve this has never been more powerful (Barkham 1996). Sadly, only 
a few people are making substantial profits from overexploiting biological resources, 
and those with the highest political profile seem to generate the largest profits than 
those without (Brubaker 1995; McNeely 1996). Consequently, the call to alter human 
patterns of consumption is seldom heeded because of selfish greed. 
I Altruism is not universally practiced and spontaneous conservation demands from the individual 
altruism against which his Darwinian heritage rebels. 
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The loss of biodiversity has not yet had immediately observable negative impact on 
lifestyles, especially of those people living in cities far removed from biological 
resources that support their consumption. In fact, many people argue that advocating 
for biodiversity conservation need not involve them making immediate changes to 
their own personal lifestyles (Brennan 1996). If indeed hundreds of species are lost 
daily, then people are already living with the consequences of extinction without any 
discernible effect on their daily lives (McNeely 1996). Only a small fraction of the 
world community is aware of the importance of biodiversity and most people do not 
realise that the functioning of local ecosystems contribute to the overall biosphere 
functioning (Alders 1994; McNeely 1996). Therefore, when conservationists argue 
that efforts to conserve endangered species deserve especially high priority, they often 
have difficulty linking their argument to development issues that are of interest to 
politicians (McNeely 1996; Kamppinen & Walls et al.1999). 
Population and economic development pressures virtually ensure that natural areas 
will be exploited at ever increasing rates (Alders 1994). Most governments, driven by 
the need to create jobs or some undefined public good, are often the least responsible 
stewards of biodiversity resources. Governments of all political persuasions have 
licensed and bankrolled polluters, turned forests into wastelands, emptied oceans of 
fish, and dammed rivers that were once magnificent (Brubaker 1995). In fact, the 
amount of money spent by many governments on perverse subsidies that ultimately 
lead to environmentally destructive activities amount to US$2 trillion, and this trend is 
still continuing (Myers & Kent 2001). 
As governments are pressured to please their citizens, policy-making on biodiversity 
renders scientific knowledge open to re-interpretation and selective use for political 
purposes (Holland 1996). Equally, citizens want politicians to deliver benefits and not 
constraints (McNeely 1996). Indeed, when it comes to policy-making for biodiversity, 
various policy actors use scientific facts in differing ways (Holland 1996; Peuhkuri & 
. Ka· & W lIs 1999) Thus keeping biodiversity conservation on 
Jokinen 1999; mppmen a ., 
. J·ncentives to use far exceed incentives to 
the public agenda is not easy, smce 
conserve, again a clash of interests. 
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Most developing countries of the South are financially indebted to the developed 
countries of the North. The average African country has an external debt greater than 
100% of its GNP (Gross National Product), inevitably leading to unsustainable use of 
many biodiversity resources for both direct consumption and for generating cash 
(Barkham 1996). In addition to servicing debts, most African countries give priority to 
their urban populace. Thus, development efforts are concentrated on infrastructure and 
on highly visible projects that yield quick results and which, therefore, win them 
immediate support from urban taxpayers (Areola 1987). In this context, biodiversity 
conservation measures, other than establishing PAs for the supposed common good, 
lack immediate political appeal or utility. 
1.3.3. Funding dilemmas 
Inadequate funding for PAs is well documented (see Bell 1984a; Leader-Williams & 
Albon 1988; WRI 1989; Leader-Williams et al.1990; Cumming 1993; McNeely 1996; 
Jachmann & Billiouw 1997; Phillips 1998; James et al.1999; Balmford et al. 2002). In 
fact, many PAs exist on paper rather than on the ground, and most face threats of 
poaching, encroachment and over-exploitation. In sub-Saharan Africa, the financial 
situation is particularly bad. Insufficient funds are often channelled into biodiversity 
conservation and, where sufficient funds are provided, they always tend to be spent 
ineffectively. Contrast this with US agencies that spent $37.5 million in 1987 on 
biodiversity research, and increased it to US$63 million in 1989 while Africa and Asia 
together received less than US17 million (Abramovitz 1991). This is because many 
developing countries expect PAs to pay their own way, but this is often difficult to 
achieve (McNeely 1994). Furthermore, taxpayers regard PAs as public resources and 
are generally reluctant to pay high user fees (Boo 1990; Leclerc 1994). 
The scope of unmet funding for biodiversity conservation is often difficult to estimate 
or to predict. In 1989, it was estimated that as much as US$20-50 billion would be 
required to fund PAs globally for the period 1990-2000 (WRI 1989). Sadly, most of 
this funding has not been realised (Balmford et al. 2002). Instead, parochialism or 
idiosyncratic protection characterises the attitudes of most agencies where relatively 
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large sums of money are allocated to species that are locally rare, while in poorer 
nations species threatened with global extinction receive far less funding (Hunter & 
Hutchinson 1994; McNeely 1998; Stuart 1999). In fact, while many NGOs generate 
substantial funding from developed countries, ostensibly to assist species conservation 
efforts of developing countries, most of the funding covers their running costs. 
The full benefits of PAs are unquantifiable and are seldom recognised, making their 
benefits less apparent to policy-makers. Many of the benefits of PAs are not recorded, 
and hence the distribution of their benefits is insufficiently addressed (McNeely 1994; 
Constanza & Folke 1997). Funding for PAs in many developing countries has fallen 
sharply (Davey 1998), resulting in shortages of staff, vehicle, fuel, and other basic 
expenses (James et al.1999; Wilkie et al. 2001), risking both biodiversity and benefits 
that PAs provide to local and global communities (Balmford et al. 2002). Although it 
is estimated that about US$I.1 billion per year is required to cover basic expenses for 
all PAs in developing countries and countries with economies in transition (Balmford 
et al. 2002), and that US$12-13 billion per year will be required over the next decade 
to manage and expand PAs (Bruner et aZ. 2003), so far neither sum is being realised. 
1.4. Challenges to biodiversity conservation 
The theme of People and Parks chosen by the 4th WPC in Caracas in 1992 was 
dominated by two questions. Firstly, how can PAs contribute sustainably to economic 
welfare, without detracting from their natural values? Secondly, how can local people 
adjacent to PAs be provided with benefits so that they become supporters of PAs? 
Recognising that, as part of their economic development, PAs can provide multiple 
benefits to society, the 5th WPC held in Durban 2003, re-affirmed this with its theme 
of Benefits Beyond Boundaries. In this section, I use the narratives of sustainable use, 
economics, ecotourism, and community participation to show why they are often used 
as solutions to conservation and development problems. The reason is because 
narratives help policy-makers and practitioners to confidently fill the gap between 
ignorance and expediency (Fairhead & Leach 1997). Are these narratives still valid, or 
is it time for counter-narratives? 
16 
1.4.1. Sustainable use and economics 
Humanity lives on a finite planet with limited resources, and this alone imposes limits 
on how natural resources can be used. As a result, sustainability of human activities is 
a major concern because natural resources are decreasing, while the human population 
is showing an opposite trend. Concern with sustainability is justified, and narratives of 
biodiversity conservation are attempts to achieve sustainability of resource use. In this 
context, I only highlight challenges facing the sustainable use narrative because details 
are implied in this chapter. 
When Caring for the Earth was published in 1991 as a global strategy for sustainable 
living, Robinson (1993) raised two contentions: 1) that a sustainable society as defined 
in Caringfor the Earth is an unattainable utopia because its stated goals and principles 
are incompatible with one another; and 2) that the goals of both sustainable use and 
development, as defined in Caring for the Earth, will lead inevitably lead to the loss 
of biodiversity. Part of the problem is that the sustainability is all things to all people 
(Mearns 1993). While these contentions are logical, they are considered unhelpful to 
achieving the goals of either sustainable use or of maintaining biodiversity (Holdgate 
& Munro 1993). Sustainability is not properly monitored (Rasker & Freese 1995), and 
overuse threatens indigenous species (Hilton-Taylor 2000). Sustainable use is usually 
underpinned by different theoretical and practical views (Leader-Williams 2002), and 
its implementation is a highly contested (Magome & Fabricius 2004). 
Sustainable development is now a focal concept of development theory and practices 
(Moyo et al. 1993), and has become a prominent discourse in development language 
(Adams 2002). Since sustainable development has different things to different actors, 
it has become a collision of incompatible concepts. Indeed, sustainable development 
has become an oxymoron, representing a reality that has never existed and is beyond 
our capacity to create (Sinclair-Brown 2003). Using biodiversity is an imperative for 
humanity (Hutton & Leader-Williams 2003). Thus, regulating use requires incentive-
driven conservation approach ('t Sas-Rolfes 1995; Murphree 2003; Hutton & Leader-
Williams 2003). Inevitably, incentive driven conservation is about economics. 
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Economists view the earth as a storehouse of raw material resources (Caldwell 1990), 
with people as rational economic creatures, Homo economicus. Empirical evidence 
shows that the economic benefits of most PAs are limited at a local scale, increase 
somewhat at national level, but become substantial at a global scale, while their costs 
move in the opposite direction (Wells 1992; Moran 1994; Brown 1998). It follows that 
developed countries fill their consumption at the expense of developing countries, 
leading to greatly mismatched costs and benefits. However, the process of evaluating 
the contribution of biodiversity to human welfare is a complex task that also involves 
values, ethics and politics. Indeed, costs and benefits, including differences between 
commodity and moral value, are complex issues (Munasinghe & McNeely 1994). 
It is questionable how complex resources such as biodiversity can be captured by cost-
benefit analysis (Pearce 1993; Roughgarden 1995; Brennan 1996). As a result, it is 
necessary to contrast what is financially beneficial to private individuals and to society 
as a whole, and the latter judgement is a political decision. Thus, not all policy issues 
are purely economic, and certainly not all questions of value are economic (Brennan 
1996). Many decisions take place within the realm of environmental ethics, which by 
its very nature consists of competing sets of theories about whether human actions and 
attitudes to nature are morally right or wrong (Comstock 1996). When ethical values 
are too conflicting, compromises are difficult to reach. 
C02 emissions provide an excellent example that suggests that developing countries 
act as global pollution sinks. In 1993, the US and Europe contributed 32% and 44%, 
respectively, to global atmospheric pollution while Africa contributed only 2%. In 
fact, most of the economic development of the North has been partly achieved at the 
expense of unconsidered environmental costs. While economists maintain that funding 
for biodiversity should be based on the principle that "those who benefit from 
biological resources should pay more for the costs of insuring that such resources are 
d . bl" (AbramoVl'tz 1991'30) reality shows otherwise. It is unrealistic and use sustama y . , 
disingenuous to imagine that countries that have not been the beneficiaries of this 
growth will readily accept curtailment of their own prospects of development by a 
similar route without substantial support (Barkham 1996). 
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Based on C02 emissions, developed countries have already used up the ability of the 
atmosphere to absorb C02, thereby foreclosing all future industrial options for the 
developing countries (Daily 1997). For example, the US is the leading source of fossil 
fuel emissions (Harvey 2000). Unlike developing countries, developed countries can 
easily switch to other energy-efficient means of production, and can even benefit from 
the change by realising more jobs, thus becoming the beneficiary of improved energy 
measures (Renner 2000). However, fossils fuels are abundant and will likely dominate 
energy markets through the 21 st century (Taylor & Van Doren 2000). In fact, controls 
over fossil fuels are the main causes of war in the Middle East. 
Considered as a single product, biodiversity cannot be sold because consumers only 
wish to buy some of its components. To put a cost on something that is not already 
traded is very difficult. Thus, biodiversity resources are consumed wastefully, and 
wi1lingness to pay (WfP) techniques cannot accurately measure the importance that 
people attach to these resources. The major problem with these numbers is that their 
accuracy is more akin to that of World War II bombers than to that of precision-guided 
missiles (The Economist, 3 December 1994:106). If WTP was the basis for securing 
essential goods, there would be a total economic disaster because the manufacturing 
industries would fail to recoup even the bare minimum of production costs. In the case 
of high value biodiversity resources, WTP is further masked by perverse government 
subsidies and by conflicting pricing structures (Myers & Kent 2001). 
The consequentialist basis of economics limits its general usefulness in contributing to 
informed biodiversity decisions. In fact, no description can totally capture the essence 
of biodiversity and no formula will demonstrate its true value (Holland 1996). Generic 
balance sheets showing the economic value of individual ecosystem services and the 
cost of replacing them are valuable, but they lack connection to the lives of real people 
(Wilcox & Harte 1997). The major limitation of economics is its inability to put real 
monetary value on a1l components of biodiversity. In 1855, Chief Seattle (in Benton & 
Short 2000: 12) is said to have asked: "how can one buy or se1l the air, the wannth of 
the land?" Despite these limitations, economics is often presented as a narrative that 
can best mitigate these skewed imbalances. 
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1.4.2. Ecotourism 
Ecotourism is a complex phenomenon that cannot be easily defined (Goodwin 1996; 
Roe et al. 1997; Goodwin et al. 1998), but as a concept it is associated with nature 
tourism. The distinction between urban tourism, for example, the motivation to see the 
concrete jungles of London or New York, and nature tourism does exist in the 
decisions of most tourists. It is, however, difficult to make a clear distinction between 
urban and nature tourism because the tourist often combines both activities in a single 
trip. While many scholars and practitioners try to argue that there is some distinction 
between general tourism and ecotourism, they invariably use terms interchangeably 
with little implied difference between them. 
The term 'ecotourism' was coined to describe prescriptive activities. Its narrative is 
that the primary purpose of a tourist is to interact with nature while also minimising 
negative impacts and benefiting local people. It suggests that the ecotourist visits 
relatively undeveloped areas in the spirit of appreciation and sensitivity by practising 
non-consumptive use of biodiversity resources while contributing to the visited area 
through labour or financial means in order to directly benefit the conservation area and 
the economic well-being of local residents (see Ziffer 1989). In reality, this altruistic 
and benevolent tourist does not exist. For instance, a study of 23 PAs with projects 
designed to generate local economic development found that, while many projects 
promoted ecotourism, few generated substantial benefits for either PAs or local people 
(Wells & Brandon 1992). Thus, promoting ecotourism on the pretext that it benefits 
nature and local people is disingenuous (King & Stewart 1996). 
The ecotourism industry focuses on flowing money to service providers, and has since 
become a fiercely competitive business. Planners of the ecotourism industry are now 
forced to recognise the importance of earning money. Despite the strength of the 
tourist demand and the constant desire for new and exotic experiences, individual 
destinations must compete as never before for the fickle, often seasonal interest of 
tourists (Richter 1992; Ceballos-Lascurain 1996; Honey 1999). Thus, without binding 
guidelines for the industry it is difficult for local people to benefit from ecotourism. 
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So far, developed countries capture most of the benefits that are associated with the 
ecotourism industry. A particular concern is the high leakage in the industry, and in 
some cases, leakage is as high as 90% (Koch 1997; Gossling 1999). The major cause 
of high leakage is that, at the national level, the potential for the ecotourism industry 
in developing countries is often crippled by lack of infrastructure (Goodwin et a/. 
1998). Hence, the control of the industry lies in the hands of foreign companies. The 
industry is a multi-layered maze that is dominated by international corporations that 
are also becoming increasingly consolidated (Honey 1999). The fact is that developing 
countries cannot easily control what they do not own, nor can they own what they do 
not control. For instance, most of the high income generating industries such as hotels, 
car rentals and airlines, are owned and operated by multinational companies. The 
destination region relies upon these companies to sell their products. 
Ecotourism has been hailed as a panacea for funding biodiversity conservation, but a 
closer look shows a much more complex reality than the rhetoric. Worldwide, most 
PAs face destructive activities of tourists, suggesting that the economic benefits of 
ecotourism are inflated, while its ecological costs are either ignored or minimised 
(Alderman 1994). Some of the negative impacts of ecotourism include: overcrowding 
leading to environmental stress; animals showing changes in behaviour; erosion of 
trails or beaches; increased pollution such as noise and litter, and; over-development 
with unsightly structures (Roe et a/. 1997). Ecotourism is usually lined with pitfalls 
and it is not a panacea. 
Ecotourism also contributes to biodiversity loss through infrastructure development. In 
many coastal areas, a golf course, a marina and a sandy beach are regarded as having 
greater value than mangroves and wetlands (HaIl 2000). Unavoidably, ecotourism is a 
choice between the good of money brought in by the tourist, and the bad of undesired 
negative environmental and social consequences. Despite the plethora of discussions 
about sustainability in ecotourism, we often seem no closer to finding solutions to the 
problems that are associated with its development. For every ecotourism success, there 
are failures, or recognition of its negative impact on biodiversity (Hall 2000), as well 
as undemonstrated positive attitudes to conservation (Walpole & Goodwin 2001). 
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1.4.3. Local people 
Describing beneficiaries at biodiversity conservation sites is controversial, especially 
when distinctions between indigenous and local people are assumed. Although rural 
people like the San live primitive lifestyles in inhospitable areas and seem to resist 
modern development, the term 'indigenous peoples' is not universally accepted and is 
also problematic (see Burger 1987; Thornberry 1991; Wilmer 1993; Furze et al. 1996; 
Colchester 1997; IUCN 1997). I therefore use the term 'local people' to describe rural 
people who depend on biodiversity resources to sustain their daily lives. While 
biodiversity conservation requires local solutions (Martin 2000), a critical problem in 
relation to local people is the definition of , local ness' (Adams & Hulme 2001). 
Involving local people in conservation uses many acronyms. Recent reviews focused 
on four key: 1) ICDPs, integrated conservation and development projects (Wells & 
Brandon 1992); 2) CBC, community-based conservation (Western & Wright 1994); 3) 
CC, community conservation (Hulme & Murphree 1999,2001), and; 4) community-
based natural resource management, CBNRM (Magome & Fabricius 2004). Involving 
local people in conservation projects has become a popular alternative to exclusionary 
practices of the past (Hackel 1999; Kellert et al. 2000). Attempts to link biodiversity 
conservation to rural development are collectively discussed as conservation and 
development initiatives (CDIs) because they advance a discourse that conservation 
and development can be initiated to mutual advantage (Magome 2000). 
CDIs offer the lure of 'win-win' solutions to the human-wildlife conflict (Infield & 
Adams 1999; Adams & Hulme 2001a) and are usually used as a 'tactic' to convince 
local people about the value of conserving wildlife (Fabricius et al. 2001 a). In extreme 
I I ople are expected to tolerate their conflict with harmful wildlife. These cases, oca pe 
au·on strateaies partly explain why those advancing the discourse on crypto-conserv c' 
CDIs often rush to judge projects on the ground, and, invariably, conclude that results 
. d' that the approach 'does not work' (Adams and Hulme 2001b). In 
are 'mixe or 
. d bate about whether CDIs work or not, depends on a frame of reference 
practIce, any e . 
der which proiects are taking place (Table 1.2). or the context un 'J 
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Table 1.2. Conditions for effective conservation and development initiatives (CDIs). 
Context 
Wildlife resource harvest 
Projects likely to achieve both 
development and conservation 
objectives 
Yields sustainable revenue. 
Sustainability of market for Sustainable 
wildlife resource 
Adequacy of wildlife resource Large enough to secure local 
support for conservation action 
Range of biodiversity on which 
economic benefits depend 
Loss of rights by local people 
Donor investment 
Influence of COl rhetoric on 
conservation agency 
Extent to which expectations 
are met 
Extent to which conservation 
agency shares power with local 
people 
Non-monetary values of nature 
High 
Outweighed by economic benefits 
and/or other incentives 
Long-term 
Ideology and practices of 
conservation agency change 
Project delivers benefits as 
planned 
Genuine power sharing (in terms 
of tenure security in resource 
access and/or revenues and 
decision making) 
Shared by local people 
Source: Adapted from Adams & Hulme (2001b) 
Projects unlikely to achieve 
both developmental and 
conservation objectives 
Does not yield sustainable 
revenue flow 
Not sustainable 
Not large enough to secure 
local support for conservation 
action 
Low 
Not outweighed by economic 
benefits or other incentives 
Short-term 
Ideology and practices of 
conservation agency do not 
change 
Project promises are not 
delivered 
Token power sharing 
Not shared by local people 
CD Is are dynamic, varying greatly over time and space dimensions. They are also 
highly influenced by unexpected events such as socio-economic situations and local 
politics. Hence, evaluations of projects done in 'snapshot' fashion invariably lead to 
wrong conclusions. As concluded by Fabricius et al. (2001a:iv) CDls are: 
Characterised by widely diverging goals and contexts, in terms of their actions, 
their reasons for establishment, control of access, level of community 
participation, type of land and resource tenure, level of community cohesion and 
distinctiveness, extent of donor support, and their revenue-generating potential. It 
is extremely dangerous to extrapolate from one initiative to another. Different role 
players have different end goals, and measure success differently. Government 
officials, communities and private investors have different perceptions about 
scarcity of natural resources, and of human impacts on biodiversity. This lies at 
the root of many of the conflicts observed. 
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CDls are based on the false premise that local people have a greater self interest in 
sustainable use of biodiversity resources than does the state (Brosius et al. 1998), and 
are, as a result, active supporters of conservation efforts (Hackel 1999). The narrative 
of CDls is powerful and convincing. Yet promise and rhetoric represent one reality, 
while implementation and delivery represent quite another (Kellert et al. 2000; Hulme 
& Murphree 2001). Conceptual dilemmas are the bane of CDls because the model on 
which most of them is based is seriously flawed, for three main reasons. 
The first flaw is the dogged belief based on a false assumption that a 'community' of 
homogenous people, all with common interests and purpose, exists and is the best 
mechanism for implementing CDls. In fact, the concept of 'community' is a mirage 
(Andersen 1995). However, it is difficult to dispel of the community narrative because 
it evolved to deal with uncertainty and complexity (Roe 1991, 1995) and, by repeating 
it over and over again, it has become part of received wisdom (Leach & Mearns 1996; 
Leach et a1. 1999). The community narrative is used to describe people living in the 
same geographic area, but having little else in common (Fabricius et al. 200 1 a-c). The 
term 'community' persists because it derives power from its vagueness. Since CDls 
are more complex than the simple shift of responsibility from the state to local people 
(Wells & Brandon 1992; Western & Wright 1994; Hulme & Murphree 1999; Hulme 
& Murphree 2001; Adams & Hulme 2001a). the term 'community' fills the gap. 
The second flaw is a belief that the time prior to modernisation was compatible with 
nature and that it should be recreated (Spinage 1998; Leach et al. 1999; Kellert et al. 
2000). Central to this belief is an attempt to re-engineer the historical past, wherein 
human beings supposedly lived in harmony with nature. CDIs are a revisionism that 
attempts to revive historical traditions and cultures for managing the environment 
(Agrawal & Gibson 2001). There is no turning back to such idealised 'harmony'. For 
if we turn back, we must go the whole way and return to the beasts (Popper 1966), but 
this is unlikely for we are always 'in search of a better world' (Popper 1994a). In 
CDls, 'turning back' can take different modes of delivery (Agrawal & Gibson 1997; 
Hulme & Murphree 1999), and in some cases they idealise ecological consciousness 
where the "noble savage has become the ecological hero" (Benton & Short 2000:1). 
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In practice, there is no evidence of communities managing biodiversity resources or 
living in harmony with nature. In stark contrast, Agrawal & Gibson (2001 :3) stated 
that: 
Images of pristine ecosystems and innocent primitives yielded over time views of 
despoiling communities out of balance with nature, mostly due to the double-
pronged intrusion of the state and the market. 
The third flaw is the naivety to overlook the broader political environment affecting 
CDIs. The mixed profile of success and failure in CDIs owes much of its ambiguity to 
strategic pragmatism in its implementation, because policy and practice have been 
placed before politics (Murphree 1995). The false assumption here was to expect post-
colonial planners and politicians to support CDIs. This has encouraged the birth of 
CDls into a political and legal environment, which if not hostile, is hardly a nurturing 
one (Murphree 1995). This has put an ironic twist on the conventional approach to 
planned change. In order to ensure that the objectives of biodiversity conservation are 
achieved, participation by local people in CDls is often reduced to a point where they 
are just passive partners (Gibson 1999; Hulme & Murphree 1999). To put it bluntly, 
where biodiversity conservation is the core function, buying support from local people 
is usually dressed up with the rhetoric of development language such as 'participation' 
and 'economic empowerment' (Magome 2000). 
The practical implementation of CD Is are like the proverbial "between the devil and 
the deep blue sea" (Magome 2001), for they require greater state capacities than did 
the fortress narrative (Adams & Hulme 2001a). In developing countries, the state often 
lacks the capacity to meaningfully engage local people in CDls, and this situation is 
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the once dominant narrative 
of fortress conservation no longer enjoys hegemony because it has progressively been 
challenged by the discourse that stresses the need not to exclude local people from 
biodiversity conservation (Adams & Hulme 2001a). CDls are here to stay (Adams & 
Hulme 200 1 b) and lessons learnt from case studies may provide some ideas on how to 
avoid some pitfalls (Table 1.3). As shown in the table, the successes or otherwise of 
CDIs is influenced by several factors. 
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Condition for success 
• Funding is most useful in the early stages of initiatives, as seed funds. 
• Funds for training are most useful when local people have a sense of 
permanence and long-term guarantees of resource security. 
• The need for institution building needs to be carefully investigated before 
funds are invested in local institutions. 
• The role of government as administrator should not be underestimated. 
• There is a need for skilled facilitators, and donor funds can assist with this. 




High-quality, light-touch facilitation is a key ingredient in the success of 
CDIs. 
Government remains an important role player. 
Local people training needs should be carefully determined before training 
programmes are designed and implemented. 
• Local people define and redefine themselves on an ongoing basis, and all 
consist of sub-units that have different needs and aspirations; to lump 




















All role players need to commit resources to the bargaining table. 
Local people need to increase their bargaining powers by laying claim to 
assets that they can put on the 'power table'. 
There is no substitute for land ownership. 
Appropriate facilitators play an important role and need to be recruited. 
Fractures within local people should be anticipated when financial benefits 
become substantial, and strategies to deal with conflicts should be in place. 
Law enforcement is one of the cornerstones of common property resource 
management and cannot be neglected. 
Participatory monitoring can be a useful tool to sensitise all role players to 
trends in natural resources. 
CDIs are a slow and expensive process; to fast track it is to invite disaster. 
As few promises as possible should be made. 
Sustainable resource management should be adopted at the outset. 
Skilled facilitators are valuable. 
Alliances between government departments, local people, private sector, 
NGOs, and donors should be promoted. 
Information should be provided to local people about the broader (national 
and international) scarcity or abundance of the resources at stake. 
Clear CDIs policy directives should be given to officials, and other role 
players need to be informed about policies and policy changes. 
Resource ownership is important, to give a sense of permanence to local 
people and to lower their discount rates. 
Policies should harmonise CDIs and other role players. 
Policies should be made accessible to all role players. 
Agreements that prevent sustainable resources use should be avoided. 
Local people should be allowed to define themselves, geographically or 
otherwise. 
Source: Adapted from Fabricius et at. (2001 b). 
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1.5. Conclusion 
Biodiversity conservation is a beleaguered movement because the unprecedented loss 
of diversity still continues. Indeed, biodiversity conservation is still beset by problems 
at three scales, comprising ecological, socio-political, and financial. Since 1878 when 
Yellowstone NP was established with a strong protectionist mandate, these key 
dilemmas still persist. If anything, this situation has created more paper PAs, re-
affirming that the fortress approach to managing PAs offers little hope for conserving 
biodiversity. Equally, PAs all over the world are still struggling to overcome the key 
challenges posed by narratives such as ecotourism, economics, and the participation of 
local people in biodiversity conservation. Despite various attempts to implement these 
narratives, we are no closer to curbing species and habitat loses than when the primary 
narrative of biodiversity loss was popularised. 
A question can be asked as to who are 'the winners and losers' from these narratives, 
and whether counter narratives can be advanced (Swift 1996). However, pondering 
alternatives is outside the scope of this overview. For now, we have to contend with 
the fact that we there are gaps between theory and practice. State actors at all levels of 
scale prioritise economic growth and accord biodiversity conservation mechanisms 
such as CD Is second-order priorities in national context where they are implemented 
(Murphree 1997). Unavoidably, biodiversity conservation is about resolving conflicts 
at all levels of scale where it affects the interests of various actors. 
Notwithstanding the dismal performance of secondary narratives, ostensibly derived to 
curb biodiversity loss, the global network of PAs continues to increase (IUCN 2003), 
suggesting that the primary narrative of biodiversity loss is still powerful enough to 
garner public support. We can conclude that in practice, the protectionist strategies of 
'the state is best', or the new model that 'local society is best, or the market is best', 
have all proved invalid (Hulme & Murphree 1999:283). Consequently, scholars and 
practitioners are back to the drawing board, first to analyse what went wrong and why, 
and second to design new experiments because biodiversity conservation is a complex 
issue and, as a result, its solutions or narratives cannot be over-simplified. 
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As stated by Peuhkuri & Jokinen (1999:133-134): 
The complicated nature of the biodiversity issue makes it possible to emphasise its 
different aspects. In other words, different interests tend to own the problem of 
biodiversity loss and define it in their own terms. There are divisions, for example, 
between actors recognising or denying the problem, between property owners and 
groups without property rights, between anthropocentric and ecocentric values, 
and between local and global spheres of action. 
The key challenge is to design adaptive management models that can work with the 
support of a broad range of key stakeholders or actors. While conservation biologists 
have diagnosed that biodiversity is declining at an unprecedented rate, the prescription 
to reduce human activities that alter the functioning of habitats and ecosystems cannot 
be administered for two fundamental reasons (Magome 2000): 
First, the prescription tastes bitter to the client and is simply rejected. Second, 
despite the diagnosis of a worsening situation, the quality of life of the client does 
not deteriorate and, as a result, the prescription fails to make sense. 
The key challenge is how to influence the human psyche so that negative attitudes to 
conservation can be altered in to achieve global goals of biodiversity conservation as 
proposed at the 5th WPC. What have we learnt as a result of decades and decades of 
developing narratives and counter narratives, and why are models not working? A key 
lesson learnt is that 'throwing out the baby with the bath water' is unwise. It is now 
recognised that not all the elements of a narrative are wrong. Policy makers can, using 
an incrementalist approach, 'pick and mix' from these discourses to generate a range 
of practical policy choices (Adams & Hulme 2001). There are no universally accepted 
laws that govern the way people will behave, because human behaviour is the result of 
complex interactions between various actors, individuals, communities, national and 
international on the basis of shared and unshared values. Even while there is a general 
acceptance of models that advance sustainable living (Adams 2002), ultimately power 
differentials between various actors became the centre stage for conflict (Magome & 
Murombedzi 2003). Consequently, the effectiveness and relevance of models such as 
CD Is is being questioned. 
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In the context of involving local people, the complexity of problems is compounded 
because of disincentives. As summarised by Magome & Fabricius (2004: 106): 
• The contribution of CDIs to biodiversity conservation is highly questionable, 
and there is little evidence of local people investing resources (time, money, 




The direct benefits from formal biodiversity management are negligible in 
most instances, while the direct benefits from informal use are substantial; 
The relative contribution of biodiversity to local people's complement of their 
livelihood strategies is poorly understood, but can be relatively small in some 
instances, and; 
The cost of living with some components of biodiversity such as wildlife (in 
terms of both the opportunity costs to land and labour, and the direct costs of 
damage to property) is very high. The transaction costs, in terms of causing 
conflict and administering initiatives, are also high. 
When it comes to biodiversity conservation, reality often falls short of the rhetoric of 
the narratives derived to reduce its loss. To reduce biodiversity loss, our theory and 
practice must be less prescriptive and must appreciate that effective biodiversity 
conservation requires effective institutions, the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Institutions and biodiversity conservation 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I outline institutions that are often regarded as effective tools for 
biodiversity conservation and how they affect various beneficiaries. Central to the 
notion of institutions, formal and informal, is the realisation that success or failure to 
conserve biodiversity is nested within the human-devised systems of incentives and 
disincentives. Thus, the proposition that biodiversity should be considered as a global 
common heritage or good has been rejected, because most of its components are 
situated under the jurisdiction of nation states (Ostrom 1990). While recognising that 
biodiversity conservation is a common concern of all humankind, an emphasis is now 
placed on the sovereign rights of nation states over their biological resources (Glowka 
et al. 1994). Hence, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) focuses on national 
responsibilities over biodiversity resources and cooperation between nations. 
The CBD was adopted on 22 May 1992, in Nairobi, and was signed by over 150 
nations on 5 June 1992, in Rio de Janeiro, and entered in force on 29 December 1993 
to provide a framework for contracting parties on biodiversity conservation. The CBD 
meets every 2 years and its provisions are legally binding. By the end of 2003, over 
188 countries had ratified the CBD. As a global treaty, the CBD commits all of its 
contracting parties to achieve three objectives: 1) conserve biodiversity; 2) use its 
resources sustainably; and, 3) ensure fair and equitable mechanisms for sharing the 
benefits derived from the use of genetic resources. Generally, contracting parties 
support the first and second objectives of the CBD. However, the third objective 
continues to stir up debates and heated discussions (Louafi & Morin 2004). As a 
result, developing countries that hold most of the world's biodiversity-rich countries 
(Appendix 3) have formed a group of 'like-minded megadiverse countries' in order to 
promote their interests regarding biological diversity. 
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The CBD recommends institutions such as property rights and good governance as the 
way to enhance biodiversity conservation and to provide for fair equitable distribution 
of its resources (UNEP 1992). When it comes to accessing components of a powerful 
commodity such as biodiversity, equitability becomes a fuzzy concept. Torn between 
the demands of the global agenda and the prerogative of nation states, the CBD states 
that biodiversity is a global heritage, but accepts the sovereign rights of nation states 
over its use. The CBD requires contracting parties, often biodiversity-rich developing 
countries, to allow access to their genetic resources for use by other contracting 
parties, often developed countries, on mutually agreed terms (UNEP 1992). However, 
the provisions of the CBD, though legally binding, are broad aspirational goals that do 
not contain everything practitioners wished to see reflected (Holdgate 1992). 
The objectives of the CBD are masked by those of the powerful WTO (World Trade 
Organisation), which promotes the privatisation of biodiversity resources, knowledge 
and technologies to the detriment of nation-states and their local people (Kennedy 
1998). The initial and continuing opposition to the CBD by the United States (US) 
government was based on inadequate protection of patents and the rights of US firms 
engaged in international bio-prospecting. The sovereign rights enshrined in the CBD 
provoked the US delegation at Rio, heavily lobbied by biotechnology industries, to 
reject the treaty, and so far the US Senate has not ratified the CBD (Garner 1999). In 
spite of this, the resolutions of the CBD must be improved to provide a coherent 
framework for delivering incentives efficiently, and should be monitored in order to 
measure its effectiveness in producing the desired results (Vickerman 1999). 
Legislation on biodiversity conservation legislation should seek to be comprehensive 
in its approach (Stuart 1999). Since Rio, the resultant six Conferences of the Parties 
(COP) to the CBD have focused on actioning the decisions of the CBD by putting in 
place measurable goals. Despite these efforts, the decisions from the sixth meeting of 
the conference of the parties (COP) to the CBD (CBD 2003) are imprecise, and this 
forced COP7 to set measurable goals, objectives, targets, and activities for contracting 
parties and the secretariat. However, applying institutional arrangements, such as the 
CBD to local people is still unclear. 
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2.2. Institutions 
Institutions are human-devised constraints that define relationships among individuals 
and indicate who may do what to whom (Bromley 1989). Consequently, property right 
systems are institutional arrangements. Institutions are the nonns and the rules of the 
game that influence human behaviour in relation to social interactions. Institutional 
arrangements establish relationships to resources by translating interests into claims, 
and claims into rights (Gibbs & Bromley 1989). Thus, institutions structure incentives 
in human exchange, whether political, social or economic, by defining organisations 
(North 1990). Hence, organisations, groups or individuals are actors whose behaviour 
is governed by institutional arrangements, which in tum define the space within which 
individuals, groups, and organisations exercise decision-making discretion. 
Institutions and property rights are centred on the notion of entitlement, which is often 
defined as a legitimate command over endowments or bundles of commodities. As a 
result, entitlements enhance the capabilities of claimants to achieve their well-being by 
choosing what they can do with their endowments (Leach, et al. 1996). Consequently, 
institutions shape processes of endowment and entitlement to resources in question. In 
biodiversity conservation the way that we understand the role of institutions and 
institutional change in resource allocation is central to our analytical framework. Thus, 
the distinction between endowments and entitlements depends on context and time 
(Leach et al. 1996), especially in situations where legislation for the control and use of 
resources is fragmented (Bond 2001). 
The purpose of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by making human behaviour more 
predictable. However, the effectiveness of institutions in achieving this predictability 
is subject to compliance and enforcement of agreed rules (Presber James 2001). For 
every right, rules must exist that dictate reciprocal behaviour from other individuals in 
relation to that right. Thus, institutions can be viewed as regularised patterns of human 
behaviour from underlying structures or sets of rules in use (see Leach et al. 1999; 
Klooster 2000; Presber James 2001). Of interest in biodiversity conservation are rules 
governing common property resources (CPRs) or common-pool resources. However, 
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CPRs require collective decision-making, co-operation and adherence to sets of agreed 
rules by resource users (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et a/. 1994; Ostrom & Schlager 1996; 
Berkes 1995). However, CPRs are characterised by the difficulty of excluding access 
to common resources and by subtractability, whereby each resource user subtracts 
from the welfare of other the users (Berkes 1989, Ostrom et a/. 1994; Berkes 1995). 
Most CPRs draw their legitimacy from resource users, and not from nation-state from 
in which they are located. In spite of this, the rules for most CPRs are problematic and 
very difficult to pin down, and this makes implementation difficult (Young 1995). As 
a result, CPRs are often based on the sensibility of users, and assumes that they will 
not become irrational. However, if individual rationality is not viewed as rational from 
the perspective of the group, overuse leads to 'CPR dilemma' or to the 'tragedy of the 
commons' (Ostrom et al. 1994). In the case of CPRs, the probability of behavioural 
change without strong and well-defined property rights is very low (Hanna et al. 
1995). In the context of institutions, it is important that the usage of terms such as 
'property' and 'rules' is fully understood, particularly in highly contested entitlements 
to a global resource such biodiversity. 
Rules are prescriptions that define what actions are required, prohibited, or permitted, 
and the sanctions authorised if rules are not followed (Ostrom et al. 1994). In society, 
'rights' often emanate from 'rules', but rights are not equivalent to rules (Ostrom & 
Schlager 1996). Ultimately, rules are designed implicitly or explicitly to achieve order 
and predictability of desired outcomes. Thus, understanding rules in use is important 
in the analysis of CPRs. However, many local institutions have already disintegrated 
to the extent that there are concerns that they will be destroyed and taken over by 
either economic markets or by states (Ostrom & Schlager 1996). In fact, local 
institutions have changed so many times that insistence on indigenous systems or 
CPRs as practised with fishery resources, is absurd. While considerable attention has 
been given to the role played by local people in biodiversity conservation, empirical 
evidence to support the effectiveness of CPRs has been flimsy at best, and historical in 
most cases (Little & Brokensha 1987). The challenge is whether CPRs can cope with 
problems of a modern age (Ostrom & Schlager 1996) under insecure ownership. 
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Full ownership means the right to use resources, to determine the mode of usage, to 
benefit from their use, to determine the distribution of benefits and the rules of access 
(Murphree 1993). To achieve this, local people must have a sanctioned authority that 
implements their responsibilities. This requires the state to relinquish its authority and 
responsibility to local people, but this runs contrary to the bureaucratic impulse to 
retain central authority (Murphree 1994). The performance of local institutions rarely 
approximate to their promises, because the central political and economic structures of 
nation-states are not disposed to surrender their privileges, and will use their power, 
including their abilities to shape policy and law, to maintain the monopolies of their 
position (Gibson 1999). These rules may be formal or informal, written or unwritten, 
as in the case of statutes or culture and tradition (Presber James 2001). 
2.3. Property rights 
Property rights are about rules and obligations. The debate on property rights has a 
long pedigree. Since 1888 the communist manifesto of Marx & Engels (1967) traces 
the debate on property rights back to the end of the feudal system in France. In fact, 
Marx and Engels submitted that the I ~th century arguments about the origins of 
property proceeded from GenesiS, according to which God had given the earth to 
mankind for use in common. In modem societies, property rights are a form of power, 
sanction and authority for decision-making (Denman 1978). Central to all notions of 
property are issues of rights, resources, and of the power of resource users to achieve 
desired outcomes from the resource in question. In law property is not 'things', but 
'rights' in things or 'rights' to things (Hollowell 1982). 
A property right is a socially enforceable claim to a resource, or its use including a 
right to select its uses as an economic good (Alchian 1987). Property rights provide 
some exclusivity, security, and transferability of economic goods. Correspondingly, as 
resources become scarce and increasingly valuable, resource users are often willing to 
bear the costs of establishing and enforcing their rights over resources (Brubaker 
1995). Furthermore, systems of property rights are deeply rooted in economics (Lane 
& Moorehead 1996), and are part of society'S institutions (Hanna et al. 1996). 
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Property rights change over time, based on the purpose that society or its dominant 
class expects these rights to serve (Bromley 1995). Therefore, facts about systems of 
property are not simple, but change over time. Property rights must be grounded in a 
public belief that the claim is worth protecting and that it is morally right. A claim 
requires enforcement, and often the authority to do so is vested with the state. In fact, 
property rights protect those who are able to enlist the power of the state (Bromley 
1995). A crucial question to be asked of any system of property rights is whether it 
favours political stability (Rose 1998). Ultimately, property is a bundle of rights that 
allows the holder to possess, use, control, alienate others, transfer, sell, exchange, and 
donate or bequest the property in question. In theory, the bundle of rights is nominally 
held under four regimes (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1. Four categories of property regimes. 
Property 
Communal, res communes 
Open-access, res nullius 
Private, res in commercio 
State property, res publica 
Description 
Rights are vested in a distinct group of users. This is the model often 
advocated for local people. 
Rights are absent and, therefore, access is open to all. In the context of 
land, a limited resource, open access refers to state property where the 
state cannot provide effective policing or control. 
Rights are vested in individuals or in a corporation. Private property is 
often regarded as the most advanced form of ownership. 
Rights are under state control supposedly for the public good. 
Source: Adapted from Berkes (1989) and Van Schalkwyk & Van der Spuy (2002). 
In reality, few situations fit exactly into anyone of these categories because nation 
states often determine property regimes that they can enforce. Thus, the four property 
rights are unlikely to found in one country. For example, while South African scholars 
talk about four categories of property rights, legal systems accord greater respect and 
recognition to state and private property rights at the expense of communal property 
rights (Bennett 1995). This is because the South African legal system evolved from 
the Roman Dutch law and endorses western property rights at the expense of African 
customary rights (Van Schalkwyk & Van der Spuy 2002). Ultimately, systems of 
property rights are crafted by nation states depending on various objectives that they 
want to achieve such as political, and socio-economic agendas. 
3S 
In reality, the increasing human population and limited resources, imply that rights are 
often exercised either in open access or in private regimes. Hence, 'open access' often 
refers to mismanagement of any property, and this occurs in situation where the 
capacity of the right holder to maintain or control the property in question is either 
absent or severely constrained. Similarly, state property often equates to corporate 
rights (Alchian 1987) while common property can be considered a special cluster of 
private property rights (Lynch & Alcorn 1994). Thus, this reduces the four bundles of 
rights to only two: state and non-state property such, as various private property rights 
(Lynch 2001). Despite this, it is still difficult for scholars involved in conservation and 
development work to accept that, in many situations of resource use, state and non 
state property regimes are the only two that influence behaviours of resource users. 
In a system of secure property rights, some form of ownership promotes stewardship 
(Brubaker 1995). Ownership determines the value of property rights (Delport 1999), 
such as the right of possession, use and disposal of worth, and entitles the owner, inter 
alia, to: control (ius possidendi); use (ius utendi); enjoy (ius fruendi); encumber (ius 
abutendi); alienate (ius disponendi); vindicate (ius vindicandi), including to ward off 
\ infringements (ius negandi) (Van Schalkwyk & Van der Spuy 2002). However, 
ownership is often formed by political, legal, socio-economic, historical, religious, and 
philosophical ideas. Briefly, ownership is the most comprehensive right a legal subject 
can have in relation to a thing, but the entitlements of the owner are not absolute and 
unlimited because they exist within the limits placed by the law (Van Schalkwyk & 
Van der Spuy 2002). Limitations on entitlement may originate from the provisions of 
the law or from rights of others with or without permission of the owner. 
Entitlements can be strong or weak depending on how rights are enforced by both the 
state and society. Ownership is not absolute; it is a spectrum of rights from weak to 
strong. The strength of ownership is determined by its time frame and the conditions 
attached to it (Alchian 1987). Thus, ownership is a right to use resources with 
limitations regarding the rights of others, and intellectual property rights (JPRs) are a 
. . t Until recently it was considered highly unlikely that IPRs could cover 
case In pom. ' 
collective assets of indigenous people (Posey & Outfield 1996). Increasingly, 
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governments, NGOs and private entrepreneurs deem the knowledge of local people to 
be of some commercial value and, thus, property that can be bought or sold. In reality, 
local people have major hurdles to overcome before IPRs can be of benefit to them, 
and this in essence makes equitable sharing difficult to achieve. Indeed, there is a 
discrepancy between de jure and de facto rights of users (Mutphree 1997). 
IPRs provide companies, corporations, groups or individuals legal protection against 
the counterfeiting of their products, technologies, and services. By covering patents, 
copyright and trademarks, IPRs protect ideas and data that can be of commercial 
value. In biodiversity conservation, IPRs are mechanisms by which bio-prospecting 
can provide equitable distribution of benefits derived from biodiversity among nation-
states (Gollin 1993). If properly administered, IPRs can provide developing countries 
with most of the benefits of biodiversity resources. Hence, the potential welfare gains 
to developing countries from strengthening IPRs have been the subject of on going 
theoretical analyses (Perrin 1999). However, IPRs have been construed as negative 
rights, because they prevent others from using the original invention (Cornish 1999), 
making them the battleground for trade in biodiversity (Bhat 1999; IUCN 1999). 
Solutions to these problems are vaguely defined in the CBD (UNEP 1992) and the 
WTO 1993 Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Part of the problem is 
that powerful agencies have more interest in gaining jurisdiction over biodiversity 
resources than on its equitable distribution. The application of IPRs to the traditional 
knowledge of local people is stilI controversial because the key problem facing local 
people with respect to IPRs is to prove authenticity; to reduce or limit biopiracy, and 
to stop commercial exploitation of their indigenous knowledge (Appendix 3). IPRs are 
somewhat inimical to their interests because often they do not know how to act legally 
or, if they do, legal action is often prohibitively expensive. Having a right is one thing, 
and exercising the right is completely another thing. Despite these difficulties, local 
people are starting to asset their rights. Rights are about entitlements, which form the 
core of the human psyche with regards to ownership. Based on the difficulties of 
overcoming problems caused by IPRs, tenurial rights of local people over resources in 
their spheres are now advocated as means to enhance their livelihoods. 
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Tenure is as also a subset of property rights, and it is simply a bundle of rights (Bruce 
& Fortmann 1988) that defines the obligations of individuals or groups regarding 
resources governed by a particular system (Murombedzi 1990). Tenure defines social 
relations between people with regard to their legal status in land, such as freehold, 
leasehold or communally owned (Lynch & Alcorn 1994; Martin 1997). Therefore, 
individuals or groups with tenure have certain status vis-a-vis resources on their land 
in comparison to those without tenure. However, where local people lack strong tenure 
rights, attempts to involve them in biodiversity conservation are often co-optive or 
collaborative arrangements (Murphree 1994). However, in biodiversity conservation, 
most state property rights exemplify the state's reach exceeding its grasp (Bromley & 
Cernea 1989) and this converts de jure rights to de facto open access regimes. 
In CPRs, rights have several important dimensions (Barrow & Murphree 2001): 
• Rights are rarely, if ever, absolute: their strength is determined by time frames 
and conditions attached to them. Correspondingly, the longer the sanctioned 
duration, the stronger their tenure will be, and the fewer conditions attached to 
them, the stronger their ownership will be. 
• Rights can be conferred: by the state, in a strong form as de jure rights or in 
weaker versions as de facto rights; by customary law derived from the norms 
and practices of long established non-state agencies and social groupings; or, 
by the configurations of power in specific contexts of social interactions. 
• Rights require regimes of authority ranging from small units, e.g., household 
or partnership, to the state. The authority is usually influenced, inter alia, by 
the nature of the resource over which rights are exercised. 
• Rights confer authority and responsibility. When authority and responsibility 
are delinked, and assigned to different actors, then both are eroded. 
In CPRs, tenurial systems are complex mixtures of individual and group rights. Thus, 
the legitimacy of CPRs is dynamic, ever evolving, and often contested. Accordingly, 
institutional arrangements for establishing and allocating rights are needed (Lynch & 
Alcorn 1994). Hence, the role played by tenure in shaping institutions of local people 
is still the focus of empirical research, including this study. 
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2.4. Governance 
In modem societies, property rights and institutions are ultimately nested within some 
system of governance. Correspondingly, governance determines how property rights 
and institutions translate into a functional network of interdependence between social, 
political, economic, and environmental interests. However, while the political role of 
governments as human-devised systems of creating social order is somewhat easy to 
define, there seems to be no consensus on how governance should be defined. Indeed, 
governance may refer to just about anything political (Hyden 1998). Politicising the 
concept is sad because governance should shape the actions of governments to avoid 
them being synonymous with undesired social outcomes such as excessive regulation, 
corruption, and lack of accountability. 
The connection between governance and conservation and development initiatives is 
relatively recent (Hyden 1998; Smith et af. 2003). Many analysts now accept that 
biodiversity conservation is not only technical or economic but is also explicitly 
political. In the context of biodiversity conservation, governance refers to institutional 
structures that promote the accountability of three key actors, the state, the private 
sector, and local people to one another with regard to the use of affected resources 
(Brinkerhoff & Veit 1997; Hyden 1998; Hulme & Murphree 1999). Furthermore, 
governance requires models that allow all three key actors, i.e., the state, local people 
and the market to operate and to be accountable to one another in ever changing 
situations, such as environmental, economic and socio-political conditions (Hyden 
1998; Hulme & Murphree 1999). 
Biodiversity conservation is a quagmire of moving factors in a fierce battlefield of 
competing and conflicting interests (Magome 2001), and this makes governance 
difficult to implement. Since there are no fixed states, but different configurations 
through which reality presents itself, governance models must be fine-tuned with clear 
accountability and responsibility for all actors involved. It is therefore assumed that by 
specifying the roles and the responsibilities of all actors, ensuring accountability, and 
by providing legal recourse, governance can be realised. However, governance means 
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absolutely nothing if it cannot be easily implemented. For most developing countries, 
the challenges are huge and vary greatly based on their histories, current socio-
economic situation, and future options. Recognising the centrality of governance, the 
5
th 
WPC noted that governance is about power relations and accountability. 
A key variable in these models is co-operation and trust among main actors, so that 
new experiments allowing for 'both-and' rather than 'either-or' can be initiated 
(Adams & Hulme 2001). Correspondingly, academic scholars and practitioners who 
are interested in finding workable solutions to both the challenges of biodiversity 
conservation and of economic development must attempt to device experiments that 
recognise this dynamic environment and should implement projects on a 'learn-as-
you-implement' basis. However, in implementing experiments, various actors need 
some form of a framework at various levels of scale. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The governance model should not become another narrative because the storyline of 
narratives is too simplistic, but it is also very dangerous because of its prescriptive 
nature. In fact, the challenge is to have 'governance without governments' (Rosenau & 
Czempiel 1992) by promoting the role of social institutions (Youn 1996). In terms of 
biodiversity conservation, ecologists have now narrowed the gap between ignorance 
and knowledge. While actions for achieving biodiversity goals are specified (Holdgate 
1996), there is little agreement on how they can be attained (Child et al. 1997; 
Swanson 1997), and this creates problems. Central to the success or failure of these 
experiments, is the role that can be played by institutions that operate across scale in 
the arena of property rights and governance. The challenge facing scholars and 
conservationists is how to design institutions that can harmonise the apparently 
conflicting goals of biodiversity conservation with those of economic development. In 
the next chapter, I outline the context within which such institutional arrangements are 
often crafted as a background to this study. 
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Chapter 3 
South African context, study areas, and methods 
3.1. Background to South Africa: a country in transition 
South Africa, is ±1.22 million km2 in extent, occupies the southern most part of the 
African continent and is surrounded by both the Atlantic and Indian oceans. The 
population of South Africa is increasing rapidly. In 1996, the population was about at 
41 million (Stats SA 1998), but the 2001 census revealed over 45 million people. The 
population comprises largely black Africans (78%) and is growing at an annual rate of 
2%, which is matched by a slow economic growth rate of 2% (Appendix 4). Despite a 
per capita income of US$3,000, 52% of the country's rural people live below the 
poverty line of SAR237 or US$67 per adult per month (Carter & May 1999). In fact, 
South Africa is a recent democracy that is still trying to shape its political landscape, 
which was created by apartheid2 prior to 1994. The action space for conservation and 
development initiatives is largely created by post-apartheid shifts in natural resource 
policies and strategies (Isaacs & Mohamed 2000). In order to understand the context 
of biodiversity conservation and related policies in South Africa, it is imperative to 
outline its pre- and post-apartheid eras, because 'success' or 'failure' of its objectives 
and strategies to conserve biodiversity is strongly aligned to these two political eras. 
In this chapter I provide the context under which South Africa's PAs and its flagship 
national agency, now renamed South African National Parks (SANParks), implement 
conservation strategies. Consequently, this chapter first starts by providing a brief 
description of the land conquest in South Africa and the government's land reform 
process. This is then followed by contextualising the country's network of PAs 
including its national parks agency. Thereafter, I provide the study hypothesis, study 
areas, and the general methods used throughout the study. 
2 A racially based separate d~vel~pm~t str:a!egy that was designed by government to advance and to 
benefit the interests of its mtnonty whIte CItizens at the expense of its majority of black people. 
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3.2. Land conquest 
The history of land conquest in much of Africa is strongly associated with colonial 
rule. In South Africa, the land conquest dates back to 1652 when the first European 
settlers arrived. The land conquest started slowly with colonial rule, and was rapidly 
consolidated by apartheid rule. From the mid 17th century, black farmers and other 
African pastoralists, such as the Khoi and the San, were gradually dispossessed of 
most of their land through conquest, spurious treaties and economic pressure 
(Ramphele 1991; Levin 1996). Bourgeois private property regimes were introduced, 
frequently to the exclusion of the black indigenous people. Legislation in the early 
1850s paved the way for land titling and registration to exclude black people, leading 
to unjust legal dispossessions, generally without the knowledge of the inhabitants of 
the land. Huge parcels of traditionally or communally owned land were privati sed, and 
this consolidated land dispossession by entrenching private property rights of minority 
of white people at the expense of the majority of black people. 
Land conquest was institutionalised and fast-tracked when the government passed the 
Natives Land Acts of 1913 and 1936. These Acts restricted land ownership by black 
people to just 13% of country's total land area (puzo 1978; Platzky & Walker 1985; 
Ardington & Nattrass 1990; Ramphele 1991; Worden 1995; Tordoff 1997; Reader 
1998), which in turn left a legacy of land degradation. Ultimately, these land Acts 
limited the amount and locations of land owned by black people to isolated areas 
known as 'Native Reserves' or 'black areas' (Figure 3.1). 
The significant impacts of these Acts are summarised by Levin (1996: 1 05-1 06): 
These 1913 and 1936 land acts limited the amounts and locations of African-
owned land, and facilitated the forced removals of many communities from land to 
which they claimed ownership and, at times title deeds. Other communities were 
dispossessed of their rights to occupy and use land because of the abolition of 
labour tenancy. Still more Africans were removed to make way for forest 
plantations or national parks. These removals destroyed the local agricultural 
systems as well as social structures. 
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The land allocated to native reserves consisted of fragments that were deliberately 
scattered in selected regions of South Africa and was, with very few exceptions, 
agriculturally unproductive. The resultant population increase put further pressure on 
limited land resources enclosed within native reserves. These land Acts removed the 
means by which black people had resisted incorporation into the migrant labour 
system of the gold mines and the wage labour on maize farms. Ultimately, these land 
Acts were engineered to produce cheap labour. For this reason, these Acts have been 
described as the product of 'the alliance of gold and maize' (Worden 1995). These 
Acts established the principle of a racially based, dual system of land ownership. 
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In 1970, the apartheid government passed the Homelands Citizenship Act, which was 
based on ethnic or tribal differences. This Act justified, both ex post facto and for the 
future, the policy of forcibly removing black people from so-called 'restricted areas' to 
these homelands in order to maintain the apartheid policy. Politically, the homelands 
system provided the apartheid regime with the ethnic justification for 'moving black 
people to where they belong', thus re-enforcing tribal divisions between black South 
African. These tribal divisions were part of a 'divide and rule' strategy, which reduced 
combined resistance by homeland leaders to apartheid policies. By erecting puppet 
regimes headed by African leaders, apartheid rule legitimised its control over 
repressed African Subjects (Levin 1996). 
Between 1958 and 1988, over 3.5 million black people were brutally uprooted and 
forced to settle in homelands. The homelands (as they were colloquially known in 
South Africa) provided a basis for deeming black people to be citizens (based on 
ethnic groups) of one or other of the homeland territories. The effect of this was to 
cause the lapse of normal South African citizenship. Following this Act, nominal 
independence was accepted by the homelands of Transkei in 1976, Bophuthatswana 
(1977), Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1981), and hence the acronym 'TBVC states'. The 
remaining six homelands, Gazankulu, KwaZulu, KwaNdebele, KaNgwane, Lebowa 
and QwaQwa, instead opted for the status of 'self-governing territories' (SGTs). The 
TBVC states were generally viewed as puppet states, while the SGTs were viewed as 
having resisted the apartheid government. 
The TBVC states and the SGTs were both financially and economically dependent on 
the apartheid government, the effect of which ensured de facto and de jure control by 
the apartheid regime. Hence, the division between TBVC states and SGTs only 
reinforced apartheid rule by increasing political tensions in the various leaderships of 
black people. These tensions manifested themselves through so-called 'black on black 
violence'. The effect of creating homelands was to prolong apartheid rule. However, 
with the transition to democratic rule on 27 April 1994, the four apartheid provinces of 
Cape, Natal, Orange Free State, and Transvaal, and the ten homelands, have been 
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Figure 3.2. The redrawn provincial boundaries of the post-apartheid South Africa. 
3.3. Land reform 
The land reform programme is crucial to the successful creation of a politically stable 
post-apartheid South Africa, because unequal access to land affects over 15 million 
rural black people living in the former homelands as tenants or farm labourers (Cooper 
1991). Restructuring of land tenure rights is now used to redress the legacy of land 
conquest. Section 25 (7) of the South African Constitution, Act 108 of 1996, states 
that: 
A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of 
past racially discriminato/y laws or practices is entitled to the extent provided by 
an Act of Parliament either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress. 
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The primary aim of land reform is to: 1) redress the injustices of apartheid; 2) foster 
national reconciliation and stability; 3) underpin economic growth; and, 4) improve 
household welfare and alleviate poverty. To achieve restitution or equitable redress, 
the government promulgated the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. This Act 
epitomises the struggle for social justice in the democratic South Africa. At its 
starkest, the question posed by the Act is whether a society can ever hope, by a dint of 
a fresh round of law making, to undo the effects of past unjust laws (Budlender et al. 
1998). Land restitution attempts to link land issues to issues of social justice, and this 
ultimately makes land reform both a political issue and a human rights issue. For 
example, some 50,000 white farmers have access to twelve times as much land for 
cultivation and grazing as 15 million rural black people (Table 3.1). 
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·Farmland comprises commercial agricultural farms (70%), various communal areas mainly in the 
former homelands (13%), and state owned (17%). 
Source: Adapted from Huntley et al (1989). 
Against the disproportionate land holdings between the small advantaged minority and 
the vast majority of disadvantaged South Africans (Table 3.1), the post-apartheid land 
reform process is both a complex and a difficult task to implement speedily on a 
nation-wide scale. While it is one of the government's priority is to restore land rights 
to those previously dispossessed by the apartheid era, justice must be balanced with 
the long-term goals of political stability and economic growth. Indeed, the government 
wants to settle all valid claims by the end of 2005, an ambitious date indeed. To attain 
social justice, the government's land reform process aims to meet three key objectives 
ofland redistribution, land restitution, and land tenure reform (Table 3.2). 
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Aims to provide the poor with land for residential and productive use to improve 
their livelihoods because it will be difficult for them to buy land on the open 
market without state assistance. To achieve this, the principle of 'willing seller, 
willing buyer' is applied. However, under the volatile economic conditions of 
high interest rates, troubled agriculture and soaring debts, current land owners are 
often willing to find a buyer. 
Emphasis is often placed on restitution, and not restoration ofland lost because of 
racial laws passed since 19 June 1913. 
Land to restructure land rights: the dilemma is that the post-apartheid constitution 
protects the land rights of those individuals that were unfairly privileged by the 
previous political order. 
Source: Adapted from Magome & Murombedzi (2003). 
However, there are major problems with the land reform process. Restitution is often 
delayed by inefficient administrative systems that must first establish those in critical 
need of land, and then secure them state grants (Du Toit 2000). Restitution seems to 
apply a strict judicial procedure that uses noble principles of fairness and equity to 
what in essence is a political problem (Winberg & Weinberg 1995). Therefore, even 
though claimants have to recount how they were removed from their land and stripped 
of their dignity, they cannot be guaranteed getting their land back. Claimants must, as 
a matter of fact, balance legal costs of regaining land lost against benefits of restitution 
(Magome & Murombedzi 2003). As a result, land reform has serious implications for 
PAs because the state must balance its imperatives of land reform against those of 
conserving the country's biodiversity (Cock & Fig 2002; Magome & Murombedzi 
2003). Given the escalating cost of land and imperatives of restitution, it is debatable 
how the state will increase the coverage of its PAs from 6.5% to 8% (Magome 2003b). 
3.4. Management of protected areas 
It is a commonly accepted narrative that wildlife conservation in South Africa started 
in 1888 during the early colonial rule in the Cape Province. A century later, wildlife 
conservation was entrenched in the Transvaal when the Kruger National Park was 
established in 1898. Under apartheid rule, government agencies charged with the 
management of PAs were diverse and highly uncoordinated, and this situation has not 
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yet changed (Table 3.3). The responsibility for conservation at the national level lies 
with the Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. The National Parks Board 
(NPB), first constituted by the National Parks Bill of 1926, oversaw the creation and 
central management of all national parks outside homelands. In addition, provinces, 
homelands, and local municipalities also performed some conservation functions. As a 
result, each conservation agency determined its own philosophy and policy, and the 
management structure it adopted. 
Table 3.3. The protected area network in South Africa after majority rule. 
Responsible agency 
Provincial autbority 
Eastern Cape Province 
Northern Cape Province 
Western Cape Province 
North West Province 
KwaZulu Natal Nature Conservation Service 
Free State Province 
Mpurnalanga Province 
Northern Province (now Limpopo Province) 
Gauteng Province 
National autbority 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
National Botanical Institute 
South African National Parks (SANParks) 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
Total 
Source: Kumleben et al. (1998). 





























In terms of philosophy and policy, most agencies followed policies that focussed on 
creating and maintaining a network of PAs to protect biological diversity. Relatively 
few agencies followed integrated policies of making conservation socially acceptable 
to black people. This network of PAs has, by and large, emerged because colonial 
needs and values were imposed on local people whose livelihoods depended on using 
biological resources inside PAs (Fabricius et al. 2001a), paying little attention to the 
negative impacts of PAs (Cock & Fig 2002). Hence, the management of PAs in post-
apartheid South Africa is still characterised by past and present conflict. 
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During the apartheid era, the homeland agencies of the fonner Bophuthatswana and 
KaNgwane pioneered conservation policies that were sensitive to the needs of local 
people. While Natal Parks Board achieved prominence in the early 1990s by initiating 
programmes that attempted to integrate their local people with PAs, the NPB waited 
until 1994 (Robinson 1994). Indeed, although the NBP strategically uses Richtersveld 
National Park as a prime example of its community owned land, Richtersveld was, 
according to Robinson & Fowkes (1996), a 'saga' that was settled after 18 months ofa 
long protracted legal battle (Magome & Murombedzi 2003). 
Nonetheless, the post-apartheid political changes have led to drastic review of all the 
conservation agencies, including the NPB. Indeed, most of these agencies find 
themselves under siege, and now desperately seek new social and economic roles to 
justify and secure their future (Wells 1996). Accordingly, the NPB commissioned this 
policy study ostensibly to provide a framework that would ensure that it complies with 
the political, social, and economic realities of the post-apartheid era. However, the 
political realities of the post-apartheid South Africa affect all PAs, and hence the study 
took a broadened approach. 
3.5. Research aim and hypothesis 
Since the study was originally commissioned, the fonner NPB has been partially 
transfonned (Chapter 7), both in name and function. Now known as the South African 
National Parks (SANParks), the organisation derives its mandate from new legislation 
(Chapter 8). As previously constituted by National Parks Act (57 of 1976), section 4 
of this Act limited the role of national parks to within their borders, stating that: 
The object of the constitution of a park is the establishment. preservation and 
study therein of wild animals. marine and plant life and objects of geological. 
archaeological. historical. ethnological. oceanographic. educational; and other 
scientific interest and objects relating to the said life or first-mentioned objects or 
to events in or the history of the park. in such a manner that the area which 
constitutes the park. shall as may be and for the benefit and enjoyment of visitors. 
be retained in its natural state. 
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However, more recent government policy on PAs requires otherwise. For instance, the 
Government Gazette No.18163 (1997:34), specifically states that: 
The government will through the Land Restitution Programme, and in accordance 
with the Constitution of South Africa and the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 
1994, facilitate the settlement of land claims, taking into account the intrinsic 
biodiversity value of the land, and seeking outcomes which will combine the 
objectives of restitution with the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. 
This study initially aimed to provide a dynamic policy framework that integrated NPs 
managed under SANParks, with the development needs of local people (see Appendix 
1). To achieve this broad aspiration, this study aimed to determine the most 
appropriate institutional framework for integrating the development needs of local 
people with the biodiversity conservation goals of SANParks. Hence, the research 
approach to this study centred on two fundamental questions: what should SANParks 
consider when developing a policy framework, and what practical means exist to make 
such a policy framework successful? Answering these key questions required framing 
the research hypothesis on the basis of South African's previous attempts to integrate 
local people with the management of PAs, and on the constitutional requirements. 
In the post-apartheid South Africa, constitutional requirements introduce rights, and in 
particular the central issue of property rights. For marginalised black people, tenurial 
rights are assuming greater significance as issues of human rights take the centre stage 
of political debates. Of major relevance to conservation agencies is how the conceived 
rights of various local actors influence their attitudes to both PAs and biodiversity 
goals. As a result, the research hypothesis was broadened to include key PAs in the 
post-apartheid South Africa, stating that: 
The relationship between PAs and their local communities is best enhanced when 
such affected people enjoy some form of ownership. 
The hypothesis tests incentives and institutional arrangements for linking biodiversity 
conservation to rural development. Arising from this hypothesis is the need to test if 
indeed the central issue affecting the attitudes of beneficiaries to PAs is ownership. To 
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test this, case studies were investigated to contribute data that could give rise to policy 
recommendations that can ultimately assist the managers of PAs to link conservation 
to the socio-economic needs of local people. 
3.6. Rationale for choosing study areas 
South Africa offers a wide range of case studies that can test the research hypothesis 
that ownership affects attitudes of beneficiaries to various benefits arising from PAs. 
During the apartheid era, the participation of black people in conservation activities 
was mostly limited to homelands. In this context, the conservation agencies of the 
North West Province, Mpumalanga Province, and Limpopo Province, situated in the 
former Transvaal of apartheid South Africa, provided appropriate case studies for 
testing the present study hypothesis. Furthermore, these provincial conservation 
agencies also had long established histories of involving a wider spectrum of actors 
and beneficiaries, including both white and black people. 
A case study refers to the collective of assumed beneficiaries of the activities of a 
particular PA. One case study area was selected at each of three levels of ownership in 
each of the North West Province, Mpumalanga Province, and Limpopo Province, in 
situations where a continuum of ownership levels were mediated through the three 
provincial conservation agencies (Figure 3.3). Hence, the study sought to compare a 
total of nine case studies, three in each province. No case study of strong ownership 
that co-operated directly with the provincial conservation agency could be identified in 
Limpopo Province. However, Selati GR is entirely under private ownership and 
appropriately filled the gap. 
The basis for defining the three ownership levels was as follows: 
• Strong ownership refers to beneficiaries who, through legal documents, have 
rights over both land and wildlife, and extend full management control or have 
secure tenure over PAs. However, owing to South Africa's political history, 
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Figure 3.3. Research approach and the case study areas arranged by levels of ownership for 
each one of three provinces. As shown with these arrows, ownership is not absolute, but it is a 





Intermediate ownership refers to beneficiaries who have land title but lack full 
control of wildlife because the state has appropriated its control, and has in its 
discretion given nominal rights to identified communal owners. 
Weak ownership refers to beneficiaries without clearly defined tenurial rights 
over both land and wildlife. In this level of ownership, the state has given local 
rural black people marginal benefits from GRs, in the form of jobs, thatching 
grass, firewood and or subsidised meat. 
This typology of ownership does not take account of the extent to which different 
categories of owners exercise the rights appropriate to their level of ownership. For 
example, it could be argued that the level of intermediate ownership gives community 
members an even higher legal status to exercise their rights than those categorised as 
strong ownership level. However, those within the strong ownership level, primarily 
the white landowners with a long history of ownership, had very strong perceptions of 
their rights. Such experience of exercising a right can prove even more important than 
the provisions made for them in legal instruments. 
In all the nine case studies, benefits from different forms of resource use had to be 
somewhat comparable, thereby allowing comparison of consumptive (commercial 
safari hunting) and non-consumptive (photographic) tourism activities in each GR on 
an equal footing. Given the selection of these nine case studies, I will now outline the 
political economy of the three provinces, and their associated conservation agencies 
because these factors are most likely to have an influence on socio-economic situation 
of beneficiaries around each GR. The socio-economic status of the three provinces is 
well documented (Stats SA 1998; Burger 1999), and is briefly provided below. 
3.7. North West Province 
The North West Province is 116320 km2 in extent, had a population of about 3.5 
million people in 1996, and included much of the former Bophuthatswana homeland, 
known colloquially as 'Bop'. About 23% of adults older than 16 years in this province 
were uneducated. The province contributed 5.5% to South Africa's total GDP, with 
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mining contributing 55% to the economy of the province and employing a quarter of 
its labour force. In the selected case studies, the agency in charge was fonnerly Bop 
Parks, but it is now the North West Parks & Tourism Board (NWP). The study areas 
comprised Pilanesberg and Madikwe GRs, the latter of which contributed both weak 
and strong levels of ownership within different areas and contexts of Madikwe. 
3.7.1. Pilanesberg Game Reserve 
PHanesberg GR (Pilanesberg) is 550 km2 in extent (Figure 3.4), and was created by the 
state in 1979 to primarily to protect its unique geology. It is the second largest alkaline 
ring complex in the world, after the inaccessible and snow-covered Russian Kola 
Peninsula (Lurie 1973). Livelihoods of local people around Pilanesberg are peri-urban, 
being neither strictly rural nor highly urbanised. Nevertheless, the livelihoods of local 
people around Pilanesberg are cash-driven, initially due to rich iron ore and platinum 
mining in the Thabazimbi (meaning 'mountains of iron') and the platinum reserves of 
Rustenburg and Bafokeng areas, and later due to the tourism activities arising from the 
adjacent multi-million dollar Sun City Casino and other tourism resorts. During the 
time of Bop, local people were arbitrarily given ownership of some 80 km2 of land 
inside Pilanesberg, but wildlife is controlled by NWP&TB, and this makes them 
intennediate owners. However, with the introduction of Land Restitution Act, these 
local people are attempting to reclaim the entire Pilanesberg. 
3.7.2. Madikwe Game Reserve 
Madikwe GR (Madikwe) covers 750 km2 (Figure 3.4), and was established in 1991 on 
state land, based on three key assumptions: 1) that wildlife-based tourism was the best 
economic use of the acquired land; 2) that it would increase the value of the land and 
economically benefit local people whose lives depended on cash income and livestock 
production, and; 3) that the state, private sector, and local people would all equally 
benefit from the creation of Madikwe. Since both land and wildlife are state-owned, 
this makes local people weak owners. However, some adjacent landowners have use 

















Figure 3.4. The location of selected study sites in the North West Province. 
3.8. Mpumalanga Province 
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The Mpumalanga Province covers 79490 Jan2 in extent, had a population of about 3 
miJIion people in 1996, and incorporated the entire territory of the former homeland of 
KaNgwane. About 29% of adults were illiterate. The province contributed 8.2% to 
South Africa's total GDP, and had a well-diversified economy with one of the highest 
citrus-producing areas in the country, as well as rich coal reserves. However, tourism 
remains the main driver of the local economy, as the province has strategic road links 
with the neighbouring countries of Swaziland and Mozambique. The key tourist areas 
in the province include the south-western region of the Kruger NP with famous resorts 
such as Sabi Sand Reserve, and PAs under the Mpumalanga Parks Board (MPB), three 
of which were included in this study. 
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3.8.1. Mthethomusha Game Reserve 
Mthethomusha GR (Mthethomusha) covers 72 km2 (Figure 3.5), and was created in 
1986 on land owned by local people in the former KaN gwane homeland. The main 
purpose of establishing Mthethomusha was to reduce erosion of its mountain slopes 
caused by high cattle grazing. The name 'Mthethomusha' means 'new law' because in 
this situation, local people were not forcibly removed for its establishment. In fact, 
they co-owned the idea and agreed to resettle nearby. The livelihoods of local people 
around Mthethomusha are peri-urban, similar to those around Pilanesberg, but wildlife 
is state-controlled under MPH. In combination, these factors define these local people 
as intermediate owners. 
3.8.2. Songimvelo Game Reserve 
Songimvelo GR (Songimvelo) is 490 km2 in extent (Figure 3.5), and was created by 
the state in 1986 to protect its rich biodiversity. In fact, 'Songimvelo' means 'nature 
protection', and it contains some unique Cape plant species including archaeological 
evidence of human habitation dating back to both stone- and iron-age periods. The 
livelihoods of local people around Songimvelo are mainly rural, and are dependent on 
a mixture of livestock production and some cash income. Both the land and wildlife 
resources are controlled by MPB, and this defines local people around Songimvelo as 
weak owners. 
3.8.3. Ligwalagwala Game Reserve 
Ligwalagwala GR (Ligwalagwala) covers 120 km2 in extent (Figure 3.5), and was 
created in 1997. The establishment of Ligwalagwala was primarily motivated by both 
biodiversity conservation objectives and the need to create a viable tourism industry 
by pooling resources together. It is therefore an initiative to increase the size of 
conservation land and to increase tourism income by joining privately owned land 
with state land under MPB to form one relatively large contiguous area. As the 
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Figure 3.5. Location of selected study sites in Mpumalanga Province. 
3.9. Limpopo Province 
( 




Limpopo Province is 123910 km2 in extent, had a population of 5 million people, and 
it incorporated the former homelands of GazanJculu, KwaNdebele, Lebowa and Venda. 
About 30% of adults in the province were illiterate. The province contributed 3.7% to 
the country' s total GDP, mainly from state employment, commercial agricultural, and 
mining of copper, asbestos, iron ore and chromium. The tourism industry was far from 
being optimally utilised. The agency in charge of the selected GRs was the Limpopo 
Parks & Tourism Board (LTB). LTB managed two study sites, Makuya and Letaba 
GRs, while the third, Selati GR, was both privately owned and managed. 
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3.9.1. Makuya Game Reserve 
Makuya GR (Makuya) covers 158 km2 (Figure 3.6), and was created in 1984 on land 
owned by local people in the former homeland of Venda. Makuya is far removed from 
major metropolitan areas, and is accessible only by all-wheel-drive vehicles with high 
ground clearance. With only one bush camp, Makuya is underdeveloped and was used 
only for limited hunting. Furthermore, local people live some 50 km away from the 
reserve and their livelihoods are dependent on a mixture of livestock production and 
cash income, derived mostly from the local mines. Wildlife is controlled by LPB, and 
this defines local people as intermediate owners. 
3.9.2. Letaba Game Reserve 
Letaba GR (Letaba) covers 420 km2 (Figure 3.6), and was created by the state in 1981 
under the former homeland of Gazankulu. The Letaba was established mainly for 
commercial wildlife enterprises such as hunting. Like Makuya, Letaba is also poorly 
developed and does not even feature on key tourism guides of the country. Tourism 
activities in Letaba are sustained by limited and irregular hunting operations. The 
livelihoods of local people around Letaba are rural and are similar to those described 
for Makuya. Both the land and wildlife are controlled under LPB. In combination, this 
situation defines local people around Makuya as weak owners. 
3.9.3. Selati Game Reserve 
Selati GR (Selati) is 300 km2 in extent (Figure 3.6), and was established in 1993 as a 
nature conservancy. While the endemic cycad, Encephalartos dyerianus, gives Selati a 
special biodiversity feature, economic viability through co-operation forced private 
land owners to gave up unprofitable cattle ranching for commercial wildlife activities, 
such as hunting, selling live animals, and photo tourism. As already mentioned, Selati 
is independent of LPB, as it is entirely under the control of its private owners. Hence, 
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3.10. General study methods 
Applied policy research demands a fine balance between both theoretical research and 
applied research. Where applied policy studies straddle political transition, the need to 
cross-check the applicability of study recommendations becomes even more daunting 
than if the study was undertaken in less dynamic situations. 
In general, the study methods were divided as follows: 
• 
• 
Testing the ownership hypothesis required obtaining data from representative 
samples of the case studies outlined above. Invariably, social science methods 
were used to establish if there were differences between the three ownership 
levels. In this context, structured questionnaires adequately served the purpose. 
Testing the transferability of the study results since SAN Parks commissioned 
this study in order to provide policy guidelines that would integrate all national 
parks with the development needs of the neighbouring local people. Achieving 
this required gaining insights into SANParks by reviewing secondary data, 
both published and unpublished documents, and by triangulation. 
• Policy guidelines often follow from study results, but the changing political 
climate in the post-apartheid South Africa, dictated that policy guidelines 
should flow from the new legal contexts and not the other way round. 
3.10.1. Structured questionnaire surveys 
Obtaining information from people often requires using survey techniques. Indeed, 
survey research is widely used in social sciences (Babbie 1973), and has since evolved 
to include action-based approaches such as participatory research appraisal (Chambers 
1986). Modem survey methodologies can be traced back to ancient forms of human 
censuS (Neuman 1997). Briefly, all field techniques are based on a combination of 
complimentary approaches such as: observing; listening; and, asking questions that 
cover a broad spectrum from researcher structured to respondent and/or situation 
strUctured surveys (Byers 1994). Using different sources of information also provides 
cross-checks or triangulation (Chambers 1991; Furze et al. 1996; Neuman 1997). 
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For purposes of testing the study hypothesis, structured interviews using direct face-
to-face interviews was the most appropriate tool to sample local communities in the 
lesser ownership levels, comprising weak and intermediate owners. However, the busy 
schedules of strong owners dictated that the face-to-face technique be combined with 
telephone interviews. Refining the questionnaire involved pre-testing with the research 
assistants and testing in the field with respondents. There are two major disadvantages 
of using surveys. Firstly, they interfere with the routine of respondents. Secondly, they 
can provide misleading data when respondents attempt to please the researcher. The 
questionnaire data only provided a narrow perspective of the reality of respondents, 
and must be supported by, or triangulated with, other sources of data. 
3.10.2. Secondary data review 
Social policy research is a highly specialised field (Samson & South 1996; Pawson & 
Tilley 1996). In order to gain further insights into the various attempts by SANParks 
to include local people in the management of its national parks required researching 
archives to review annual reports, internal articles or magazines, organised workshops 
or conferences, and other published documents. The purpose of this exercise was to 
provide 'real life' experience of what SANParks went through in order to involve local 
people, and how it could overcome the challenges it faced. 
3.10.3. Triangulation 
As a policy study, there was a key need to 'ground-truth' the validity of observations 
made in both the analysis of results and in the review of secondary data. Accordingly, 
this required triangulation, a term originally used in land surveys using trigonometry 
(Bruinsma & Zwanenburg 1992). In the social sciences, triangulation is used to cross-
check the validity of results with other sources (Sapsford & Jupp 1996), because 
qualitative data are often blamed for lacking the tenets of 'good' science (Decrop 
1999). In this study, triangulation involved comparing findings with other researchers 
mainly in the discussion sections of each chapter in Chapter 7, which focused on the 
transformation attempts of SANParks. 
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Chapter 4 
Ownership and attitudes 
4.1. Introduction 
Biodiversity conservation is a social, economic, and political issue, whose success or 
failure needs to be defined within this broader context. It is a stewardship of natural 
resources for the public, and in partnership with the public. Accordingly, the problem 
in biodiversity conservation is the management of the public. Hence, biodiversity 
conservation is 90% managing the public and 10% managing the resource (Fazio & 
Gilbert 1986). Therefore, problems facing biodiversity conservation have their roots in 
how the public view and use natural resources. Traditionally, managers of PAs have 
focused on technical problems, but have generally been less successful in dealing with 
the public. Indeed, while the core activities of PAs focus on managing biodiversity 
(Caughley & Sinclair 1994), implementing successful programmes for these areas is 
fundamentally about managing public attitudes. 
Despite this, public attitudes are often treated as a peripheral issue to the management 
of many PAs. Since the public is amorphous, managers of PAs must try to identify the 
constituencies on whom success or failure of their desired programmes will ultimately 
depend. Local people neighbouring PAs are often regarded as a major constituency 
because the success or otherwise of efforts to conserve biodiversity requires their 
support. In the context of South Africa, with its racist history, the support of local 
people, now a powerful voting constituency, is essential to the long-term conservation 
of the country's biodiversity. Correspondingly, some of the country's conservation 
agencies are attempting to establish the attitudes of local communities neighbouring 
PAs to determine the extent to which they can influence their attitudes in order to 
achieve desired outcomes (Infield 1988). Since local communities are also amorphous 
(Murphree 1993), it is important to establish a range of key local communities that are 
linked to various PAs, and this is the key focus of this chapter. 
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Under apartheid, relationships between local communities and PAs were characterised 
by constant conflict and distrust (Carruthers 1989; Ellis 1994). Prior to South Africa's 
1994 democratic elections, surveys tended to focus mainly on the attitudes of black 
people towards PAs (Infield 1988). Understandably, the objective of these surveys 
was to test the extent to which the exclusion of black people from PAs had an 
influence on their attitudes to these areas. After the 1994 democratic elections, South 
Africa's new Constitution placed a great emphasis on creating one nation where every 
citizen has equal rights. It is therefore imperative that, where possible, the attitudes of 
all South Africans in key sectors of the country's political ecology be established in 
order to guide land refonn programmes, including relevant policies and strategies. 
Nevertheless, South Africa's 1994 democratic elections did not immediately end or 
destroy the unequal structures and patterns created by the apartheid regime. Rather, 
the 1994 elections satisfied an essential precondition for dealing with the apartheid 
legacy, in other words, to establish the principle of administrative justice (Budlender, 
et al.1998). Therefore, administrative justice should become the modus operandi that 
would create an institutional framework for legitimising South Africa's land refonn 
policy. However, ownership and distribution of limited land remains the cornerstone 
of South Africa's property rights. In fact, skewed ownership of land is one of the 
central legacies of the apartheid era that is still intact. While property rights and 
economic development fonn the basis of South Africa's democratic constitution and 
its Bill of Rights, property rights may strongly influence ownership of resources and, 
ultimately, the attitudes that people hold towards the resources contained on such land. 
The challenges are: to establish a legal way of effecting land refonns that can maintain 
political stability; to facilitate socio-economic growth without drastically undennining 
the Bill of Rights; and, ultimately, to assist the country to achieve national unity. In 
this chapter, I test the hypothesis that land rights and resource ownership together 
improve the relationship between PAs and potential beneficiaries. In order to test this 
hypothesis, I attempt to establish if indeed there are significant differences in attitudes 
between case studies around Game Reserves (GRs) under three levels of ownership, 
comprising strong, intennediate and weak owners (see Figure 3.1). 
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4.2. Methods 
Structured interviews, using a mixture of yes/no responses, and open-ended questions 
(Appendix 5) were conducted between March 1997 and February 1999. Respondents 
in both intermediate and weak ownership levels were interviewed going about their 
daily business in villages, houses or offices. For these lesser ownership levels, sample 
sizes were based on at least 10% of adults aged 16 years and above living in each 
targeted village around 'their' PA, based on the 1996 census (Stats SA 1998). For the 
relatively small group of strong owners, attempts were made to interview all 
respondents, using a combination of telephone surveys and face-to-face interviews. 
Briefly the questionnaire survey (shown in full in Appendix 5, interrogated individual 




Socio-economic status, important for assessing the local situation as well as for 
gaining insights into the composition of samples for each case study; 
Awareness about the existence of PAs from which respondents are supposed to 
realise real and perceived benefits; 
Attitudes about land use choices, important for establishing the level of support 
for conservation against other short- and medium-term livelihood benefits; 
• Perceptions of broad long-term issues of biodiversity conservation, such as its 
importance for posterity, and its contribution to the country's economy, and; 
• Needs and aspirations, important for establishing expectations of beneficiaries 
from each P A. 
4.3. Data analysis 
Completed questionnaires were available from 2901 respondents, comprising: 29 for 
strong ownership; 1607 for intermediate ownership; and, 1265 for weak ownership, 
each distributed between provinces as shown in Table 4.1. Once all the questionnaires 
had been cross checked and tallied, the questionnaire answers were re-organised using 
the descriptors illustrated in Table 4.2, in order to explain the basis of any differences 
between ownership levels. 
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Table 4.2. The re-organised questionnaire for analysis showing re-ordered questions and 
their original number from the questionnaire (Appendix 5), the statistical test to which each 
descriptor is subjected, and the section where the analysis for each descriptor is presented. 
No. Question Des~ril!tor {test! Section 
I Gender and age Socio-economic profile 4.4.1 
2 Currently earning a salary? 
2.1 If yes, monthly salary range? 
3.2 If no, receiving other income? 
3 Visited the PA? 
3.1 If yes, for what purpose? 
3.2 If no, why not? 
Benefits from PA3: 
9.2 Local people can collect firewood freely Short-term benefit (:;() 4.4.2 
9.3 Landless to be allocated P A land 
4.1 Develop P A land for mining, industry or agriculture Mid-term benefit (:;() 4.4.3 
4.2 Remove animals and redistributed P A land 
5 Government should fund the PA 
6 P A contributes to your livelihood 
9.1 PA protects biodiversity Long-term benefit (:;() 4.4.4 
9.4 Managers protect P A for our benefit 
9.5 Fences protect wildlife and people 
9.6 P A should be kept for posterity 
9.7 P A contributes to SA economy 
7 How does you or your community (currently) Aspirations (rank tests) 
benefit from P A? 
8 How would you or your community like to benefit 
from PA? 
P A agency effect (:;() Chapter 5 
Differences within provinces by ownership 
Determinants of Chapter 6 
attitudes (MLR) 
Socio-economic factors that determine attitudes 
Source: Adapted from Appendix 5 
;;hort-term benefits are immediately realisable from the relevant GR, while medium-term benefits are 
realisable after change of Current land use. Long-term benefits span both present and future generations. 
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The socio-economic profile of respondents, comprising: gender; age; and, 
sources of income, were summarised using descriptive statistics; 
Differences in proportions of "yes" and "no" answers were compared across 
different ownership levels, using a chi-square (i) test in the statistical package 
Minitab. 
Differences in needs and aspirations were ranked and analysed using rank tests 
in the statistical package Minitab. Differences were compared only between 
intermediate and weak owners, as the needs and aspirations of strong owners 
were totally different to those of lesser ownership levels. 
4.4. Results 
The comparisons between the three ownership levels were ordered into the socio-
economic profiles of respondents (4.4.1); their short-, medium- and long-term benefits 
(4.4.2); and, their needs and aspirations of respondents (4.4.3). Overall, the results 
showed very significant differences between strong ownership and the other two lesser 
ownership levels. Nevertheless, there were significant differences between the two 
lesser ownership levels. 
4.4.1. Socio-economic profiles by ownership level 
Of the 29 strong owners, 3 were females while the rest were males. In stark contrast, 
989 females (62%) and 618 (38%) males were interviewed amongst the intermediate 
owners, and these proportions did not differ (i= 3.35, df=2, P>0.05) from the 795 
females (63%) and 470 males (37%) interviewed amongst weak owners. The age 
range amongst the strong owners was 28 to 76 years, which differed markedly ci= 
3.35, df=2, P>O.05) from the age range amongst intermediate and weak owners, many 
of whom were in the younger band from 16 to 27 years (Table 4.3a). Absence of this 
younger age class among strong owners could have influenced results, and this could 
have significantly affected the differences between the strong and lesser levels of 
ownership, including the determinants of attitudes (see Chapter 6). 
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Table 4.3a. Age profile of respondents. 
Stron& ownershil! Intermediate owners Weak owners 
Ale class (~ears) No. PercentaBe No. PercentaBe No. PercentaBe 
16-21 388 24% 341 27% 
22-27 318 20% 258 20% 
28-33 3 10% 254 16% 204 16% 
34-39 4 14% 180 11% 138 11% 
40-45 3 10% 129 8% 107 9% 
46-51 8 28% 100 6% 72 6% 
52-57 3 10% 67 4% 42 3% 
58-63 2 7% 64 4% 39 3% 
>63 6 21% 107 7% 64 5% 
Total 29 100% 1607 100% 1265 100% 
All strong owners earned income, some (27%) from the PA in question and the rest 
from other sources (Table 4.3b). In comparison to the lesser levels of ownership, most 
strong owners were relatively wealthy individuals, over 90% of whom earned more 
income than the top earners among the two lesser ownership levels (Table 4.3b). 
Table 4.3b. Monthly income of respondents expressed in South African Rand (SAR) and 
US$ (with 1 US$=6SAR in 1999). 
Income Ran&e StronG owners Intermediate owners Weak owners 
InSAR InUS$ No. Percentse No. PercentaBe No. PercentaBe 
No income 1207 75% 1039 82% 
SlOO ~3 152 9% 100 8% 
501-1000 84-166 76 5% 51 4% 
1001-2000 167-333 89 6% 25 2% 
2001-3000 334-500 36 2% 23 10% 
3001-4000 501-667 17 1.06% 16 1.8% 
4001-5000 668-833 15 0.9% 6 0.5% 
5001-6000 834-1000 10 0.6% 
6001-7000 1001-1167 3 0.19% 1 0.08% 
7001-8000 1167-1333 3 10% I 0.06% 2 0.16% 
~OOOI ~667 26 90% 
Total 29 1607 100 1265 100 
Very few respondents (10%) among strong owners earned SAR7000-8000 (US$1167-
1333) per month, while the remainder earned well over SARI0000 (US$1667) per 
month. Most were managing other businesses, and were therefore reluctant to disclose 
their full incomes. In contrast, among lesser ownership levels, 78% of respondents 
combined earned no income, and of the small proportion that earned income, most 
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(61%) earned less than 8ARI000 (U8$166) per month, with no evident difference 
(P>O.05) between intermediate and weak ownership levels. 
All respondents (100%) among the strong owners had visited their neighbouring GRs 
(Table 4.3c). All the strong owners cited wildlife and landscapes as the main attraction 
for their visits to PAs. However, all respondents among strong owners recognised that 
they had the necessary transport such as motor vehicles to visit GRs. Indeed, some 
strong owners resided within their GRs and, as a result, found the question a bit 
irrelevant. Visiting PAs by the strong ownership level was correlated with both their 
life styles and tourism-related business activities, such as checking tourist transactions. 
In contrast, many fewer individuals among both intermediate (47%) and weak owners 
(57%) had visited their neighbouring GRs (Table 4.3c). The lesser owners required a 
great deal of financial sacrifice to visit their neighbouring PAs even when they needed 
to make the trip in order to look for work or to visit family relatives. Apart from 
lacking the culture to visit PAs, the costs of the visits far outweighed the benefits. 
Table 4.3c. Reasons for visiting and not visiting PAs. 
Stronl owners Intermediate owners Weak owners 
Reason No. Percentase No. Percentase No. Percentase 
For visiting: 
Enjoy wildlife and landscape 29 100% 205 16% 270 17% 
Stay in accommodation 12 1% 102 6% 
Look for work 256 20% 340 21% 
Work there 49 4% 113 7% 
See friends 74 6% 67 4% 
Total 29 100% 596 47% 892 55% 
For not visiting: 
Not interested 335 27% 455 29% 
Too expensive 334 26% 260 16% 
Total 669 53% 715 45% 
Only 16% of the lesser ownership levels cited wildlife and landscapes as the main 
attraction to visit PAs, while the rest either worked there or had gone to look for work. 
Furthermore, even if they had wanted to visit PAs, the lesser owners simply lacked the 
means, such as transportation or sufficient money, in order to make the trip possible. 
Accordingly, visiting PAs amongst lesser ownership levels was more dictated by the 
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necessity of meeting basic material needs rather than to relax or to appreciate wildlife 
and landscapes. Hence, only 21 % of lesser owners overall stated that they could not 
afford to visit because it was too expensive. The remaining half (49%) of the lesser 
ownership level indicated that they were not interested or even keen to find out what 
was happening inside PAs (Table 4.3c). In summary, the differences between strong 
and lesser levels of ownership are like two worlds apart in the context of visiting PAs, 
because they have totally different viewpoints on the use of PAs. To the strong 
ownership level, visiting PAs or their respective GRs is considered an integral part of 
their lifestyles, and perhaps a key aspect of conducting their business strategies. 
4.4.2. Attitudes to short-term benefits by ownership level 
Most strong owners did not support providing any immediately realisable benefits 
from PAs to local communities, whether this comprised free firewood collection or 
allocating land to landless people (Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4. Differences between the views of respondents to short-, medium-, and long-term 
benefits, according to ownership level (with S=strong, I=intermediate, and W=weak). 
Strong Intermediate Weak SvIvW IvW 
Time frame & variables ~%} !%l !%} t.: df=2 r.,: df=l 
Short-term: 
For free firewood collection 21 72 86 124.8··· 81.4··· 
For allocation ofland to landless 7 48 37 44.7"· 34.8··· 
Mid-term: 
Against development of P A land 97 41 38 41.8··· 2.6 
Against removing animals 97 50 64 80.3··· 56.4·" 
For state funding ofPA 59 51 63 39.3··· 41.3·" 
P A contributes to livelihood 97 54 49 28.5·" 7.1·· 
Long-term 
P A protects biodiversity 100 80 86 22.0·" 17.7·" 
Managers protect P A 97 71 78 28.3··· 18.2··· 
Fences reduce conflict 100 93 91 6.1· 4.1· 
Keep P A for posterity 100 87 84 9.9·· 5.0· 
P A contributes to SA econom~ 97 71 76 17.1·" 8.9·· 
Only 21 % of strong owners supported free firewood collection, compared with 72% of 
intermediate, and 86% of weak owners, respectively. Furthermore, there was even less 
support (7%) among strong owners for allocating some PA land to landless people, 
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compared with 48% of intermediate, and 37% of weak owners, respectively. These 
differences were significant, both between all three levels of ownership, and between 
intermediate and weak owners (Table 4.4). 
4.4.3. Attitudes to medium-term benefits by ownership level 
Almost none of the strong owners supported removing the animals from PAs (refer to 
Table 4.4). For example, 97% of strong owners were against both these medium-term 
benefits. In contrast, there was more, although not overwhelming, support among both 
intermediate and weak owners for developing P A land and for removing the animals, 
although the latter received less support. There was majority, but marginal support for 
state funding of the PA, with strong showing among weak owners. Almost all strong 
owners recognised that the PA contributed to livelihoods, while views were more 
evenly divided among intermediate and weak (Table 4.4). 
4.4.4. Attitudes to long-term benefits by ownership level 
Almost all the strong owners supported long-term benefits of PAs, including that the 
PA protects biodiversity that managers protect the PA for the common good, that PAs 
should be kept for posterity, and that PAs contribute to the South African economy 
(see Table 4.4). There was also very strong support among the intermediate and weak 
owners for the long-term benefits of PAs. Furthermore, there was greatest agreement 
between ownership levels on the value of fences in protecting people and wildlife, and 
on keeping PAs for posterity. 
4.4.5. Current benefits and expectations 
The benefits and expectations of strong owners were so totally different from those of 
lesser ownership levels that they could not be compared using Mann-Whitney rank 
tests. The benefits that strong owners received from associated PAs were rewards such 
as high returns on capital investment, and psychological fulfilment or 'the feel-good 
factor' of self-actuaIisation as a result of achieving objectives. In terms of aspirations, 
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strong owners simply expected more of the same rewards, namely, continued capital 
appreciation, high return on initial investment, and more of 'the feel-good factor' or 
increased self-actualisation. Clearly, the strong ownership level was into high order 
needs (Maslow 1970). In stark contrast, the benefits and aspirations among the lesser 
ownership levels were exactly the same, namely, jobs, development, and education, 
and both levels of ownership simply expected more of the same benefit (Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5. The current and expected future benefits of the lesser ownership level. 
Level of ownership 
Intermediate Weak Significance 
Current 1. Jobs 
2. Infrastructure development 
3. Education or awareness 
4. Electricity 
5. Subsidised meat 
1. Jobs } 
2. Education or awareness 
3. Infrastructure development P<O.005 
4. Firewood 
5. Subsidised meat 
Aspirations More of the same current benefits More of the same current benefits P<O.OO5 
The rank test showed significant differences between weak and intermediate owners in 
terms of prioritisation of these benefits and aspirations (Table 4.5). For weak owners, 
the benefits that they perceived from PAs were, in descending order of priority: jobs, 
education or awareness, and infrastructure development. For intermediate owners, the 
order of priority of the second and third expectations was reversed, and emphasis was 
placed on development needs, and less emphasis on environmental education. In the 
case of aspirations, the differences were not significant. In both situations, provision 
of energy and cheap meat ranked lower than other benefits. 
4.5. Discussion 
The level of ownership in PAs strongly influenced the attitudes of respondents to the 
time-related benefits that could be derived from PAs. In the context of the hypothesis 
that ownership influences the relationship between PAs and their beneficiaries, it is the 
strong ownership level had highly positive attitudes to PAs when compared to lesser 
ownership levels. However, the attitudes of all ownership levels varied significantly 
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according to the time frame involved, but this could equally have being influenced by 
factors such as the differences in the age classes of samples from the strong and lesser 
ownership levels, and as well as the social status of the different ownership levels. 
Based on short- and medium-term benefits, the strong ownership level supported PAs 
more than lesser ownership levels. However, all the ownership levels showed strong 
support for long-term benefits of having PAs, suggesting that they all supported the 
long-term ideals of biodiversity conservation. Despite this, the lesser ownership levels 
earned far less income than the strong owners, implying that, while the long-term 
ideals of biodiversity conservation are supported by all levels of ownership, the short-
to medium-term benefits of PAs were most likely to determine whether the lesser 
levels of ownership supported PAs or not. 
In terms of current benefits received from PAs and aspiration, the lesser ownership 
level viewed PAs totally differently from the strong owner. While the lesser 
ownership levels expected PAs to provide them with basic socio-economic benefits 
such as jobs, education, and infrastructure (good roads, water, and electricity), the 
strong ownership expected high order socio-economic benefits such the 'feel good 
factor' based on high returns on their investment. Of particular interest here was that 
the lesser ownership levels simply aspired for more of the same benefit, suggesting 
that the lesser ownership levels would always expect PAs, or the managing 
conservation agency, to contribute towards improving their livelihoods. Accordingly, 
the present study results should be interpreted and discussed in the context of how the 
various ownership levels were constituted. 
Initially, the strong ownership level developed through the wildlife ranching industry, 
and mainly from the desire by the ranch owner to have a wildlife retreat for their 
private enjoyment (Bothma 1996). Strong owners, invariably white people, benefited 
from the privileges associated with long established access to state PAs. By having 
long established access to PAs they internalised both the conservation and economic 
values of these areas. Indeed, the strong owners entrenched their rights to wildlife by 
establishing their own PAs. For instance, in 1995 there were about 5,100 registered 
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game ranches, and in 1997 these ranches increased in numbers to 8,000 covering 
150,000 km
2 
or 14% of South Africa's land surface (Du Plessis 1997). Through trial 
and error, white farmers recognised that wildlife ranching was more profitable than 
cattle farming in marginal rainfall areas (Robinson & Lademann 1998; Grossman et 
al. 1999). On fenced ranches, wildlife belongs to landowners, while it is state-owned 
and controlled on unfenced land (Glazewski 2000). In marginal rainfall areas, wildlife 
ranching performs better than agricultural farming in terms of financial returns on 
initial capital investment (Magome et al. 2000), and private wildlife ranchers are fully 
aware of these facts. 
The private wildlife ranching industry is no longer 'a tottering child' using trial and 
error, or 'gut instinct' (Bothma 2002), instead it has become a 'centre of excellence' 
(Bond 2004). By early 2000, wildlife ranches had increased in numbers to 9,000 
covering 170,000 km2 or 2.5 times the total area covered by state PAs (Bothma 2002), 
and this total excludes unregistered wildlife ranches (Magome 2003b). Recognising 
the contribution of private landowners to both the economy and to conservation, the 
state assisted them (Bothma 2002). In return, there were massive investments by white 
farmers in conservation, and this encouraged the government to leverage this success 
to achieve national goals (Magome 2003a, 2003b). 
In stark contrast, black people have been marginalised from the wildlife industry since 
colonial rule. Land dispossession through apartheid rule was more extensive and 
systematic, more protracted, and probably more violent and cruel than elsewhere in 
Africa (Bernstein 1997). This dispossession created a dichotomy of experiences at all 
levels between white and black South Africans, ultimately culminating into two sets of 
racially polarised views and attitudes on almost all aspects of the country's socio-
political economy. Indeed, nature conservation and an interest in wildlife have been 
largely the preserve of the privileged white people, those with the privilege and leisure 
to enjoy such pursuits (Kumleben et al. 1998). By restricting black people to 13% of 
the country's land surface, the apartheid regime got rid of those features of their land 
ownership that it found undesirable (Everson & Hatch 1999; Miller 2000). Ultimately, 
this dichotomy placed obstacles in the path of economic advancement of black people. 
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To the extent that this is true, the results of this chapter simply reflect the country's 
political dichotomy. In this context, simple scientific analyses play only a small part in 
explaining the human-environment interactions (Stott & Sullivan 2000). Furthermore, 
the need to develop a sound policy framework requires that the results of this chapter 
be further discussed in three key contexts: 1) testing the effect of ownership in terms 
of the study hypothesis; 2) the political ecology of ownership on the attitudes of the 
respondents to PAs, by unveiling the socio-political environment in which such 
ownership was initially crafted, and; 3) the political ecology of ownership in Southern 
Africa in terms of those studies involving only local communities, by removing the 
confounding effect of the strong ownership. 
4.5.1. Effect of ownership 
Strong owners showed more positive attitudes on most key measurements of attitudes 
towards PAs than lesser levels of ownership. Thus, the relatively small group of strong 
owners, with their management plans formalised through written agreements, showed 
cohesion and a shared common purpose. The net effect was that title to land and its 
associated wildlife use rights shifted the balance of power to a privileged group of the 
South African society. Most (76%) of these strong owners are white males, with the 
only exception of strong owners in Madikwe, who comprised four white women and 
three black men. The white females were commercial owners of land inside and 
outside of Madikwe, while the black men were predominantly cattle farmers with only 
lease rights on state land. While almost all white people in the strong ownership were 
pursuing the highly profitable benefits of Madikwe's wildlife tourism, black people in 
the same ownership level were only pursuing the less profitable cattle farming option. 
The relatively high socio-economic profile of strong owners showed that they had 
enjoyed long established access to PAs. In South Africa, white people have enjoyed 
access to PAs since 1898 when Kruger National Park was first established as a game 
reserve. Furthermore, other investments, jobs and pensions provided the bulk of non-
farm income for strong owners in South Africa (Benson 1986). Elsewhere, different 
socio-economic status between respondents accounted for some of the key observed 
74 
variations in attitudes to PAs (Jacobson 1991; Sanjay & Weber 1995). Availability of 
disposable income affects leisure and livelihood choices, particularly in situations 
where such choices require travel to expensive destinations. 
The attitudes of strong owners included in this study favourably compared with those 
of their counterparts in the USA (Benson 1986). Indeed, a high socio-economic status 
usually confers greater leisure time and mobility, more opportunity for enjoying the 
recreational advantages of nature, and less direct financial dependence on deriving a 
living from using its resources (Kellert 1996). Therefore, demographic and socio-
economic factors exerted greater influences on the attitudes of respondents, suggesting 
that local development needs are important (Mehta & Kellert 1998). In addition, 
appreciation of PAs varies between cultures, and the circumstances under which 
affected people provide for their daily livelihoods (Jachmann 1998). In stark contrast, 
the lesser ownership levels did not have a long-established practice of visiting PAs. 
Under the apartheid regime, the lesser levels of owners, comprising only black people, 
were denied access to PAs. The only meaningful choice left to them was to secure jobs 
in activities associated with PAs. In this context, it is financially expedient for the 
lesser ownership levels to value short- and medium-term benefits associated with PAs, 
because of discounting. Equally, it is difficult for the lesser ownership levels to justify 
state funding for PAs, as it would reduce funding for other welfare needs such as 
education, health, and social security. However, state funding subsidises management 
costs for PAs, explaining the support from strong owners who are in partnership with 
the state, for example at Ligwalagwala and Madikwe. 
Ligwalagwala and Madikwe were created as new models of state and private sector 
partnerships. The state provides the basic infrastructure such as land, fencing, wildlife, 
electricity, water supply, and road networks, while the private sector builds lodges to 
accommodate paying tourists, which in return pays lease and right-to-use fees to the 
state. This quid pro quo ensures that the state re-invests part of the lease money to 
maintain the integrity of its PAs (Magome et al. 2000), thereby further improving the 
investments of the private sector. However, for a completely private initiative such as 
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Selati, receiving state funding could limit their right to freely manage their land. The 
refusal of Selati owners to accept state funding limits interference by the public, who 
could otherwise object to the state enriching private individuals at their expense. For a 
long-term conservation development initiative to succeed, members must share 
common goals. In Selati, the seven founder members understood that success entailed: 
1) sharing of a common goal, and recognition amongst the founder members ensured 
that they were creating a new partnership, and; 2) understanding by the founder 
members that they were not striking a one-off deal but embarking on a process in 
which early focus had to be given to the legal structuring of the project (Snaddon 
1994). To ensure success, Selati's common long-term goal was agreed to and written 
in bold letters as: "to conserve and enhance the bio-diversity of the ecosystem and 
to realize its full economic potential on a sustainable basis" (Snaddon 1994:3). 
Similarly, the founder members of Ligwalagwala had a similar goal. However, high 
financial returns on initial investments were the primary motive for strong owners in 
Madikwe, while biodiversity conservation goal was a secondary spin-off (Davies 
1996; Magome 1996; Magome et al. 2000). In essence, these goals are similar since 
they are all based on attempts to generate sustainable economic benefits from 
biodiversity conservation. The shortfall of the Madikwe model might arise when the 
pursuit of financial returns starts to compromise long-term biodiversity conservation 
goals. However, practice so far demonstrates that strong owners recognise that they 
will not make a quick or high economic return on their initial capital investment, and 
so recognise the need to look after their business interests over the long term. 
Strong owners also have financial incentives that shape their attitude. Thus, 
conservation and utilisation of wildlife on private land in South Africa has contributed 
towards a change in the wildlife management profession (Benson 1989). Accordingly, 
strong owners did not support short- and medium-term benefits from changing land 
use, because they had already made a quantum leap to the most appropriate economic 
and productive use of land over the long term. The same cannot be said, however, 
about lesser owners for whom most of the benefits of PAs are less easily quantifiable, 
but for whom the opportunity costs of forced removal or denied access to resources 
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are real. Indeed, the lesser ownership levels were largely composed of unemployed 
respondents with poor levels of education. In stark contrast, high levels of education 
are generally associated with support for the natural world (Kellert 1996). 
Many among the lesser owners were poor or had low income, and the ratio of potential 
beneficiaries to that of available resources was high compared to that of the strong 
owners. Consequently, the lesser owners preferred short- and medium-term benefits 
that had the net effect of increasing benefit streams to their constituency. The lesser 
ownership levels visited PAs mainly to seek jobs as opposed to engaging in leisure 
activities. Their marginal support for PAs was evidenced by opting for agriculture or 
industrial development or industrial development over medium-term benefits from 
conservation, and suggested that they are unlikely to support PAs in the short- or 
medium-term when their survival needs were not met. It is likely that their level of 
support for environmental issues was tempered by the fact that their basic economic 
needs had not been met (Kivilu 2002). Given these social needs, the lesser ownership 
levels wanted PAs to provide immediate material gains, suggested by their strong 
utilitarian view of PAs. 
In South Africa, this utilitarian view of PAs has indeed been heavily promoted by 
some homeland agencies as part of their conservation strategies (see Odendal 1991; 
Molope 1988; Davies 1993; Anderson 1995). This utilitarian view further suggested 
that many local people supported conservation if they received material benefits. 
Elsewhere in South Africa and in Tanzania, some local communities supported PAs 
only on the basis of material benefits that they derived from them (Infield 1988; 
Newmark et al.1993). In contrast, this study covered three ownership levels, and 
because of South Africa's political history, it also encompassed two polarised racial 
constituencies. Thus, the antipathy of black people to both nature conservation and 
wildlife is of concern to the post-apartheid government (Kumleben et al. 1998). Sadly, 
this dichotomy also affected the views and attitudes towards PAs. The differences 
between the strong owners and lesser levels of ownership limited general comparisons 
with other studies on attitudes (compare to Infield 1988; Newmark et al. 1993). Other 
differences between strong and lesser ownership levels are related to issues of scale. 
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Generally, the smaller the number of people in an ownership level, the more effective 
they are in achieving stated goals. Thus, increases in scale complicate communication 
and decision making. Beyond certain levels, management must be bureaucratised with 
the attendant costs (Murphree 1998). For local people, due to large numbers of people 
involved, 'bureaucratised' systems will imply further inefficiency in the management 
of communal resources. There is also a relationship between ownership, economic 
value, and institutions. With weak ownership, people tend to form institutions only 
when resources have very high economic value. With strong ownership people tend to 
form institutions even when there is very little economic value to be derived from the 
resource in question (Bond 2001). Thus, people will not form management institutions 
when the combination of ownership and economic value are inadequate. Hence, the 
likelihood of people forming workable institutions increases with the strength of 
ownership (Bond 2001; Murphree 2002). While the lesser ownership levels lacked the 
incentives required to approximate the attitudes of strong ownership, the central issue 
here is a dual land tenure system in terms of inherited colonial property rights. 
In this historical context, communal tenure was formalised specifically to deny local 
people strong property rights (Murombedzi 1999). Ultimately, the trend in communal 
areas was for the local structures of governance to be replaced by conditions of open 
access with its ills (Turner 2000). As a result, the differences between strong and 
lesser ownership levels should be discussed beyond simple statistical analysis. The 
key question is: what is it about ownership that makes strong owners have more 
positive attitudes to PAs than lesser owners? While there is no simple cause-and-effect 
relationship, the answer is partly nested within the political economy of South Africa: 
how the interplay between politics and economic aspects of a nation state constitutes 
its political economy; how production, distribution, and consumption of goods are 
organised within its society. 
In South Africa, the concept of 'political' goes beyond this simple definition. The 
political economy of South Africa is well documented and is often described as a 'dual 
legacy of a deeply divided racial society' (Nattrass & Ardington 1990; Anwireng-
Obeng 1996; Schoeman 1998). Compared to other nation states, the political economy 
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of South Africa was systematically engineered under apartheid, an era of separate 
human development that asserted the superiority of white people over black people. In 
fact, the political and economic strategy was to design racist laws, rules, regulations, 
and practices aimed at benefiting the colonisers. As a result, the country's political 
economy was deliberately planned ostensibly to promote the interests of white people 
at the expense of black people. What is relevant here is how South Africa's political 
economy affected institutions, including property rights and the notions of ownership 
between white and black people. 
Ultimately, these historical developments left the country's political economy with, 
inter alia, a key strategic feature, namely, a centralised ownership of both land and big 
business in the hands of the few white people (Schoeman 1998). While white people 
in South Africa use their rights in property and land to secure capital growth, black 
people use their rights to maintain survival strategies. The net effect was that people 
with entrenched rights were compared to people with extinguished rights. South 
Africa's political economy polarised its minority white people from its majority black 
people in all aspects of their lives, essentially creating two worlds in one country: 
'first world' lifestyles for white people and 'third world' livelihoods for black people. 
As a result, the observed attitudes of respondents in this study mainly demonstrated 
the long established status quo in South Africa. 
The effect of South Africa's political landscape on the attitudes of its society, strong 
ownership (mainly white people) and lesser ownership (only black people), is further 
discussed in relation to the environment. Interpreting ownership in relation to political 
ecology is what Wolf (1972) termed 'ownership and political ecology'. Understanding 
full extent of the effects of institutionalised racism on the political ecology of South 
Africa, particularly in rural areas, is a pre-requisite for meaningful reform measures 
(Turner 2000). Political ecology, as politically located ideas of the environment and of 
the 'right' relationship of society to and within it, has existed unconsciously from the 
time people started to imagine environmental utopias and dystopias (Stott & Sullivan 
2000). In-depth analysis helps to reveal and to clarify the circumstances whereby 
differences within society mean that not all people experience environmental ideas in 
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the same way (Stott & Sullivan 2000). Furthermore, the limitations of conventional 
analyses of environmental data are that they rely heavily on scientific explanations, 
with both social and political dimensions either ignored or downplayed (Adams 2002). 
4.5.2. Political ecology of ownership in South Mrica 
In policy studies, contextualising the influence of politics on human attitudes to the 
environment offers better insights into observed patterns than relying on scientific data 
alone (Hammersley 1995; Fook 1996; Bryant & Bailey 1997; Bryant 1998; Gibson 
1999; Stott & Sullivan 2000; Anstey 2001; Adams 2002). During apartheid, there 
were some accounts of the interplay between society and environment (Cock & Koch 
1991; Griffiths & Robin 1997). Ironically, most conservation and development studies 
rarely draw from political ecology to explain either the results or the performance of 
projects. Much knowledge about the people and the environment is mythologised as 
scientifically correct, while ultimately being based on very little (Stott & Sullivan 
2000). By ignoring political ecology, some studies lack insights to produce sound 
policy guidelines. Indeed, methodologies of 'science' playa small part in explaining 
interactions of humans and their environment (Stott & Sullivan 2000). 
Political ecology provides explanations that take into account the dynamics and the 
properties of the politicised environment, and of how unequal power relations between 
different actors affect outcomes of interactions of society and its environment (Stott & 
Sullivan 2000; Adams 2002). Therefore, political ecology can shed more light on the 
results of the present study than depending on statistics alone. Much of the 20th 
century South Africa has been one of imposition of many constraints on black people, 
rather than of opening opportunities for them (Buttler et al. 1977). 
Under apartheid, conservation objectives were secondary to the political priority of 
establishing a society based largely on the privileges of white people (Khan 1989). 
Since South Africa is a legacy of dualism that was politically crafted ostensibly to 
separate black people from white people, a historical perspective for interpreting the 
polarised nature of environmental issues is indispensable (Khan 1989). This is because 
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the 'politics of ecology' (Cock 1991a) is at the core of this study. South Africa still 
has two racial constituencies for PAs, white people with easy access to PAs, and black 
people with restricted access. The results of this study mirror this reality. Under 
apartheid, offending black people were brutally assaulted by law enforcement officers, 
and subsequent fines imposed by the courts became another prohibition. These cruel 
practices often raised questions of human rights: are poachers 'victims or villains' 
(Klugman 1991) of 'fences and fines' (Carruthers 1995)? Therefore the differences 
between the attitudes of strong and lesser ownership levels on visits to PAs, and on 
short- and medium-term benefits, provide insights into the country's political 
landscape, and its effects on the socio-economic status of its racial constituencies. 
The debate on issues of environment and socio-economic has a long pedigree in South 
Africa (Glazewski 2000; Seleoane 2001; MacDonald 2002), and this influenced how 
the country's two major political constituencies, white people and black people, view 
environmental issues. Under the apartheid era, South Africa's PAs were 'playgrounds' 
for white people (Carruthers 1995). Except for a few national parks, almost all PAs 
were created to re-establish declining populations of 'game', basically comprising 
hunted large mammals, for the exclusive use of the country's white citizens. The hunt 
was a seminal rite of passage for young white males (Beinart & Coates 1995). Thus, 
the hunting industry stimulated a rapid growth in the number of private ranches 
(Bothma 1996). Indeed, the word 'park' was problematic because it conveyed ideas of 
a public recreational playground, and titles such as 'reserve' had connotations of 
exclusivity (Carruthers 1997). In fact, the term 'game' instilled a strong commercial 
use of wildlife because it is in most situations, highly associated with recreational 
hunting of wildlife species. With time, some PAs became important cash generating 
areas, as photographic tourism started to compete with the hunting industry. 
South African PAs were deeply political because racial privilege dictated access to 
resources, and issues of power intensified as a result of opportunity costs, restricted 
access, and denied rights. Hence, the problems and costs of PAs depend on the extent 
to which long-term conservation goals conflict with short- to medium-term needs of a 
people (Bell 1984b). Since short-term economic gains are likely to replace long-term 
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rewards, any discussion of my results needs to frame the issues of access and control 
in a broader political context (Zemer 2000) of rights and privileges (Beinart 2003). In 
South Africa, local people have been influenced by social, political, and economic 
factors, both in time and space. Accordingly, the present results reflect the country's 
colonial and racial history, and are a snapshot of its transition from this history into a 
yet undefined future. What is relevant here is how this history affected the present 
results, in terms of the attitudes and behaviours of both lesser and strong owners. 
The creation and management of South Africa's PAs was part ofa socio-political plan 
of land use that was systematically engineered by the apartheid regime. At the height 
of apartheid (1913-1983), black people were legally prohibited from visiting PAs 
except as employees (Khan 1990). This situation somewhat changed with the creation 
of homelands for black people, as some PAs fell under the homeland management 
systems. However, homelands did not rectify problems caused by isolating and 
restricting black people from PAs. While some homeland agencies tried to integrate 
local people with PAs, these efforts could not rectify land rights, which were 
essentially a national problem. Thus, when the concept of property rights is applied in 
South Africa in relation to land, its effectiveness is restricted (van der Merwe 1990). 
In the context of PAs, understanding of property rights reflected exclusive access only 
for white South Africans that focused on big game (Cock 1991a, 1999b), and its 
commercial use in private game ranches (Bothma & Teer 1993; Bothma 1996). The 
net effect of this approach was to entrench the rights of all white South Africans 
towards PAs. In fact, many of the country's game ranches were created in 1950s for 
economic returns often associated with the hunting industry (Steyn 1966; Joubert 
1968; Grossman 1989). While white people narrowly associated PAs with the notion 
of pristine nature, black people associated PAs with forced removals, denial of access 
to natural resources and creation of privileges for the white minority (Glazewski 
1999). Indeed, denying black people rights included land rights, in the most 
economically viable parts of the country (Miller 2000). With the majority of black 
people trapped in a continual battle to survive, few had the means, the inclination, or 
the leisure to engage in the country's conservation activities (Khan 2002). 
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It would be naIve to expect black people, largely peasants, to have the same positive 
attitudes to PAs as white people, who were mainly entrepreneurs. Thus, for the strong 
ownership level, privately owned game ranches are investments in real property that is 
tradable and can be used as collateral for other investment, thereby increasing choices. 
In Zimbabwe, a large number of commercial farms have converted to game ranches as 
a result of the 1975 amendment to the Wildlife Act, which gave ownership of wildlife 
to the landowner. While white farmers involved in game ranching used the full gamut 
of activities such safari hunting, cropping for venison and hides, trading in live 
animals, and photographic tourism (Martin 1984b), the biggest challenge was to bring 
the rural peasant sector into the wildlife industry through the CAMPFIRE programme 
(Martin 1984b; Murphree 1984). 
In South Africa, private game ranching has made conservation gains through profit 
incentives for white farmers (Luxmoore 1985). Private land ownership in South Africa 
has a strong Caucasian ancestry because the owners of private lands are mainly white 
people of European descent (Benson 1989). Over time, these white people evolved 
capitalist systems of wildlife ownership similar to those in other developed countries 
such as the United States of America. Hence, wildlife is a source of income for white 
farmers and they treat it as such through good management (Benson 1986, 1989). In 
contrast, the immediate concerns of the lesser ownership levels are to sustain their 
livelihoods, and land-based strategies are central to achieving this. South Africa's rural 
popUlation of over 11 million black people live in communal areas of the former 
homelands (Van Horen & Eberhard 1995), and they need land in order to sustain their 
livelihoods (May 1996; Cousins 1999), but this is unavailable (Miller 2000). These 
land-based livelihood strategies focus on meeting basic survival needs such as small 
scale subsistence farming, and trade with natural resources (Shackleton et al. 2001). 
The attitudes of the lesser ownership levels correlate closely with their survival needs. 
For black people still reeling under the impact of apartheid laws, and struggling to 
survive the harsh socio-economic and political climate created by these laws, and with 
few opportunities for quality education or leisure time in PAs, conservation issues 
were of extremely low priority, if indeed they were thought of at all (Khan 2002). 
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Contrast these black people with established white people using their land as game 
ranches, and in some situations through partnership with state-PAs to exploit the 
choices associated with the lucrative wildlife-related industry. While the rights of 
strong owners were psychologically and socially entrenched, and were also protected 
by the law, the rights of the lesser levels of ownership were extinguished without legal 
recourse. The social engineering that characterised the apartheid rule was linked to the 
ways in which occupation ofland, and resources were regulated (de Villiers 2003). 
It can be posited that this study unfairly compared an advantaged and enfranchised 
minority of South African society to its majority of disadvantaged and disenfranchised 
citizens, and such a comparison is seldom done. While in the democratic South Africa, 
black and white people are supposedly equal in law, the former have economic power, 
and the latter have political power. Consequently, the words 'in a democratic South 
Africa' designate a long-cherished but still unrealised ideal (Cowen 1999). For policy 
guidelines, the key question is whether the marginal attitudes of disenfranchised lesser 
owners can be changed to approximate to those of the enfranchised strong ownership 
observed in the present study, assuming that the attitudes of the strong ownership are 
desirable for the long-term conservation of the country's biodiversity. The answer to 
this question depends on what the government wants to achieve in terms of allocating 
rights and various incentives to its constituencies for biodiversity conservation, and on 
how a particular constituency wants to use such allocations. 
To improve the land ownership of disadvantaged South Africans, the government has 
introduced a land reform programme, a sensitive political issue that must balance the 
issues of social justice against those of the broader socio-economic goals of creating a 
stable and viable economy. In the context of this study, the apartheid government 
created incentives for its powerful political constituency by entrenching their property 
rights. The quagmire is that Restitution of Land Rights Act epitomises the paradox at 
the heart of the struggle for social justice in South Africa, for it poses questions about 
whether a society can ever hope, by a dint of a fresh law-making, to undo the effects 
of past unjust laws (Budlender et al. 1998). While restitution and environmental rights 
of black people can be achieved by targeting basic survival needs (Khan 2002), the 
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elite status of white people increases their wealth (Burgess 2002). However, for the 
first time since the 17th century, black people in South Africa can now form a juristic 
person, a Communal Property Association (Act 28 of 1996), to acquire, hold, and 
manage property on an agreed basis by community members based on a written 
constitution. While the white people of South Africa use their rights in PAs to 
leverage income, black people are still trying to learn the ropes. The key question is 
whether local people wish to maximize financial returns on their land investment or 
whether they wish symbolic rights (Magome & Murombedzi 2003). However, if local 
people wish to maximize returns from PA under secure tenure rights, they may have to 
use modem conventional business principles. 
4.5.3 Political ecology of ownership in southern Africa 
In most African countries wildlife is a state owned resource. Furthermore, the manner 
in which local people participate in conservation activities is strongly influenced by 
the wider political context, and macro policies affecting access to land and natural 
resources vary among different countries (Little 1994). Ownership of both wildlife and 
land has a crucial bearing on how local people view their participation in conservation 
efforts (Murphree 1997; Glazewski & Bradfield 1999). Without very clearly defined 
tenurial rights, the sine qua non of power, local people lack incentives to participate in 
conservation efforts that were designed for their benefit (Magome et al. 2000; 
Murphree 2003). So far, this chapter has shown that strong owners enjoy secure land 
rights, but this is mostly limited to a privileged sector of South Africa. Therefore, 
various attempts to link local people to successful biodiversity conservation initiatives 
boil down to two harsh realities - disenfranchised rural people with weak rights, and 
developing countries with limited resources to improve livelihoods of their citizens. 
Most rural people of southern Africa live on state land, in conditions where the state 
cannot manage resources, and where local people have neither the motivation nor the 
authority to manage the resources themselves (Murphree 1991). Indeed, small-scale 
black farmers exist in the fiefdoms of bureaucracy under tenurially discriminatory 
conditions, in systems where title deeds are regarded as emblems of competence, and 
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communal land ownership the badge of incompetence (Parker 1993). Ironically, land 
reform policies of the region have failed to change the situation. The main reason for 
this failure is that post-colonial governments are interested in economic growth, which 
is centrally driven and controlled (Murphree 1997). Therefore, the success or failure of 
communal resources is influenced by central policy imperatives. 
Post-colonial political land settlements in southern Africa have been dominated by 
concerns over the fate of the colonial settler class, thereby further entrenching their 
property rights (Murombedzi 1999b). In essence, most countries of the region have 
maintained the status quo, except that only the new political elite has also become the 
strong owners observed in this present study. At the local level, most government 
priorities encompass the appropriation of power and value from the centre (Murphree 
1997; Gibson 1999). The region's rich wildlife resources are used to control political 
constituencies. Indeed, the significance of wildlife makes it a political commodity, and 
politicians use it to discriminate between allies and enemies (Gibson 1999). Hence, the 
local people are most unlikely to enjoy benefits from wildlife with state interference. 
In Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, land reform policies are mainly based on 
land redistribution, as well as land tenure reform, in order to ensure some security of 
tenure for local people who did not have any such security during the colonial era 
(Murombedzi 1999). As land and natural resources have assumed greater economic 
and political values, post-colonial authorities have also expropriated resources for 
themselves. As a result, communal tenure suggests that local communities can control 
only those few resources with negligible values (Murombedzi 1999). It is evident that 
devolution of authority to local people in the context of natural resources is a complex 
issue, raising a number of fundamental legal and institutional questions, which go to 
the very heart of sustainable development (Glazewski 2000). 
In Namibia, over 90% of the populations of some large wildlife species are located 
outside formally proclaimed PAs, largely on agricultural land (Richardson 1998). In 
wildlife-rich communal areas of Namibia, residents of communal areas can be granted 
conditional ownership of certain wildlife species, the right to other species through a 
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pennit system, the right to buy and sell wildlife, and this has encouraged local people 
to fonn conservancies. In this context, local people define ownership in tenns of their 
connection to wildlife based on cultural values, rather than on property rights derived 
from the state (Jones 1999). As a result, property rights are important to local people 
in tenns of improving their livelihoods. By pooling their land resources together to 
improve economies of scale, perhaps they may in time achieve the entrepreneurship of 
strong owners. Where local people have land titles and some limited control over the 
natural resources, as is the case with land claims within PAs of South Africa, it 
depends on what they wish to achieve with acquired land. 
In spite of these laudable efforts, providing security of tenure to local people appears 
to be fraught with difficulties. For example, in South Africa many rural people 
experienced total disruption of their indigenous systems and traditional structures of 
communal tenure, because they were perverted and destroyed by externally imposed 
administration (Turner 2000). In fact, most dimensions of the so-called communal 
management in rural areas of South Africa are in disarray, and require legal attention 
in the draft bill on communal land rights. However, the government seems detennined 
to ignore advice or to overlook mistakes of other countries like Kenya, where imposed 
land titles did not resolve or secure livelihoods issues of the poor. 
In communal areas of Zimbabwe, local communities do not view themselves as the 
joint owners of wildlife. Rather they continue to see wildlife as a resource that belongs 
either to the state or to the rural district council (Murombedzi 1994). Correspondingly, 
attempts to foster local people's participation in conservation through the distribution 
of revenues from wildlife without devolving rights to such people, does not improve 
local stewardship of those resources, regardless of the extent of revenues distributed 
(Murombedzi 1999a). Furthennore, these local communities cannot use their limited 
rights in wildlife to the extent that they can gain an increased stake in its multiple level 
of value. Since property rights are the foundations of resource use, management and 
conservation (Everson & Hatch 1999), local people are constrained from reaching full 
resource utilisation by entitlement failure (Murombedzi 1999b). The challenge for the 
state and its policy advisors is how to enhance entitlements or how to use entitlements 
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frameworks to improve livelihoods of local people. However, post-colonial African 
governments continue to deny local people full authority to own the wildlife resources 
among which they live. 
The management of communal lands is dynamic and challenging (Everson & Hatch 
1999), but the post-colonial models still treat them as static (Barrow & Murphree 
2001), Thus, as in colonial times, communal lands are still held in the fiefdoms of 
state bureaucracies, political elites and their private sector business partners (Murphree 
2003). In situations where the community structures have been revived, local people 
neither manage nor control the resources on their lands (Gibson 1999; Dore & Chafota 
2000; Murombedzi 2003). This situation continues unchanged throughout much of 
southern Africa, of the rest of Africa, and in many developing and many developed 
countries (Murphree 2003). Correspondingly, the discourse of the performance of 
communal lands often ignores the pressures of the broader political ecology in which 
projects operate (Koch 2004a). 
In Zimbabwe, while the Wildlife Act of 1975 granted full ownership of wildlife to the 
private landowners (Martin 1984b), the Communal Lands Act of 1982 only vested the 
ownership of communal resources with the state and assigns rural district councils the 
power to regulate resource use in such communal lands (Murombedzi 2001). A central 
feature of all these developments is a lack of devolution to local communities (Anstey 
2001). Therefore, as currently constituted, local people are most unlikely to 
approximate the status of strong owners observed in this study. Furthermore, the 
diversity of stakeholders and socio-economic conditions makes it difficult to apply 
formal management regimes to communal lands (Benson 1989; Everson & Hatch 
1999; Els 2002a). The problem becomes acute and compounded where biodiversity 
resources contribute little to livelihoods (Magome & Fabricius 2004). 
Given all these constraints, what should local people do? In situations where wildlife 
is profitable, local people are advised to commercialise part of their equity to 
competent individuals or agents that can match the sophisticated world of managing 
the tourism industry (Magome & Murombedzi 2003). Commercialising does not mean 
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selling off, but outsourcing those aspects of resource management that fall outside the 
core competencies of local people. Most, if not all, communal rights are combinations 
of communal and individual assets (Fabricius & Koch 2004). Failure to recognise this 
has crippled the multiple nature of rural livelihood strategies (Turner 2004). 
In theory, control over spatial access through clearly defined rights and boundaries has 
been emphasised as an essential factor in effective communal control over resources 
(Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990; Western & Wright 1994). In practice, rights alone do not 
constitute sufficient conditions for justice, whether as communal control, capture of 
benefits, or resource management (Zerner 2000; Hulme & Murphree 2001). Access to 
other goods and services such as markets, is equally important. Therefore, analysts and 
advocates of communal resource management regimes need to frame issues of access 
and control in a broader multidimensional context (Zerner 2000). Indeed, communal 
approaches to biodiversity conservation have a strong economic rationale (Emerton 
2001). Despite this, issues of both access and control pass each other by, like ships at 
night (Turner 2004), because analysts often fail to realise that in rural development, 
the concept of a community is an imposed social construct (Koch 2004b). 
4.6. Conclusions 
Strong ownership clearly has played a key role in influencing positive attitudes of a 
few respondents to PAs in South Africa. However, in this situation strong ownership 
has enjoyed entrenched rights with a long history of resources management. The major 
difference in the present study is that: 1) relatively wealthy individuals in the strong 
ownership level were compared to relatively poor individuals in lesser levels of 
ownership; 2) small and cohesive groups were compared to large and uncoordinated 
masses of local people that, as it appeared, hardly shared a common vision; 3) strong 
rights were compared to weak rights that had been extinguished de jure; and 4) astute 
entrepreneurs with well developed business acumen were compared to peasants trying 
to eke out a living under difficult rural conditions. The central challenge facing policy 
makers is whether this situation can be reversed. 
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In essence, the results of this chapter epitomise the uneven power balance between 
black and white people of South Africans. These 'racial inequalities should largely be 
understood in terms of deeply ingrained white power and black powerlessness' 
(Terreblanche 2002:391). In South Africa racial discrimination has been a major factor 
in shaping access to natural resources (Beinart 2002) because of the country's 'legal 
pluralism' (Bekker et al 2002). While the principles of game ranching can be applied 
in rural areas to promote socio-economic development of local people (Els 2002a), 
they are often limited to how the private landowners can involve local people (Els 
2002b-c). Under these conditions, expecting the results to show otherwise would be 
like assuming that the post-apartheid South Africa has already completely nullified the 
existence of apartheid, implying that it was pro non scripto. However, some homeland 
conservation agencies attempted to nullify the apartheid divide, and this is the object 
of the next chapter. 
90 
Chapter 5 
Conservation agencies and attitudes 
5.1. Introduction 
The World Conservation Srategy (IUCN 1980) is often regarded as the first global 
attempt to encourage conservation agencies to win the support of local people for the 
goals of biodiversity conservation. In Africa, an early recorded attempt to integrate the 
needs of local people with PAs began in Kenya in 1960 when recommendations were 
made to preserve the hunting rights of the Wata tribe along the Tsavo National Park 
boundary (Parker & Amin 1983). However, implementation of the recommendation 
was scuppered by the conservation philosophy of the Kenyan Wildlife Department 
(Adams & McShane 1992). Evidently, the philosophies and policies of conservation 
agencies do influence the success or otherwise of integrating PAs with local people. 
Integrating people in biodiversity conservation is a contested issue because long-term 
benefits of conservation often conflict with its short-term needs (Bell 1984b). Thus, 
conservation awareness is often used as a means of influencing public attitudes. While 
educating the public about conservation is important, two key factors should be noted 
(Price 1984). Firstly, each stakeholder group among the public has different opinions 
and interests, and relates to conservation objectives in different ways. Secondly, each 
must be reached differently. In spite of its key role, monitoring of public opinion has 
tended to be neglected in the past because it is time consuming, it has less immediate 
appeal than classical ecological studies, and it often produces data that managers of 
PAs do not want to hear (Bell 1984b). 
In South Africa, notable attempts to meet the needs of local people living adjacent to 
PAs started in the early 1980s when the homelands governments established their own 
conservation agencies. Apart from material benefits that local people received from 
I 
homeland conservation agencies, some agencies introduced conservation education. It 
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can be argued that conservation education was part of a philosophy to instil a sense of 
ownership of PAs in local communities, in order to overcome some bad attitudes that 
were associated with apartheid conservation agencies. In the context of the present 
study hypothesis, the conservation agencies of the North West Province, Mpumalanga 
Province, and Limpopo Province offered the opportunity to further test the success or 
otherwise of these efforts (Chapters 3&4). 
In Chapter 4, I showed that strong owners were significantly more supportive in all 
aspects of their attitudes towards protected areas (PAs) than lesser owners over the 
short-, medium- and long-term benefits. While various factors were responsible for the 
favourable attitudes of strong owners, mostly white people with secured rights in PAs, 
the key challenge facing South African conservation agencies is to win the support of 
the lesser ownership levels, comprising black rural people adjacent to PAs. As 
previously mentioned, white people with strong rights in PAs have had a long history 
of access to PAs, which pre-dates the influence of homeland conservation agencies. 
Indeed, as was apparent with the private owners of Selati, it is highly unlikely that the 
attitudes of strong owners were influenced by the conservation agencies included in 
this study. As a result, this chapter focuses exclusively on the influence of 
conservation agencies on the attitudes of the lesser ownership levels, popularly known 
as 'local communities' in other similar studies, and hereafter referred to as such. 
5.2. Methods 
Data from the same structured questionnaire (Chapter 4) were used for respondents in 
the lesser ownership levels, comprising only the intermediate and weak owners. The 
same description of time-related benefits as used in Chapter 4 were again used, except 
that data from strong owners were excluded because they were not relevant for the 
purposes of this chapter. Data on the needs and aspirations of the local communities 
are used in this chapter to ascertain the extent to which they related to conservation 
agencies and attitudes. However, the approach here was centred on how conservation 
agencies, or provincial contexts, or a combination of both, influenced attitudes of local 
communities to short-, medium-, and long-term benefits arising from PAs. 
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5.3. Data analysis 
The questionnaire data (Chapter 4) were re-analysed using chi-square tests (i) to test 
the difference between: 1) intermediate and weak owners based on the three provincial 
conservation agencies; and, 2) to test for differences between intermediate and weak 
ownership level within provincial agencies. Secondary data on other factors affecting 
livelihoods of local communities were obtained from Stats SA (1998). 
5.4. Results 
Briefly, the effect of provincial conservation agencies on the attitudes of respondents 
is examined at three levels. Firstly, there were significant effects on all other variables 
across all time frames between the three ownership levels, except for 'state funding for 
PAs' and for 'fences reduce conflict' (5.4.1). Secondly, significant differences were 
observed within ownership levels according to provinces at all levels (5.4.2). Thirdly, 
secondary data on people's livelihoods provided insights into the results (5.4.3). 
5.4.1. Difference between provincial owners 
Among the intermediate owners (Table 5.1a), there were significant differences over 
the short-term benefits of free firewood, which resulted from marginal support (55%) 
in Makuya (Limpopo Province) compared to strong support (76%) from Pilanesberg 
(North West Province), and even much stronger support (86%) from Mthethomusha 
(Mpumalanga Province). In stark contrast, respondents at Pilanesberg were the least 
supportive (28%) of giving land to the landless, compared to marginal support from 
Makuya (58%) and Mthethomusha (57%). For the medium-term benefits, respondents 
from Pilanesberg showed marginal support for industry (49%) while there was less 
support from Makuya (39%) and Mthethomusha (36%). However, some respondents 
at Makuya were less against wildlife (44%) compared to marginal support from those 
at Pilanesberg (53%) and Mthethomusha (52%). Long-term benefits were generally 
well supported, but Mthethomusha respondents were least supportive of the potential 
of PAs to improve the economy (63%) and to protect biodiversity (69%). 
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Table S.la. Differences between the views of provincial respondents among the intennediate 
owners to the short-, medium- and long-tenn benefits, with ***=P<O.OOl, **=P<O.OI, and 
*=P<O.05. 
Time frame & variables Makuya Pflanesberg Mtbetbomusba t,df=2 
(%) (%) (%) 
Sbort-term: 
For free firewood collection 55 76 86 139.5"'" 
For allocation of land to landless 58 28 57 124.2"''' 
Mid-term: 
Against deVelopment of P A land 39 49 36 20.6"'" 
Against removing animals 44 53 52 11.8"· 
For state funding ofPA 50 50 54 1.4 
P A contributes to livelihoods 49 53 59 10.5"'''' 
Long-term: 
P A protects biodiversity 90 81 69 78.5"''''''' 
Managers protect P A 78 64 71 27.2"''' 
Fences protect people & animals 92 92 93 0.5 
Keep P A for posterity 92 84 81 26.5"''' 
P A contributes to SA economl 75 74 63 20.5"''' 
Among the weak owners (Table 5.lb), short-term benefits of free firewood were least 
supported (27%) at Letaba (Limpopo Province) compared to the strong support (73%) 
at Songimvelo (Mpumalanga Province), and even stronger support (78%) at Madikwe 
(North West Province). However, 67% of respondents at Songimvelo wanted some of 
the P A land reallocated to the landless compared to the weak support at both Letaba 
(25%) and Madikwe (23%) for this measure. 
Table S.lb. Differences between the views of provincial respondents among the intennediate 
owners to the short-, medium- and long-tenn benefits, with ***=P<O.OOI, **=P<O.OI, and 
*=P<O.OS. 
::Time frame & variables 
Short-term: 
Letaba '%2 Madikwe '%2 Sons!mvelo '%2 'zdf=2 
For free firewood collection 27 78 73 297.8"''''''' 
For allocation of land to landless 25 23 67 206.9"''''''' 
Mid-term: 
Against development of P A land 34 51 33 33.0"'" 
Against removing animals 60 51 62 16.5"· 
For state funding ofPA 58 55 77 44.8"· 
P A contributes to livelihoods 44 51 56 14.9"· 
Long-term: 
P A protects biodiversity 84 91 84 9.2"'''' 
Managers protect P A 75 81 81 6.1'" 
Fences protect people & animals 92 86 92 10.4" 
Keep P A for posterity 92 90 97 15.1"''''''' 
P A contributes to SA economy 75 87 66 48.8"'" 
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For medium-term benefits, there was marginal support against industry at Madikwe 
(51%) compared to least support at Letaba (34%) and Songimvelo (33%). For long-
term benefits, notable differences are on the contribution of PAs to the economy and 
for keeping them for posterity. Except for low support at Songimvelo on the economic 
importance of PAs, long-term benefits are well supported by all owners. 
5.4.2. Difference within provinces by ownership 
In the North West Province (NWP), there were few differences (Table 5.2a) on short-
term benefits between weak (Madikwe) and intermediate owners (Pilanesberg), with 
short-term benefit of allocating some PA land to the landless being strongly resisted 
by both ownership levels. There were significant differences on medium-term benefits 
against removal of wildlife, with strong support (74%) from Madikwe. Although there 
were significant differences on long-term benefits, the overall results showed that the 
NWP had stronger support for its PAs with little variation between ownership levels. 
Table S.2a. Differences between the views of respondents to short-, medium- and long-term 
benefits among intermediate and weak owners in North West Province, with ***=P<O.OOl, 
**=P<O.Ol, and *=P<O.05. 
Time frame & variables Intermediate (%) Weak(%) t,df-Z 
Short-term: 
For free firewood collection 76 78 0.6 
For allocation ofland to landless 28 23 2.3 
Mid-term: 
Against development of P A land 49 51 0.5 
Against removing animals 53 74 34.8"''' 
For state funding ofPA 50 55 1.9 
P A contributes to livelihoods 53 51 0.4 
Long-term: 
P A protects biodiversity 81 91 15.9"'** 
Managers protect P A 84 81 1.2 
Fences protect people & animals 92 86 8.9"''''''' 
Keep P A for posterity 84 90 5.9* 
P A contributes to SA econom~ 74 89 26.3"''''''' 
In contrast to NWP, Mpumalanga Province (MP) had significant differences for short-
term benefits (Table 5.2b), with about 67% of weak owners (Songimvelo) supporting 
allocating land to landless people than 57% of intermediate owners (Mthethomusha). 
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Table 5.2b. Differences between the views of respondents to short-, medium- and long-term 
benefits among intermediate and weak owners in Mpumalanga Province, with ***=P<O.OOl, 
**=P<O.Ol, and *=P<O.05. 
Time frame & variables Intermediate (%) Weak(%) t, df=2 
Short-term: 
For free firewood collection 86 73 26.4··· 
For allocation ofland to landless 57 67 9.6" 
Mid-term: 
Against development of P A land 36 33 0.7 
Against removing animals 52 62 9.0·· 
For state funding ofPA 54 77 50.8··· 
PA contributes to livelihoods 59 56 0.7 
Long-term: 
PA protects biodiversity 69 84 29.2"· 
Managers protect P A 71 81 12.3··· 
Fences protect people & animals 93 92 0.3 
Keep P A for posterity 81 97 56.6"· 
P A contributes to SA econom~ 63 66 0.7 
On medium-term benefits, the key significant difference was on strong support (77%) 
given by weak owners for state funding as opposed to marginal support (54%) from 
intermediate owners. For long-term benefits, key insignificant differences were on the 
importance of fences to protect people and wildlife and the contribution of PAs to the 
economy. However, weak owners strongly supported (84%) the importance of PAs for 
protecting biodiversity compared to the intermediate owners (69%). Similarly, weak 
owners even strongly believed that PAs should be kept for posterity (97%) than did 
the intermediate owners (81%). 
However, Limpopo Province (LP) showed highly pronounced significant differences 
than those observed in the MP (Table 5.2c). While there was marginal support of 55% 
for the short-term benefit of free firewood by intermediate owners at Makuya, weak 
owners at Letaba were less supportive 27% in this measure. Similarly, while weak 
owners showed much less support (25%) for allocating some PA land to the landless, 
intermediate owners indicated a marginally high and opposite support for the same 
benefit (58%). On medium-term benefits, few intermediate owners (44%) were against 
removal of wildlife, a view not shared by a 66% of weak owners. Overall, support for 
long-term benefits was much higher and less varied in Limpopo Province than was in 
the other two other provinces. 
96 
Table 5.2c. Differences between the views of respondents to short-, medium- and long-term 
benefits among intermediate and weak owners in the Limpopo Province, with ***==P<O.OOI, 
**==P<O.OI, and *==P<O.05. 
Time frame & variables Intermediate % ,df'=2 
Short-term: 
For free firewood collection 55 27 89.4 ......... 
For allocation ofland to landless 58 25 126.8 ......... 
Mid-term: 
Against development of P A land 39 34 3.5'" 
Against removing animals 44 60 30.6 ....... 
For state funding ofPA 50 58 6.7 ... • 
P A contributes to livelihoods 49 44 3.4 
Long-term: 
P A protects biodiversity 90 84 10.2 ...... • 
Managers protect P A 78 75 1.4 
Fences protect people & animals 92 92 0.0 
Keep PA for posterity 92 93 0.3 
P A contributes to SA econom~ 75 75 0.0 
S.4.3. Socio-economic difference between ownership levels by provinces 
The differences between ownership levels within and between provinces could also be 
influenced by the sizes of the populations within those villages chosen as study sites 
(Table 5.3) relative to available resources. 





























In this context, there were many more intermediate owners in Mpumalanga in terms of 
the population size and size of the reserve. Relative to the number of beneficiaries in 
the intermediate ownership level, Mthethomusha was the smallest reserve (72 km2), 
yet was surrounded by far the largest population. However, the proportion of people 
unemployed (33%) around Mthethomusha was lower than that of both Pilanesberg 
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(42%) and Makuya (42%). In contrast, case study sites under weak ownership had by 
far the smallest populations, but relatively larger reserves. Furthermore, about 21 % 
were unemployed in Madikwe, 23% in Letaba, and 37% in Songimvelo. Ironically, the 
weak ownership level outperformed the intermediate ownership level in key aspects of 
attitudes to PAs such as short- and medium-term benefits (5.4.2). This could suggest 
that intermediate ownership expects their equity in PAs to yield higher benefits than it 
is possible, thereby leading to disappointment or to resentment. 
Compared to provincial unemployment levels, case studies had by far the highest level 
of unemployment (Stats SA 1998). For example, average unemployment levels ranged 
from 33% in Mpumalanga Province, through to 38% in North West Province, and to 
46% in Limpopo Province. Despite this situation, respondents in Limpopo Province 
were more supportive of their PAs than the better-resourced respondents in both the 
North West Province and Mpumalanga Province, even when they were also less 
dependent on electriCity as a source of fuel compared to respondents in relatively 
better-resourced provinces (Table 5.4). 
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Source: Stats SA (1998). ·Other refers to dependence on fuel wood, followed by paraffin, and 
then gas. 
The local communities in Limpopo Province were more impoverished than those in 
both the North West Province and the Mpumalanga Province, but they nonetheless 
still supported PAs. While there is no simple cause-and-effect way of interpreting the 
results, because the different contexts under which local communities live could affect 
the outcome differently, it appears that the attitudes of local communities towards PAs 
depend on other factors in the political ecology of case studies. 
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5.5. Discussion 
This chapter showed that the attitudes of local communities to various related benefits 
arising from PAs, were influenced by both their provincial environment and their 
provincial agencies. These results further highlighted that the attitudes of local 
communities were strongly influenced by the political economies in which these 
communities were situated (see Chapter 4). Consequently, there was no simple 'cause-
and effect' between the attitudes of local communities and ownership based on the 
efforts of the provincial agencies. To avoid 'snap-shot' conclusions, the attitudes of 
local communities towards PAs were further discussed in the context of the local 
environments that shaped such attitudes. 
While there was generally strong support among all local communities for the long-
term ideals of creating PAs, what appears to be important for local people is the ability 
of PAs to provide short- and medium-term benefits as they directly affect livelihood 
strategies. In the context of rural survival, both short- and medium-term benefits of re-
allocating land from PAs for either industrial development or for replacing wildlife 
with agriculture, seemed to have the most deterministic effect on the attitudes of local 
communities. Correspondingly, while local communities generally appreciate the 
long-term benefits of PAs, limited livelihood choices suggest that their support for 
long-term benefits is most unlikely to secure the long-term protection of biodiversity 
in situations of abject poverty. Of particular significance is that local communities are 
unlikely to favour the biodiversity in PAs in times of pressing social need. 
The harsh realities of rural poverty, may imply that local communities lack sufficient 
incentives to view PAs as medium-term investment. However, their long-term view of 
PAs is highly positive, and many ways suggest that local communities support the 
long-term aims of conserving biodiversity through a system of PAs. To improve 
understanding of these case studies, the results are further discussed in terms of how 
the three provincial conservation agencies may have influenced some of the observed 
results. However, gaining insights into the modus operandi of these three provincial 
conservation agencies requires 'case-by-case' discussion. The case-by-case approach 
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is now used extensively in social studies or policy research and it proved useful for 
Roe (1994, 1998) and Fortrnann et al. (2001). For the results of this chapter, I have 
modified and adjusted the original framework used by Roe (1998) in order to suit the 
South African situation. 
Based on this study, case-by-case discussion can provide insights into some of the 
observed paradoxes because: 
• 
• 
case-by-case draws insights from different complex situations at the different 
stages of evolutionary processes of projects. At any point in time, the analysis 
draws on different approaches in an attempt to triangulate, so as to be able to 
say that from whatever angle the situation is analysed, almost the same 
conclusion is reached. 
case-by-case means that each case study is analysed on its own merits in terms 
of at least three criteria: 1) whether management achieves its stated objectives; 
2) against some idealised outcome, which the management objectives of the 
project mayor may not match; and 3) the counterfactual, in other words, what 
would have happened had the management not been in effect. 
Using the 'case-by-case' approach, the discussion outlines the context of case studies 
in terms of the philosophy of each provincial agency and its approach to working with 
local communities. The success or otherwise of each provincial agency is discussed in 
terms of current practice: are the same management objectives still being followed, 
and if not, why? The discussion with provincial agencies is both chronological and 
evolutionary in terms of which province first started working with local communities 
and one case study led to the next. Using the case-by-case approach, the results is also 
discussion within the southern African region in order establish similarities. 
5.5.1. North West Parks 
The NWP was the first conservation agency in South Africa to link local communities 
to its PAs with the primary objective of improving their livelihoods. The first case 
study was Pilanesberg. The initial survey of attitudes showed that the management at 
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Pilanesberg had failed to achieve its stated objective to 'the community' (Keenan 
1984). The management of Pilanesberg reacted by employing a 'Community Liaison 
Officer' (Molope 1988) in order to ensure that Pilanesberg remained the 'jewel of 
Bophuthatswana' (Brett 1989). The local community wanted more than liaison, they 
wanted their land back, something the government refused to do (Munnik 1992). As a 
result, NWP agreed to contribute 10% of the gross annual entrance revenues earned by 
Pilanesberg to the local community, and the lease fee was retrospectively paid to 1979 
when the reserve was first established. 
The management at Pilanesberg started dividing infrastructure projects into "chewable 
chunks" so that the local contractors could benefit. The cash dividends received by the 
local community were used to build schools; health clinics; and, creating a 40 km2 
communal game reserve situated 30 km north of Pilanesberg. Pilanesberg showed that 
the best way of being a good neighbour, is to employ local communities and also to 
benefit local entrepreneurs (Munnik 1992). In 1993, cash flow to local communities 
was increased when lions were introduced into Pilanesberg to complement leopard, 
buffalo, rhino and elephant in order to become 'a big five' tourist attraction. Following 
this, the economic impact ofPilanesberg on its region ranged between SAR16 million 
(US$8.7 million) and SAR36 million (US$10.3 million) (Vorhies & Vorhies 1993). A 
follow up attitude survey also revealed that 70% of the local community supported the 
existence of Pilanesberg (Davies 1993). However, in 1994 new casinos were built in 
Johannesburg, and Sun City lost its monopoly on the gambling industry. As a result, 
the number of jobs was slashed from about 4,000 to less than 2,000, and this heavily 
affected the livelihoods of local communities. 
In 1995, power struggles between the tribal authority and the ANC elected transitional 
councils led to the brutal death of a key leader of the local community. In 1996, NWP 
stopped paying the agreed 10% lease fee, and the communal game reserve was closed 
down as rife allegations of corruption and mismanagement took the centre stage. This 
probably explains the marginal support oflocal communities for Pilanesberg. With the 
introduction of local municipalities, the monetary benefits arising Pilanesberg also 
political situation to 'sort' itself out. Furthermore, Pilanesberg stopped all its previous 
direct dealings with local communities when local structures collapsed. The reasons 
for this included the changes in local politics and the management philosophy of the 
NWP following the post-apartheid era transformation challenges. 
While the primary reason for establishing Pilanesberg was to protect landscapes, with 
community development as a secondary goal, Madikwe was created ostensibly to 
provide socio-economic benefits based on three major objectives: 1) that wildlife-
based tourism was the best economic use of the acquired land because, and once fully 
developed, Madikwe would yield a predicted net return of 15% on the initial capital 
investment, exceeding the predicted 0.5% of cattle ranching (Setplan 1991); 2) that the 
local communities around Madikwe would benefit economically from this form of 
land use because they were economically disadvantaged, and would subsequently 
support the existence of reserve (Perkins 1993); and 3) that the conservation value of 
the land would be increased by wildlife tourism development through linkages and 
multipliers (Magome 1996). Ultimately, Madikwe was expected to improve net 
income to the state, private sector, and the local economy (Davies 1997). Based on 
these objectives, Madikwe was created as an idealised 'equal partnership' between the 
NWP, the private sector, and the community. 
The wildlife-based tourism development objective was achieved and indeed was the 
best economic use of the acquired land. Over 90% of re-introduced animal species, 
presumed to have been there in historic times, have increased significantly in numbers 
(Hofmeyr 1997), and in market values, from about US$2.5 million to US$5.7 million 
(Davies et al. 1997). Within 5 years, 200 permanent jobs were created, surpassing the 
80 jobs that could have been realised from the cattle ranching option. Despite these 
achievements, Madikwe was still far from realising the 1200 jobs promised to local 
people with an associated payroll of US$l.5 million per annum. Indeed, the initial 
15% return on the investment was hugely overestimated, and only 5% was realisable 
(Wells et al.1997). While such huge overestimates of the project arose because of the 
lack of comparable models, they nonetheless had raised the expectations of the weaker 
'partner', the local communities. 
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Madikwe also required more time to reach its tourism potential than was initially 
anticipated by the planners (Magome et al. 2000). This time lag delayed the delivery 
of intended benefits to local communities and, with unemployment standing at 90%, 
the few benefits received heightened tensions and conflict. By attempting to build the 
capacity of local communities for effective partnership, the NWP burdened itself with 
broader issues of rural development (Magome et al. 2000). Despite these obstacles, 
this study showed that local communities, the weak owners around Madikwe, were 
generally more supportive of the reserve than their provincial intemtediate owners 
around Pilanesberg. The strong support for state funding may indicate that the local 
communities still hope that Madikwe could improve their lives. Within 10 years of its 
creation, Madikwe has created more jobs and multiplier effects than its original model 
predictions, and is now an example of how PAs can benefit local communities. 
The Pilanesberg and Madikwe case studies demonstrated that PAs can contribute to 
the regional economy, and to the development goals of the government. However, to 
achieve this they required the critical mass generated by high volume tourism. In the 
case of Pilanesberg these goals were achieved within a within the first 10 years, while 
at Madikwe they might take some 30 years. The Pilanesberg case study demonstrated 
that conservation agencies can turn-around hardened negative attitudes of local 
communities into positive support for PAs. Furthemtore, it showed that the livelihoods 
of local communities can be best enhanced through concerted efforts with the other 
local industries. However, the managers of PAs can easily get carried away, as was 
with the creation of the communal game reserve, by thinking that local communities 
have the necessary expertise to manage PAs. 
The following lessons emerge from these two case studies managed by NWP: 
• PAs that are located closer (150 km) to the economic hubs such as Pretoria and 
Johannesburg have more potential to reach their socio-economic goals than 
those further away from these economic hubs; 
• PAs can contribute more to socio-economic objectives if they are part of a 
regional economic activity (e.g., Pilanesberg) than when they attempt to be the 
major driver of economic activity (e.g., Madikwe); 
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• When PAs are the only drivers of economic activity in a depressed economy, 
such as Madikwe, the time lag required to reach optimal tourism potential is 
significantly longer than in co-ordinated developments such as Pilanesberg; 
• If PAs cannot meet their stated social objectives, the resentment that results 
from broken promises can be higher than if promises had not been made; 
• The beneficiaries of PAs must be clearly identified and the benefits must be 
properly quantified because limited benefits become the source of conflict; 
• PAs can, if part of a co-ordinated regional plan, contribute to improving 
livelihoods of local people by creating high volumes of job; and 
• Land ownership, the sine qua non of power for effective bargaining, is the best 
mechanism to provide local people with required 'equal partnership' with both 
the state and private sector. 
5.5.2. Mpumalanga Parks Board 
Like the former Bop Parks, the former KaNgwane Parks Corporation (KPC), now 
Mpumalanga Parks Board (MPB) shared the same philosophy that PAs can and should 
contribute towards improving the livelihoods of local communities. In fact, the first 
Director of Pilanesberg, Dr Jeremy Anderson, resigned to become the first Director of 
KPC and thereby influenced the management philosophy of the MPB. Mthethomusha 
was the first case study for MPB to test the principle that sustainable utilisation of PAs 
can improve the lives of local communities. In order to contribute to the livelihoods of 
local communities, an up-market 60-bed lodge was built to serve as the main source of 
revenue from tourists. By 1990,200 jobs were created for the local communities, and 
these surpassed the 20 jobs that cattle ranching could have produced (OdendaI1991). 
In order to meet the protein needs of local communities some 150 impala, 25 zebra, 15 
wildebeest, 6 giraffe and 40 buffalo, were to be culled annually. Furthermore, 60% of 
all income derived from the reserve was to accrue to the local communities (Odendal 
1991). The KPC policy was 'parks for people' and indeed 'what finally convinced the 
tribal authority was the promise of jobs for their people' (Munnik 1992b). Most of the 
revenue generated by the reserve was spent on building schools and day-care-centres 
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(Koch 1997). The social objectives were a litany of disasters. From 1996, the number 
of jobs were reduced from 200 to 150 (Koch 1997), and the dividends from the lodge, 
the main source of income, were stopped from 1997 because the lodge was reported to 
be operating at a loss. 
In 1997 only 4 buffalo and 1 giraffe were culled because tourists wanted to see more 
wildlife than was available in the reserve. Since 1998, the outbreak of the exotic 
bovine tuberculosis (BTB) forced large culling operations on buffalo to establish the 
extent of the BTB epidemic in the reserve. Meanwhile, the number of local people 
living around the reserve doubled to 60,000 (Stats SA 1998) and this doubled pressure 
on the 72krn2 of land. In 1998, MPB, de facto the renamed KPC had its funding cut by 
50% resulting in management paralysis. In 1998, the present study discovered that 
local communities were indeed very disappointed and expressed anger and resentment 
towards their leaders and the reserve. Benefits had ceased leaking to them and the little 
benefits that were realised became a great source of conflict. This spawned high levels 
of distrust between local people, their leaders and the management of the reserve. The 
situation deteriorated to the extent that some influential local people wanted the 
reserve deproclaimed or handed over to the management of Kruger National Park. 
The original objective that the local people should take over the management of 
reserve (Odendal 1991) was far from being achieved. Mthethomusha demonstrates 
that too often the benefits that can accrue from PAs can be hugely overstated. The 
social objectives lacked conceptual clarity and were, therefore, seriously flawed. The 
investment was simply too small to warrant such promises. To put it bluntly, the 
benefits that would normally accrue to one farmer in the country were extended to a 
local population of some 60,000 people. The poor support for the reserve was in part 
compounded by these unrealistic expectations. As was the case for Pilanesberg, the 
MPB has stopped most of the benefits that they used to provide to local communities, 
because their lease fee with the lodge was based on net profit rather than on either the 
percentage of revenue turnover or fixed fee per bed per annum. Since profit is only an 
accounting figure, the management of the lodge stopped showing profit as far back as 
1995, and this gravely disappointed the local communities. Furthermore, the MPB also 
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stopped providing benefits such as cheap meat and other types of ad hoc assistance to 
the local communities because of inadequate funding. In contrast to Mthethomusha, 
Songimvelo was created primarily for its outstanding biodiversity and cultural features 
(Heinsohn et aJ. 1992; Boyles-SprekeI1994). 
Local communities were, as was the case for Mthethomusha, supposed to benefit from 
jobs, subsidised meat and limited harvesting of thatching grass (Anderson 1995). Most 
of the reserve's income accrued from limited trophy hunting and the reserve was 
heavily dependent on state funding. There were few supporting industries such as the 
asbestos mining and commercial timber harvesting. The reserve management sourced 
funding to build an environmental education centre in order to 'educate' the local 
communities about the importance of biodiversity conservation for both the present 
generation and for posterity. The conservation objective was achieved and there plans 
to link the reserve to Swaziland as part of transboundary conservation area. However, 
achieving social objectives also became a litany of disasters. 
The asbestos mine closed down during in 1997 and livelihoods started to deteriorate, 
forcing some of the local communities to demand greater access to grazing rights 
within the reserve and to expect more social services than they had enjoyed before the 
closure of the mine. In order to appease the local communities, MPB took on the role 
of rural developer by setting-up small scale industries such as sewing, brick making 
and offering transportation for various social services ranging funerals to wedding 
celebrations. The reserve became a showcase of what PAs should do to assist local 
people improve their lives. However, there were limited markets for the materials 
produced by these small industries and sustaining them required more money than the 
reserve could afford. These artificial industries and unrealistic social services could 
not be sustained and as is wont to happen, the frustrated beneficiaries became resentful 
towards reserve and MPB. 
Songimvelo showed that conserving biodiversity amidst rural poverty is a daunting 
task, and the weak support shown for MPB in this study reflected these difficulties. If 
tourist activities and or the government cannot create a viable economic model, the 
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incentives offered to local people are not sustainable and the situation deteriorates 
from bad to worse. Songimvelo was a promising model of how PAs can assist local 
communities to set-up small industries in order to reduce tourism leakage, but now it 
is the example of mistakes that PAs often make when they deviate from their function 
of biodiversity conservation to take on the social functions. However, this is with the 
benefit of hindsight and, under the circumstances, Songimvelo provides a lesson of 
how PAs can extend their limited resources too thinly. Both the Mthethomusha and 
Songimvelo case studies illustrate the dangers of what happens when a conservation 
agency tries to achieve too much with too little. The provision of subsidised meat was 
a typical post-colonial attempt to supply protein to 'poor' local communities. 
The following key lessons emerge from the two case studies managed by MPB, and 
they are particularly useful and important for policy guidelines in responsible tourism: 
• The lease payment from the private sector to the local communities should be 
based on percentage of turnover or number of beds rather than on percentage 
of profit. As previously mentioned, profit is an accounting figure, and that 
operators can hide behind it if they want to; 
• If the tourism market is saturated, or there are other similar tourist destinations 
as is the case with Mpurnalanga's highly diversified and numerous tourism 
• 
activities, competitive edge is what achieves market edge, and in this situation 
government agencies show their limitations; 
PAs should not promise benefits that they cannot sustain in the long-term. It is 
better for PAs not to provide benefits than to provide them in the short-term 
and then stop them completely; 
• Clearly, PAs are not the 'penicillin of all rural ailments' because they cannot 
adequately address all rural problems, even if they wanted to, and somehow 
the local communities must be made aware of this. In most situations the local 
communities are aware of the limitation, but management of PAs often opts 
otherwise; and 
• The availability of long-tenn sustainable funding to PAs strongly affects the 
long-term viability of various projects that can be initiated and sustained with 
local communities. 
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5.5.3. Limpopo Parks Board 
In the context of this study, conservation in Limpopo Province has had a long history 
of poor leadership, both during the apartheid era and even during the first decade of 
the post-apartheid era. During the apartheid era, Makuya was under the homeland of 
Venda and Letaba was under Lebowa homeland. Still undeveloped, both Makuya and 
Letaba are not yet regarded as major tourist attraction areas. Furthermore, PAs in the 
Limpopo Province have been managed as state departments from their creation, until 
2002 when they were changed to a statutory body, the Limpopo Parks Board (LPB). 
However, local communities in Limpopo Province do not live as close to PAs as in the 
North West and Mpumalanga provinces. In the case of Makuya the nearest village was 
located 50 km away from the game reserve, and the furthest was 100 km away. In the 
case of Letaba GR, the nearest village was located 25 km away from the game reserve, 
while the furthest was 50km away. Furthermore, the two case studies did not have 
detailed outreach projects for engaging with the local communities. 
The major difference between Limpopo and the other two provinces, North West and 
Mpumalanga, is that Limpopo Province was the least developed of the three study 
provinces, and the local communities at study areas were the most marginalized and 
disenfranchised. Limpopo Province is not popularly known as a tourist attraction, and 
LPB was the most under funded agency in this study. Despite these limitations, the 
respondents in Limpopo Province showed less interest in short-term benefits than did 
those in North West and Mpumalanga. Apart from firewood being relatively available 
in the vicinity of respondents, long distances to and from the PAs could have made 
firewood collection a prohibitively expensive exercise. Furthermore, the relatively low 
population in these study areas also made land shortage less acute. Hence, respondents 
in Limpopo Province performed better on medium-term benefits than respondents in 
both North West and Mpumalanga Provinces. Again, the spatial separation from PAs 
implied that these PAs were unlikely to create land use conflict on medium-term 
benefits. Correspondingly, respondents in Limpopo Province showed stronger support 
for some long-term benefits associated with PAs. Even after the post-apartheid era, the 
LPB has continued dealing with local communities as they did during apartheid era. 
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The following key lessons emerge from the two case studies managed by LPB: 
• 
• 
Local communities who live far away from their nearest PAs appear to place 
less socio-economic demands on such PAs, providing that they can access the 
same resources in their immediate vicinity; and, 
Conservation agencies who make few promises to local communities seem to 
generate a steady support base, neither too hostile nor over supportive. 
5.5.4. Attitudes to PAs globally 
This chapter has shown that the attitudes of local communities to PAs are influenced 
by socio-economic opportunities that they can derive from PAs, implying that local 
communities view PAs in terms of meeting their basic socio-economic development 
needs. Accordingly, local communities expect PAs to play the role of government or 
at least to facilitate such a role on their behalf. The expectation is logical since PAs are 
state-owned and, therefore, represent the government. While the attitudes of local 
communities elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa was not the focus of this study, studies 
in much of sub-Saharan Africa unequivocally show that local communities view PAs 
or the natural resources they contain in terms of meeting most of their basic socio-
economic needs (Cunningham 1989, 1995; Anderson 1995; Koch 1997; Murombedzi 
1999,2001; Fabricius et al. 200Ia-b; Fabricius & Koch 2004). 
In India, local communities that were entirely dependent on extraction of resources 
from PAs were less appreciative of PAs while those living far away from PAs were 
more supportive (Nepal & Weber 1995). To date, there is little evidence to illustrate 
that the various benefit-sharing schemes aimed at increasing support from the local 
communities have had their desired effect. In Kenya, Dr Richard Leakey's pledge of 
giving 25% of tourism revenue per annum to local communities raised expectations 
that KWS simply could not meet. In an attempt to rectify the error, Dr Leakey's 
successor, Dr David Western, reduced the pledge to 10%, but this promise was not 
fulfilled for most of the national parks under KWS (Honey 1999). About a third of the 
300 KWS community projects involved construction of school buildings and the 
awarding of bursaries. Invariably, local communities expect PAs to be developmental. 
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5.6. Conclusion 
The level of support received by local communities depends on several factors that are 
influenced by the local economic development context, a situation often outside the 
direct control of the managers of the PAs involved. Any form of assistance to the rural 
local communities involves extensive outlay of resources, and significant funding is 
required to achieve this. Since conservation agencies are mainly dependent on state 
funding, the support they can provide to local communities is very limited. In fact, any 
assistance to the local communities mainly comprises indirect financial support from 
the state. When funding for PAs is drastically reduced, support for local communities 
is also drastically reduced, and this causes resentment. 
Given these constraints, the major challenge facing PAs is to identify the determinants 
of the attitudes of local communities to PAs, and to find alternative ways of meeting 
some of them. The next chapter attempts to isolate key factors that are affect attitudes 
of local communities to benefits arising from PAs. 
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Chapter 6 
Determinants of attitudes to protected areas 
6.1. Introduction 
Linking local communities to protected areas (PAs) is both difficult and unpredictable 
(Chapter 5). Accordingly, there is an urgent need to rethink some of the theoretical 
assumptions on which conservation and development projects are based (Hackel 1999; 
Newmark & Hough 2000; Twynman 2001; Schafer & BeH 2002; Berkes 2003). In 
practice, managers of PAs have difficulties linking conservation to the development of 
local communities because of lack of funding and insufficient data on which to base 
most of their decisions. Furthennore, involving local communities is complex, and 
adds to existing demands that managers of PAs have to cope with. Therefore, it is 
important for planners and policy makers to establish determinants of attitudes to PAs 
so that appropriate programmes can be implemented. 
The harsh realities of survival faced by rural Africans suggest that they might pay little 
or no attention to debates on conservation philosophy (Hoare 2000). Ideally, it would 
help managers of PAs if simple yet effective tools can be provided to increase support 
from local people. Unfortunately there is no blueprint, and it is unlikely that there can 
ever be one because local histories have a significant influence on the course that the 
project takes, and in particular the effects of conflict on natural resource management 
(Schafer & Bell 2002). The mixed results across the provincial conservation agencies 
(Chapter 5) showed that many conservation and development initiatives (CDIs) that 
attempt to involve local communities were not well conceptualised. The key challenge 
is how use limited funds to produce the most impact, and simultaneously increase 
support for PAs. What is desirable for managers of PAs is to be in a position to plan 
projects that are most likely to influence the attitude of target audience in a manner 
that will increase support for biodiversity goals. Although it is commonly accepted 
that attitudes are the centre of most human behaviour, attitudes are influenced by a 
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variety of factors, some controllable and others not. The key question is what actually 
influences respondents to respond the way they do. It is, therefore, important that the 
determinants of these attitudes to PAs be identified as a prerequisite to making sound 
management plans or policy decisions. In this chapter, I present further analyses in 
order to determine which factor or combination of factors influence observed attitude 
of respondents to various benefits arising from PAs. Essentially, this chapter attempts 
to put the results together in order to explain patterns observed so far. 
6.2. Methods of analysis 
The individual responses for each question comprising strong (n=29), intermediate 
(n=1607) and weak (n=1265) owners were coded, recorded in a matrix of2901 blocks 
and then analysed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences, Version 9.0 for 
Windows). The statistical tool used was the stepwise Multinomial Linear Regression 
(MLR) analysis, a relatively fine scale statistical technique that analyses data through 
a systematic elimination of insignificant variables. In the course of running the MLR 
analyses, explanatory variables that are not significant are systematically removed, 
leaving only those variables with significant probability values. Consequently, those 
variables with significant probability values form the basis for providing the possible 
explanations of observed results. 
In the MLR analysis, each category of short-, medium- and long-term benefit (Table 
6.1) was treated as a separate dependent variable, while age, gender, ownership level, 
conservation agency in charge, and visits to PAs were treated as independent or 
explanatory variables. A trial run of the MLR analysis identified errors because of the 
inclusion of data from strong owners. This was possibly due to their small sample size 
(29) and because data on age and gender that were not normally distributed (refer to 
Table 4.2, Chapter 4). Once data from the strong ownership level had been removed 
from the matrix, the MLR analysis proceeded smoothly and no further errors were 
detected. By showing errors when data from strong ownership was initially included, 
the MLR analysis further confirmed that data from this ownership level could not be 
easily compared to those of lesser levels of ownership. 
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The final data sets entered into MLR analysis were based on a total of 2872 individual 
responses affecting only the lesser ownership level comprising intermediate and weak 
owners. Therefore, those remaining significant explanatory variables were assumed to 
form part of the combination of factors that co-determined the observed attitudes of 
respondents in the lesser ownership level. As already explained in Chapter 4, the lesser 
ownership only comprised rural black South Africans who have often been referred to 
as 'local communities' in other similar studies focusing on CDIs. 
6.3. Results 
The MLR results showed that based on time frames, a combination of several factors 
influenced attitudes of respondents to various time-related benefits arising from PAs 
(Table 6.1). However, there were no determinants for supporting 'free firewood for 
locals' and for 'managers of PAs'. In sections 6.3.1 to 6.3.3, the main determinants of 
benefits are presented, except for the age of respondents, which is presented separately 
because it showed a unique pattern (6.3.4). 
Table 6.1. The detenninants of attitudes to PAs, with medium-term benefits highlighted as 
the most deterministic. 
Time frame Dependent variable Explanatory variables 
Short-term For free firewood collection None 
r __________ !2~~~~~~~!!~1~~~l~~~~ ___ ~~~:~~~~~h~~~~~~!~~!~l~~ 
I Medium-term Against development of P A Agency, ownership, visiting PA, & age I 
I PA contributes to livelihoods Agency, ownership, visiting PA, & age I 
I Against agriculture and industry Agency, gender, & age I L ___________ A~~~~~~2!~2L~~g~ _________ A~:~~~~~~_~L~~~ ______ J 
Long-term Managers of P A Agency, Ownership & income 
Fences protect people and animals Agency, ownership, & age 
P A protects biodiversity Agency, ownership, & age 
Keep PA for posterity Agency, ownership, & age 
P A contributes to SA economy Agency, ownership, & age 
In particular a combination of the agency in charge, ownership level, and the age of 
respondents, consistently cut across the two significant time frames of medium- and 
long-term. However, as argued in Chapter 5, medium-term benefits affected the future 
prospect of PAs more than long-term benefits because of discounting. 
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6.3.1. Determinants of short-term benefits 
There were no explanatory variables that determined short-tenn benefit of allocating 
free firewood to local people (Table 6.1), suggesting firewood was not a significant 
factor. The reason often cited by the majority of respondents to free firewood was a 
lack of fair and equitable means for its a11ocation. 
6.3.2. Determinants of medium-term benefits 
The attitudes of respondents to medium-term benefits such as supporting current land 
use, and state funding, were co-determined by agency in charge, ownership level, 
visiting PAs, and age. However, each determinant influenced attitudes differently. For 
example, the effect of agency in charge is shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. The effect of agency in charge as a co-determinant of attitudes. 
Dependent variable Agency In Mean SE Wald age P 
eharse values values 
For state funding ofPA NWP 0.470 0.034 } 
MPB 0.365 0.032 18.677 P<0.005 
LPB 0.455 0.030 
PA contributes to livelihoods NWP 0.600 0.032 } 
MPB 0.463 0.032 45.396 P<0.005 
LPB 0.670 0.029 
Against development of P A land NWP 0.500 0.034 } 
MPB 0.640 0.032 27.915 P<0.005 
LPB 0.630 0.028 
Against removing animals NWP 0.550 0.029 } 
MPB 0.395 0.032 56.867 P<0.005 
LPB 0.390 0.029 
In terms of support for current land practices NWP performed better than the marginal 
support received by both the MPB and LPB. Support was higher among intermediate 
owners than among weak owners, and was lower for those who visited than not those 
who had not visited PAs. Furthermore, all three conservation agencies received weak 
support from their constituencies for state funding, with marginal support for both the 
NWP and LPB, and very little support for MPB. 
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Support for developing PA land for industry, agriculture or any alternative land use 
was co~detennined by age, agency and gender while that for CPA management' was 
co-detezmined by age, ownership and gender (Table 6.1). The support for developing 
P A land was weakest in NWP compared to that in both MPB and LPB, and women 
were generally more in favour of developing PA than were men (Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3. The effect of gender as a co-determinant of attitudes. 
Dependent variable Gender 












Support for current land use was lower for MPB compared to higher support for both 
NWP and NPB (Table 6.2). When this was included in the analysis, it suggested that, 
while the efforts of the latter two agencies won them better support from their local 
communities, MPB was less successful in this regard. Support on the role of PAs for 
improving livelihoods was better in NWP and LPB than it was in MPB. Ownership as 
co-determinant showed that support was better in weak owners than in intezmediate 
owners (Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4. The effect of ownership as a co-determinant of attitudes. 
Dependent variable Ownership Mean SE Wald P values 
For state funding ofPA Intermediate 0.490 0.024 } 46.065 P<0.OO5 
Weak 0.360 0.028 
P A contributes to livelihoods Intermediate 0.625 0.024} 27.683 P<0.005 
Weak 0.530 0.028 
Against development of P A land Intermediate 0.515 0.024 } 39.600 P<0.005 
Weak 0.340 0.063 
In this situation, NWP seemed to have influenced respondents to support current land 
use of PAs while LPB appeared to have influenced them on the importance of PAs for 
improving livelihoods. Ironically, visiting PAs showed an interesting pattern, as those 
few respondents who had visited PAs were less supportive than those who had not 
(Table 6.5). However, visiting PAs was associated with job seeking (Chapter 4). 
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Table 6.S The effect of gender as a co-determinant of attitudes. 
Del;!endent variable Res~nse Mean SE Wald P values 
For state funding ofPA Visited 0.370 0.028 } 24.396 P<0.005 
Not visited 0.620 0.023 
P A contributes to livelihoods Visited 0.510 0.028 } 34.430 P<0.005 
Not Visited 0.640 0.024 
Generally, weak owners were less supportive of medium-term benefits arising from 
PAs than were intermediate owners, except on current land use where their support 
was higher than that of intermediate owners. Intermediate ownership was important 
for medium-term benefits, and support was highest among respondents that had not 
visited PAs compared to those that had. 
6.3.3. Determinants of long-term benefits 
Long-term benefits were all co-determined by age, agency in charge, and ownership 
(Table 6.1). MPB influenced respondents to believe that its PAs contributed to South 
Africa's economy better than the equally matched NWP and LPB, but intermediate 
ownership accounted for this better than weak ownership (Table 6.6). 
Table 6.6.The effect of gender as a co-determinant of attitudes. 
Deeendent variable Ownersbll;! Mean SE Wald P values 
P A contributes to SA economy Intennediate 0.590 0.056 } 11.997 P<0.OO5 
Weak 0.530 0.064 
Fences protects people and animals Intennediate 0.790 0.023} 116.197 P<0.OO5 
Weak 0.890 0.024 
Keep P A for posterity Intennediate 0.670 0.026 } 11.997 P<0.OO5 
Weak 0.780 0.028 
However, on the importance of PAs for biodiversity conservation, LPB garnered more 
support from respondents than the equally matched but marginally supported for NWP 
and MPB. In stark contrast to the importance of PAs for the country's economy, weak 
ownership was a better co-determinant on the importance of PAs for biodiversity 
conservation than was intermediate ownership. Again, a similar pattern was repeated 
on the importance offences in protecting people and wildlife (Table 6.3). 
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6.3.4. Effect of age on attitudes 
Of all the factors that co-determined the attitudes of respondents to various aspects of 
time-related benefits arising from PAs, age showed a very unique pattern that required 
special attention. The mean age of respondents, in combination with other explanatory 
variables produced a distinct pattern on individual responses. The pattern for all the 
medium-term benefits is shown in Table 6.7. In general, the resulting pattern showed 
that there was a positive correlation between age and mean responses, suggesting that 
older people were more supportive of medium-term benefits arising from PAs than 
younger people. However, while older people generally had much higher mean scores, 
they also had relatively large standard errors (SE) when compared to those of younger 
people (Table 6.7). 
Table 6.7. The effect of age as a co-determinant of attitudes on medium-term benefits 
from PAs. SE=Standard Error and arrows showing increases with age, mean, and SE. 
For state Cunding P A tontributes to Against development Against removing 
ofPA livelihoods oCPAland animals 
Age Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
18.5 0.37 0.0342 0.50 0.0367 0.35 0.0375 0.57 0.0367 
24.5 0.40 0.0421 0.54 0.0433 0.38 0.0417 0.57 0.0400 
30.5 0.43 0.0447 0.59 0.0467 0.41 0.0458 0.60 0.0467 
36.5 0.46 0.0553 0.63 0.0533 0.50 0.0583 0.55 0.0567 
42.5 0.52 0.0632 0.64 0.0633 0.53 0.0625 0.68 0.0600 
48.5 0.49 0.0763 0.63 0.0733 0.51 0.0792 0.62 0.0767 
54.5 0.48 0.0947 0.69 0.0900 0.54 0.1000 0.59 0.0933 
60.5 0.51 0.0974 0.69 0.0933 0.55 0.1000 0.70 0.0900 
66.5 0.50 0.0734 0.74 0.667 0.61 0.0750 0.72 0.0667 
In stark contrast, while younger people generally had lower mean scores, they also had 
smaller standard errors. Therefore, while older people were generally more supportive 
of PAs, their views tended to vary more widely, implying that it would be too difficult 
to establish the key reasons for such variations. In stark contrast, while younger people 
were generally less supportive of PAs, their views were less varied than those of older 
people, suggesting that young people could be easily influenced if the cause of the low 
support could be established. Furthermore, the effect of age showed that if there are 
efforts to influence attitudes, younger people should be the key target. 
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6.4. Discussion 
This chapter showed that on medium-term benefits respondents among lesser owners 
expected PAs to provide opportunities such as jobs. While on the one side respondents 
marginally supported current land and state funding for PAs, and believed that PAs 
improved their livelihoods, these views were somewhat affected when visiting PAs for 
jobs was not rewarded. As explained previously (Chapters 5), nearly half of visits to 
PAs were job-related, suggesting that, if they failed to secure jobs, some respondents 
changed their views on medium-term benefits of having PAs nearby. The influence of 
the age of respondents further suggested that most support for PAs came from older 
people, mostly pensioners, who no longer needed jobs from PAs. 
A previous survey in Pilanesberg showed that younger people, in particular school 
children, supported the reserve more than older people, and those who had visited 
were even more supportive than those who had not (Davies 1993). Visiting PAs is 
great fun for school children, but the same cannot be said for unemployed adults. This 
study focused on adults, and the importance of jobs was shown by the strong support 
given by women for industry over PAs. The urgency to meet survival needs dictated 
against long-term conservation goals. As a result, future benefits are often discounted 
for medium-term benefits. Due to land shortage, the South African economy is mainly 
cash-driven, and rural livelihoods are sustained mostly by income from women and 
pensioners (Stats SA 1998). Thus, while women preferred industry to PAs, pensioners 
with fixed sources of income supported PAs. 
Overall, there was stronger support from intermediate owners than from weak owners, 
except for MPB, suggesting part ownership of PAs increased support for those PAs. 
However, other human welfare needs makes supporting current land use of PAs and 
state funding to achieve it, a very difficult decision for local communities which, if not 
carefully considered, appeared contradictory. Probable explanation of weak support 
from the intermediate ownership of MPB, was that since 1997 MPB has been attacked 
via the media for alleged mismanagement of funds in excess of US$50 million, and 
this might in part have affected the perceptions of local people PAs in the province. 
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6.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, there was no single key determinant that influenced the attitudes of 
local communities to PAs. Instead the results showed that combinations of factors 
acting over time, co-determined the attitudes of respondents to various benefits arising 
from PAs. However, it was the co-determinants of medium-term benefits such as the 
age of respondents, agency in charge, and ownership level, which played a key role in 
influencing the attitudes of local communities towards PAs and these, can in tum be 
influenced by the management of PAs. The results also suggested that conservation 
agencies can playa major role in co-determining the attitudes of local communities to 
PAs, and the decision to become involved should be taken by top management. While 
intermediate or part ownership of land played another important role in increasing the 
support oflocal people to PAs, according land rights is strictly a government decision. 
The availability of jobs in and around PAs played another key role in determining the 
attitudes of local communities to PAs, implying that local communities include PAs in 
their baskets of livelihoods. The absence of explanatory variables over the importance 
of PAs for 'posterity' strongly supports this. Hence, local communities expect PAs to 
provide medium-term local economic opportunities, and failure to do so may, imply 
that posterity will have little to inherit. The implications are profound, suggesting that 
PAs can improve relationships with local communities if the total rural economy can 
be rapidly developed, which is another matter outside the control of PAs. 
The key co-determinants of the attitudes of local communities to PAs over medium-
term benefits are centred on South Africa's political economy and ecology. The 
common thread of all the co-determinants of the attitudes of local communities to PAs 
is economic benefits, through a thriving economy. It is indeed evident from these 
results that how local people view PAs is a function of the influence spatial scale, 
where it is located relative to other available alternative livelihoods strategies, and 
time scale, how the livelihood situation of a respondent is affected at that moment. For 
instance, local communities in Limpopo Province lived further away, ±20 km, from 
their PAs than those in Mpumalanga and North West Provinces who were much closer 
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to PAs. Consequently, while local communities in Limpopo where poorer than those 
in those living in the other two provinces, they still supported their PAs in much the 
same way as, and in some cases even more strongly than, those living close their PAs. 
However, local communities living close to PAs, easily change their views of their 
PAs depending on how the livelihoods are affected at a particular time. In fact, the 
patterns we observe in nature are only 'snapshots' or fixed configurations both in time 
and in space (Magome 2003c). 
To local communities, participation in the management of PAs is primarily aimed at 
improving and securing their livelihoods, mainly through job creation. In this context, 
biodiversity conservation can be viewed as an imposed means to achieve this end. In 
practice, local communities use most of the benefits accruing from PAs to develop 
infrastructure such as schools and health facilities, but in reality this is taking over the 
responsibility of the government. In most developing countries, the government does 
not have sufficient financial resources to fund such developments, and in rural areas 
this places undue pressure on PAs. The government subsidises PAs and in a situation 
of continued budget cuts, the management of PAs is forced to cut down on secondary 
functions like rural development. When they do, local people unfortunately interpret it 
as reneging on promises made. Logically, it can be concluded that in fluctuating and 
unpredictable environments, as it happened with MPB, support of local communities 
to PAs cannot be easily guaranteed, despite huge initial investments. 
Unpredictability introduces a quandary for managers of PAs, but should not act as a 
deterrent for trying out combinations of co-determinants that are likely to produce the 
desired outcomes. The complexity of both ecological and social systems, and the 
challenge of coping with both uncertainty and unpredictability of the natural world, 
increases the quest for workable solutions. In the next chapter, I provide a case study 
of how relationships between PAs and local people can be dynamic and unpredictable. 
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Chapter 7 
Transformation and national parks 
7.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I outline how the National Parks Board (NPB), as it was known during 
apartheid, tried to transfonn itself into a public service agency capable of benefiting 
local communities. The inclusion of the NPB is important for two key reasons. Firstly, 
while the NPB had commissioned this study, case studies were drawn from provincial 
conservation agencies because of their long history of trying to work with local people 
during apartheid era - an experience the NPB did not have. Secondly, since the NPB 
could not afford to wait for the recommendations of the present study, it is important 
to review the 'trials and errors' of the NPB in order to distil lessons learnt. Logically 
the lessons learnt from the NPB will guide the required policy framework. The NPB 
review systematically follows the 5-year strategic plans of each leadership era. 
On 2 February 1990 the President of the apartheid South Africa, FW de Klerk, made a 
historic speech by unbanning all the underground political parties that represented the 
majority of black people. He promised to release political prisoners including Nelson 
Mandela, and introduced negotiations for transition to a new political system or 'new' 
South Africa, as he termed it. His bold step was followed by the 'Abolition of Racially 
Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991', but this was only a pre-emptive dismantling 
of the cornerstones of apartheid. De facto, South Africa remained a racist state until 
the interim constitution of 1993 gave effect to the first democratic elections that were 
held on the 27 April 1994. Following the democratic elections, South Africa became a 
government of national unity. Under the government of national unity, the party with 
the majority vote was the African National Congress (ANC), which represented the 
vast majority of the previously marginalised black people. In essence, the hopes and 
expectations of the previously marginalized majority of black people were raised, and 
transfonnation became the new buzzword in South Africa. 
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Prior to February 1990 the NPB managed national parks in isolation from the socio-
economic realities that affected them (Fourie et al. 1990; Fourie 1991). While some 
provincial conservation agencies had attempted to include the social needs of rural 
local people (Chapters 4-6), the NPB only started to consider this need in 1991, when 
political change was inevitable. Coincidentally, when Dr GA (Robbie) Robinson was 
appointed as Chief Executive of the NPB in April 1991, he tried to sensitise the 
organisation to the socio-political realities of the post-apartheid era (Robinson 1992, 
1993, 1994). However, the repositioning of the NPB created debates within its senior 
management, thereby confirming that the organisation had conflicts about what should 
underpin its transformation (Loader 1994; Anon. 1995; Dladla 1995). 
The need to transform the NPB was inevitable, but what had to change, and how it had 
to change, remained difficult to define. Consequently, the NPB remained for most of 
the first decade of democracy, extremely confused about what path to take. Part of the 
problem was the term 'transformation' because its vagueness meant different things to 
various political constituencies, and this generated extensive policy debates. Despite 
the various interpretations of transformation, all state-funded agencies were expected 
to implement meaningful change to avoid perceptions of maintaining the status quo. 
7.2. Methods 
I revieWed several documents on the transformation of the NPB, and the relevance of 
the transformation process for involving the local communities in the management of 
national parks. Additional data were obtained using archival research and personal 
observations. Archival research focused on the organisation's annual reports; internal 
journals such as Custos, Koedoe, Timbiia, Kiewiet, and Go Wild; consultancy reports; 
workshop and conference materials; and, published documents. Personal observations 
were made from 1996 in two capacities. Firstly, during the field part of the study 
period, 1996 to 2000, I was part of the NPB's senior management and was privileged 
to participate in internal workshops aimed at helping the organisation to develop new 
vision, mission, objectives, and strategies. Secondly, after analysing the results of this 
study, I was appointed head of the Social Ecology Unit (SEU) in April 2000. As head 
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of the SEU, I was expected to 'finally' integrate national parks with their adjacent 
rural local communities. However soon thereafter, September 2000, I was appointed 
by the Board of Trustees (Board) to the position of Director Conservation Services. As 
Director of Conservation Services, my major function was to provide science-based 
policies for the entire organisation, including SEU. Therefore, I continued to manage 
the SEU until June 2003, when it was later replaced by a much bigger function of 
constituency building, following recommendations of McKinsey & Company (2002), 
a firm of international business strategy analysts. 
7.3. Transforming tbe NPB 
The transformation process undergone by the NPB epitomises the struggle for power 
and privilege in the democratic South Africa. The release of Nelson Mandela, and the 
advent of the post-apartheid era, forced the NPB to make strategic adjustments ranging 
from rhetoric to tweaking the organisation. While the NPB's rhetoric of involving the 
local communities was well documented in various issues of Custos dating from 1991 
to 1998, evidence on the ground shows otherwise (DANCED 1997,2000,2001; Reid 
2001; Fabricius 2002; Cock & Fig 2002; Magome & Murombedzi 2003). The NPB 
case study illustrates the politics, paradoxes, and puzzles of integrating national parks 
with rural local communities. Unlike the nine new provincial conservation agencies 
that had to merge various legally independent authorities, the ten former homeland and 
four apartheid agencies (Chapters 3-6), the NPB retained its existing legal status for at 
least ten years. 
The 1993 interim constitution, envisioned nature conservation as a concurrent mandate 
whereby national parks were accountable to the national government, while other PAs 
were the responsibility of the provincial government. Subsequently, Schedule 4 of the 
1996 Constitution reaffirmed the legality of national parks. The legal status of national 
parks under apartheid was carried over to the post-apartheid era. Given this false sense 
of security, the management of the NPB remained confused by not knowing what, 
why, when, and how to change. Indeed, the changes undergone by the NPB represent 
the pressures faced by its leadership under each 5-year strategic planning period. 
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7.3.1 Transformation attempts, 1991-1996 
There were several attempts to transform the NPB between 1991 and 1996 (Robinson 
1991, 1992, 1993, 1994a-b; 1995; NPB's Annual Reports 1993-1996). These attempts 
included: 1) repositioning the NPB (Robinson 1991); 2) improving its racial profile 
(Robinson 1992); 3) building its corporate image through public relations (Robinson 
1993; de Villiers 1994); 4) drafting a Neighbour Relations Strategy (Robinson 1994); 
and, introducing the Social Ecology concept (Dladla 1995). In terms of involving local 
communities, the NPB's first case study started in 1991 with the Nama people who 
retained rights to the 1,625 krn2 Richtersveld National Park (Richtersveld), situated in 
the Northern Cape Province. 
Richtersveld represents the unique arid mountain landscapes that support the endemic 
succulent Karoo vegetation and wilderness features of the Namib Desert. While the 
apartheid regime had wanted to 'protect' this landscape since the late 1960s, it was 
only in 1991 that Richtersveld was proclaimed a 'contractual' national park. However, 
the proclamation was made after a successful court interdict by some 3,000 affected 
Nama people who would have lost access to communal rights such as grazing for 
livestock, firewood and medicinal plants. At the time, the political climate favoured 
the Nama people because it was during the dying days of apartheid government and 
the rights of local people were being affirmed. 
The results of the negotiations granted the Nama concessions such as: 1) maintaining 
grazing rights for 6,600 goats and sheep; 2) leasing the land for 30 years with options 
to renegotiate new rights; 3) reducing the size of the national park from 2,500 to 1,625 
km
2 
and providing 800 km2 of additional grazing land; 4) guaranteed job opportunities 
and a lease fee of RO.54Iha; 4) creating a contract that recognised the Nama as rightful 
landowners; and, 5) creating a Joint Management Board (JMB) with the Nama having 
more representation than the NPB, and the chair of the JMB rotating annually between 
the two parties. Thirteen years after Richtersveld was proclaimed as a community-
owned national park, the Nama have not received their title deed. The co-management 
ideal remains a managerial nightmare (Magome & Murombedzi 2003). 
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Realising that the political landscape was changing, Robinson (1992) outlined four 
key strategies for changing the NPB (Table 7.1). While it can be deduced from Table 
7.1 that strategies 1 and 2 were long-term ideals that cannot be fairly assessed in the 
present study, strategies 3 and 4 are open to assessment over the time frame of this 
study. Although strategy 3 has not been achieved, it is still achievable. However, the 
development of 'a comprehensive and clear corporate social responsibility' (strategy 
4) has been a daunting task for the NPB. In fact, the NPB abandoned the corporate 
social strategy for the Neighbour Relations Strategy (NRS). Ironically, the draft NRS 
published for public comment in the June 1993 issue of Custos was later withdrawn as 
the NPB felt it was prematurely released (Custos, January 1994). Withdrawing the 
draft NRS hinted at confusion and uncertainty. 
Table 7.1. Four key strategies outlined in 1992 for transforming the NPB. 
Purpose and Intended outcomes 
Strategy I Create an organisation that will be recognised by the majority of South Africans as 
legitimate for managing national parks on their behalf. 
Strategy 2. Develop and launch a sound affirmative action programme that is assessed through 
targets and performance. 
Strategy 3 Develop a national park system that will provide local communities on the border of 
national parks with meaningful opportunities to influence and to share responsibility 
for biodiversity conservation. 
Strategy 4 Develop a comprehensive and clear corporate social responsibility for the NPB and 
ensure that it is applied effectively. 
Source: Robinson (1992). 
In September 1993, the Board in office before the 1994 elections approved the NPB's 
future management (Table 7.2), and published it for public comment (Custos, January 
1994). However, the proposed structure stated the obvious and was vague on what 
direction, if any, the NPB should take. The policy proposed to ensure that the NPB 
enjoyed broader support, and that South Africa's important landscapes were identified, 
and protected (Custos January 1994). Strategically, the NPB used some of the land 
restitution claims to show its commitment to the government's social responsibilities. 
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• The national parks of South Africa are to become the pride and joy of all 
South Africans. 
• The national parks system is to represent the widest spectrum of biodiversity 
and unique natural features in South Africa. 
• The organisation is to co-operate with all groups in South Africa and must be 
recognised as a world leader in national park management and eco-tourism 
development. 
• The NPB is to be apolitical, financially independent, business-oriented and 
decentralised. 
• The NPB is to be an equal opportunity organisation 
• The NPB is to be visitor-friendly and enthusiastic, with an unquestionable 
image of high environmental ethics and social responsibilities. 
• There is to a greater emphasis on individual initiative and calculated risk-
taking. 
• Employees of the NPB are to reflect the best South Africa can produce. 
• Standards of performance for commercial, professional, research, 
maintenance, conservation and technical activities will demand ability, 
enthusiasm, motivation and teamwork of National Parks Board staff 
members as well as high morals and principles 
Source: Adapted from Robinson (1994a). 
In 1994, the NPB and the South African Defence Force (SADF) conceded to returning 
70 krn2 of land abutting the Augrabies Falls National Park. The land had previously 
belonged to the Riemsvasmaak community, but was forcibly taken by the apartheid 
government. The Riemvasmaak land was proclaimed state property in 1865 and was 
thereafter known as 'crown land' (van der Walt 1995). From 1973 to 1974, the 
Riemvasmaak community, consisting of Damaras, Xhosa, and Namas was split and 
resettled elsewhere in Namibia, Transkei and Northern Cape. The forceful removal 
was carried out in terms of the 'Separate Development Act', which was based on 
ethnicity. The SADF used the land for military training while the NPB used it as a 
'wilderness' area. When SADF left, they stripped the land of most of the infrastructure 
such as water pipes. Similarly, the NPB removed high value wildlife species such as 
the black rhinoceros. Without settlement support and proper advice on land use 
options, the new claimants resettled prime land capable of producing high value 
grapes for the lucrative wine export industry. 
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Part of the agreement was that 4 lan2 of Melkbosrand would be deproclaimed as a 
national park and also returned to the Riemvasmaak community based on Restitution 
of Land Right Act. The Riemvasmaak land claim was badly handled, and this led to a 
breakdown of trust between the claimants and the NPB. In fact, the Riemvasmaak case 
study was not widely publicised. Melkbosrand was re-claimed by the Riemvasmaak 
community and was only deproclaimed in May 2004. Convinced that a partnership 
with the NPB would not work, the Riemvasmaak community rejected initial proposals 
to co-manage their land with the NPB. 
The NPB claimed it was "adapting to change" and stated that (Custos, January 1994): 
Although national parks have traditionally been perceived as untouchable 
islands and are associated with the peace and tranquillity of nature, the outcome 
of the political debate, demands for land, a decline in domestic and foreign 
tourism due to the violence and financial restraints are all the factors that will 
determine their future. 
In mid 1994, the NPB outlined its neighbour relations strategy (NRS) as a new policy 
for extending the goals of biodiversity conservation and of tourism to include the 
neglected concerns of black people (Table 7.3). The NRS was supposed to articulate 
the NPB's corporate social responsibility, and in time become a policy document for 
including the local communities living adjacent to national parks. Logically, the NPB 
acknowledged that, to be accepted in the post-apartheid South Africa, it had to include 
the social concerns of the broader political constituency by replacing its notorious law 
enforcement profile with some contribution to local rural development. While the 
logic of introducing the NRS could not be disputed, the NRS was generally viewed as 
a 'having to do it' survival tactic (Loader 1994), because the NPB had neglected social 
issues (Smit 1995) and was, as a result, under siege (Wells 1996). Accordingly, the 
NPB tried to make strategic changes to its managerial structure, including financial 
systems, human resource policies, and its neighbour relations (Custos, January 1994). 
In reality, the 'strategic changes' translated into cosmetic adjustments, ranging from 
appointing high profile ANC-aligned black people to occupy senior positions at head 
quarters, to creating new units such as public relations and social ecology. 
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Table 7.3. Summary of the neighbour relations strategy for NPB. 
Key driver Background, desired outcomes and Implications 
Rationale The NPB has, for many years, involved local communities neighbouring its estate in 
the activities of the NPB. Chief amongst these has been the focus on employment. 
However, the NPB recognises that poverty in South Africa is the greatest threat to 
biodiversity and environmental integrity. It has therefore formalised a draft neighbour 
relations policy to integrate conservation and the aspirations of its neighbours. 
Purpose The policy proposes a re-orientation of the objectives of the NPB in keeping with 
contemporary thought. At an organisational level we propose to revise the approach to 
our mandate to expand our existing objectives (biodiversity conservation and tourism 
and recreation) to encompass social concerns. We also propose to establish an 
appropriate corporate identity that will place less emphasis on the law enforcement 
profile of the NPB, and more on its contribution to human needs. 
Target At a local and sub-regional or neighbour relations level we propose to conduct or 
facilitate programmes to contribute to economic, institutional, technical and 
educational development. It is through these areas that the wider expertise and fund-
generating ability of the NPB can be harnessed to the greater benefit of all South 
Africans and in particular our largely disadvantaged neighbours. We propose in this 
respect also to network with our more affluent neighbours. We propose in this respect 
also to network with our more affluent neighbours, some of them are already 
implement their own neighbour relations programmes. 
Strategy In order to accomplish this, the NPB will need to establish a neighbour relations 
division manned by appropriately orientated and skilled staff and of a size adequate 
for the fulfilment of the objectives of the division and of the NPB. Finally, set aside 
the necessary funding to conduct a meaningful neighbour relations programme. 
Source: Robinson (1994a). 
For ANC-aJigned black employees, joining the NPB also created opportunities to 
establish new careers. While the creation of new functions later led to major financial 
problems for the NPB, the ANC-aligned senior black employees increasingly felt 
marginalised from the core activities of the organisation. When combined with Dr 
Robinson's highly centralised management style, the NPB's head office was like two 
organisations, one for black people and the other for white people. Accordingly, the 
high profile ANC senior managers felt unwelcome, and when perceptions of 'window 
dressing' increased, they all left within two years of joining the NPB. The NRS was 
replaced by the social ecology concept, which was created under the SEU headed by 
Dr Yvonne Dladla. Dr Dladla, a highly analytical black woman with social sciences 
qualifications, had originally applied for a position in human resources, but when she 
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realised that the NPB was not doing anything for 'ordinary people', she offered to help 
(Timbila 1 (4». Dr Robinson asked Dr Dladla to help him conceptualise strategies for 
community development or neighbour relations, but she was not satisfied with either 
concept. As a result, a strategic planning meeting was held in 1995 to explore what 
'this new thing would be called' (Dladla in Timbila 1 (4):60). The 'new thing' initially 
morphed into 'Social Conservation', but Dr Dladla rejected the concept and changed it 
to Social Ecology (SE). 
However, Dr Dladla herself 'grappled' with the very concept she introduced (Timbila 
1 (4». Despite the appointment of Dr Dladla as General Manager of the SEU, the NPB 
was not ready to accept changes. Change is always painful because human beings are 
creatures of habit and tradition. In fact, transfonnation was associated with suspicions 
of hidden political agendas, general uncertainty, and also anxiety about the future. 
Indeed, as summarised by Dladla (Timbila 1 (4):61): 
When I arrived I was the third black manager in SANP. I represented a lot of 
issues: a black female with social sciences background who was community-
orientated. Can you imagine the threat I posed? 
In fact Dr Dladla and the SEU posed a threat, forcing Robinson (1994: 10) to state that: 
The NPB is not and should not be a community development agency because its 
fundamental brief, circumscribed by an Act of Parliament, is to conserve 
biodiversity. In spite of this we must contribute something directly to community 
development because of the overwhelming need for development that cannot be 
met by any single government department. To elaborate on the threat to our 
existence by not being relevant to the majority of the South African population, is 
hardly necessary. 
Uncertain what changes to make, the NPB spent time thinking strategies. Accordingly, 
the Chief Executive's Report stated (NPB Annual Report 1994-1995). 
But, in accordance with the waves of change that have swept over our country, it 
became evident, even prior to this review, that the NPB would also have to make 
significant adjustments to bring it in line with new economic and political trends. 
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Despite having prioritised the NRS (NPB Annual Report 1994-1995), and replacing it 
with the SEU (Dladla 1995), the NPB found the term 'neighbouring communities' 
difficult to define (Custos, May 1995: 18). Ironically, 90% of state PAs in South Africa 
border local communities (Els 1996a). Frustrated by lack of changes, the ANC-aligned 
senior managers wrote to Dr Robinson, and copied the Minister of Environment and 
Tourism. In September 1995, the Minister appointed a new Board (Custos, November 
1995). Correspondingly, the Chief Executive's review (NPB 1995-1996 Annual 
Report), stated that: 
With the appointment of a truly representative Board during the year under 
review, the NPB crossed the threshold into South Africa's new democracy by 
becoming a legal institution of the Government of National Unity. As with all 
other government-related organisations, the NPB too needs to undergo a 
restructuring and transformation process. 
In contrast to the apartheid Board of 12 trustees, the post-apartheid Board comprised 
18 trustees, nine nominated by the provinces and the rest by the public. The 1995 
Board had a good gender and racial mix. The previous Boards, since 1926, comprised 
only white elderly males who were closely aligned with apartheid views of racial 
domination (Carruthers 1995). While the 1995 Board comprised expertises on social 
sciences, human rights, business, and conservation, it was the political profile of the 
trustees that qualified them for appointment. Indeed, the key priority of the new Board 
was to change the public image of the NPB. Yet, the NPB's top management was still 
wondering whether 'to change or not to change' (van der Merwe 1996). Clearly, such 
a clash of ideals was bound to create problems. 
The SEU was created ostensibly to involve local communities adjacent to all national 
parks so that they could, in turn, support its national conservation mandate. The NPB 
also had to change its 'current employee corps, culture and organisational policies' to 
reflect govemment thinking (NPB Annual Report 1995-1996). In theory, the NPB 
"committed itself wholeheartedly to the basic principles of the government's RDp
4
" 
4The RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) was a radical strategy developed by the 
government's majority party, the African National Congress (ANC 1994). 
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(Havenga 1996:8), stating: "good fences don't make good neighbours" (Roderigues 
1996:8). If documents were the yardstick of progress, the NPB appeared to be on 
track. Beyond documents, implementation remained a daunting task. Although new 
initiatives with the neighbours of national parks had to be implemented 'with the 
urgency needed at this late stage' (Robinson 1996), what was being 'implemented' 
remained unclear to both the SEU and to the managers of all national parks. 
In 1996 the Board approved that the public be consulted to change the name of the 
NPB as part of a strategy to improve public ownership of the organisation. Concerned 
that changes would be limited to the name only, the majority of the black employees 
called for changes in everything that resembled apartheid South Africa, including staff 
uniform and its kudu bull head logo enclosed in an emblem labelled Custos Naturae or 
'custodian of nature'. The uniform was partly changed from military style to casual 
clothing, but only staff at head office mostly enjoyed this change, particularly senior 
black employees who had always rejected the khaki-style uniform. 
EventuaHy, the kudu buH head logo was 'freed' from the enclosure emblem, symbolic 
of new freedom in post-apartheid South Africa. The NPB started to internalise its new 
vision of making its national parks the pride and joy of all South Africans. While 
waiting a name change, the Board pushed for more transformation measures than Dr 
Robinson could handle. Within a year of appointing trustees, Board meetings became 
arenas of conflict on almost all strategic issues. Both de jure and de jacto, the Board 
took active charge of the NPB, and often bypassed Dr Robinson by obtaining 
information from his key staff. Dr Robinson reacted by centralising power in his 
office. Unknown to Dr Robinson, transforming the public service was a powerful 
force in the post-apartheid South Africa (Maganya & Houghton ] 996). 
As stated by (Munslow et al. 1997: 1 0): 
Symbolically as well as functionally there was an evident need for the structures 
of the state to be seen to reflect an appropriate diversity of South African 
communities at all levels. The exclusive and sectarian nature of the inherited 
apartheid service needed to be rapidly and decisively addressed. 
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The imperatives of change in the post-apartheid South Africa required that the various 
fonns of social development be combined with a strategy to transform public service 
organisations (McLennan 1997). This was largely because the abilities and capacities 
suited to a previous political order did not automatically translate into a democratic 
and diverse South Africa (Munslow et al. 1997). Accordingly, the SEU outlined its 
key strategic plans (Table 7.4), but the park managers scuppered their implementation. 












To develop and nurture good relations with park neighbours by promoting their 
involvement, through advisory structures, in the overall management and 
philosophy of the park. Both parties benefit from mutual appreciation of values, 
aspirations and views. 
As a resource-rich player in regional development, the SANP should provide 
economic opportunities for previously disadvantaged communities bordering its 
parks. The SANP adopted an economic empowennent policy in order to establish 
'mutually beneficial partnerships' that were economically viable and sustainable. 
Programmes were created to enable both local communities and other South 
Africans to acquire, or rekindle, a knowledge and pride in natural and cultural 
heritage. The focus was primarily on the your as the future custodians of the 
environment. Regional and national Environmental Youth Symposiums involved 
children from parks' neighbouring communities in action projects. 
To protect and promote cultural heritage is an important way in which national 
parks can become the pride and joy of previously marginalized South Africans, 
through presenting a fuller picture of the country's distorted cultural history. 
To collect and collate socio-economic baseline data and infonnation from 
community projects in the parks. Assess results so that social ecology guidelines 
can be established and incorporated into park management plans. 
Source: Adapted from Social Ecology Business Plan 
The SEU claimed that it could not create relations between national parks and adjacent 
local communities because the NPB was still untransformed (Dladla 1998). Dr Dladla 
insisted that the SEU should be a key part of the NPB's transformation strategy. With 
a knee-jerk reaction, Dr Robinson charged Dr Dladla, head of the SEU, with the huge 
task of transforming the NPB. As stated by Dr Dladla: "I don't think he expected me 
to take up the challenge" (Timbila 1(4):62). Indeed, Chief Executives should drive 
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strategic functions, such as transforming the modus operandi of organisations. Hence, 
Dr Robinson's managerial neglect further alienated the SEU from park managers who 
argued that SEU knew insufficient about national parks to influence them. 
Towards the end of 1996, the relationship between the Board and Dr Robinson 
became dysfunctional because of alleged irreconcilable differences over the splitting 
tourism activities from the control of park mangers in order to improve income (Africa 
Environment & Wildlife (5 (1) 1997). Dr Robinson opposed the Board, insisting that 
tourism was an adjunct of conservation and should, as a result, report to the park 
manager. Consequently, Dr Robinson was peremptorily forced to resign. However, 
some people agreed with Dr Robinson's claim that he did transform the NPB because 
he 'brought it screaming into the new South Africa' (Keeping Track, March 1997). 
7.3.2 Transformation attempts, 1997-2002 
In 1997, the NPB was renamed South African National Parks (SANP), and the ANC-
aligned Mr Mavuso Msimang replaced Dr Robinson as Chief Executive. As the first 
black person with a high political profile in the ANC to be appointed to SANP, Mr 
Msimang's appointment demonstrated the altered priorities of the Board, a key step in 
improving the public image of the SANP. As secretary to the ANC's president, Oliver 
Tambo (Getaway, November 1997), Mr Msimang had the much-needed political 
clout. With his dislike for khaki uniform (Keeping Track, August/September 1997), 
Mr Msimang re-enforced casual wear at the head office. As is often wont to happen, 
appointing a political leader made supporters of the SANP question the commitment 
of the ANC to protecting South Africa's national parks system. However, within a 
year of his appointment, Mr Msimang's gentle nature won him public admiration. 
In 1998, the SANP agreed to settle a second land claim, but this time it involved the 
Makuleke people and the apartheid icon of conservation in South Africa, the Kruger 
National Park. Unlike, the relatively unknown Riemvasmaak claim, the Makuleke 
claim, involving 250 km2 of the 20,000 km2 Kruger, is well documented (Steenkamp 
1998a-b; de ViIIiers 1999; Steenkamp & Uhr 2000; Reid 2001; Cock & Fig 2002; 
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Magome & Murombedzi 2003; Fabricius et al. 2004). In stark contrast to readily 
accepting the Riemvasmaak claim, the SANP had originally protested the Makuleke 
claim, which was lodged in 1996. As was the case with the Nama (Richtersveld) 
agreement, the Makuleke land claim was resolved after 18 months of prolonged 
conflict over land rights and land use options. 
The Makuleke's rights were restored on condition that: 1) no mining or prospecting 
may be undertaken and no part of the land may be used for agricultural putposes; 2) 
no part of the land may be used for residential pUtposes other than for tourism, and 
these must meet the requirements of an environmental impact analysis; 3) the land be 
used solely for conservation and its related commercial activities; 4) a servitude be 
granted to SANP to ensure that it can perform its duties in terms of the agreement and 
the National Parks Act; 5) no act shall be performed that is detrimental to the 
obligation of the state should the area be declared a RAMSAR site; and, 6) that SANP 
has the right of first refusal should the land later be offered for sale. 
Under these strict legal conditions, the Makuleke are only entitled to limited tourism 
developments on their land with highly controlled harvesting of high value wildlife 
species such as elephant and buffalo. Essentially, the Makuleke leadership anticipated 
that owning a portion of Kruger would meaningfully 'trickle-down' tourism benefits 
to their disenfranchised constituency. For the Makuleke, being part of Kruger was like 
'wining at lotto' (Magome & Murombedzi 2003). Unknown to the Makuleke, the 
northern part of Kruger was the most marginal for mass tourism. Indeed, they were 
sutprised to realise that the ecotourism bandwagon that they had jumped was very 
slow in reaching their remote area because private investors did not 'rush in' with bags 
full of money (Magome & Murombedzi 2003). 
The conflict between the Makuleke and SANP reached a breaking point, in December 
2003, when the Makuleke alleged to the Minister of Environment Affairs and Tourism 
that the senior staff of Kruger were mismanaging their land. The Makuleke are now 
attempting to manage their land. The Makuleke case study showed that the SANP was 
still dominated by the 'old era' approach that was largely concerned with protecting 
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national parks while neglecting other the needs of local communities. Accordingly, the 
myth of pristine wilderness and its consequent human exclusion, exacerbated national 
divisions along racial lines, and this had to change (Msimang et al. 2003). Under 
apartheid, the co-managed 'Contractual National Park' model was not, initially, meant 
for disadvantaged majority of black people. Therefore, SANP did not know how to 
deal with communal land under the existing co-management model (Magome & 
Murombedzi 2003). This dual and unequal treatment between private and communal 
landowners was a new form of 'ecological apartheid' in the democratic South Africa. 
It can be deduced from the Richtersveld and Kruger case studies that the joint or co-
management model involving local communities lacked conceptual clarity. 
It was not clear what such a partnership model meant, and how it was supposed to 
benefit each of the partners involved. In situations of abject poverty, it is difficult to 
reconcile long-term protectionist goals of PAs, with short-term livelihoods strategies 
among local communities. For local communities, co-management is not a preferred 
model as it represents the imposition of a top-down preservationist ideal on their 
historic rights, current expectations, and future aspirations (Reynolds 1996). Given all 
these key tmnsformation challenges, both de jure and de facto, the Board started to 
assume greater executive functions than was expected by Mr Msimang, and this 
strained the relationship between the Board and its ANC Chief Executive. 
The Board approved guiding values for tmnsformation SANP (Table 7.5), and rapidly 
started to dictate the pace of the process. A transformation task team was appointed to 
establish new values. The identified values were so vague that the executive 
management often found itself confused about what to do. Ultimately, the confusion 
caused unmanageable conflict. However, the Board's tmnsformation statement was 
emphatic, stating that (Custos, 1998:14): 
South African National Parks is striVing to transfer power and control of 
resources from the minority that had been appointed and privileged by an 
undemocratic system. to the majority that participates in the new democratic 
process. It is also directing the benefits of its activities to providing for all South 
African. rather than the more wealthy and privileged sections of society. 
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We uphold environmental ethics with regard to the protection and conservation of 
natural and cultural resources. 
We strive to provide a high-quality service to all our guests and clients. 
We are committed to the transformation process with regard to organisational 
development and our relations with external stakeholders. 
We respect individuals of all cultural backgrounds and social standing. 
We believe in a dynamic engagement with the larger community on Whose behalf 
we are stewards of the nation's natural and cultural heritage. 
We are committed to maintaining a culture of transparency through information 
sharing and good communications with internal and external stakeholders. 
We are guided by honesty in our dealings within and outside the organisation and 
professionalism in the execution of our duties. 
We value individual initiative in the advancement of organisational goals. 
Source: Tema (1998). 
The Board argued that the former SANP had worked against national unity because it 
reflected and maintained the privileges of the minority white people. To demonstrate 
its commitment, in 1997 the Board promoted the SEU to the level of a full directorate, 
the Social Ecology Department (SED), and charged the SED with the implementation 
of projects affecting local communities in the management of national parks. With the 
directive of the Board, SANP established a five-year Corporate Plan (1998-2001) sub-
titled 'a framework for transformation'. Although the corporate plan was flowed from 
consultations with staff, conflicting mission statements emerged (Table 7.6). This was 
partly because, under the multilateral talks that created the post-apartheid era, 'sunset 
clauses' were negotiated for the rights of white people, including secured civil service 
jobs (De Villiers 1994). The buzzword was 'elite-pacting' in order to demonstrate that 
the two racial elites had formed a new pact (O'Meara 1996:405). However, all these 
political compromises delayed transformation efforts. Slowly but inexorably the Board 
of the SANP began to address the exclusion and alienation of black people from 
influencing the strategic direction of the organisation. 
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Table 7.6. Conflicting transfonnation statements articulated in 1998 from SANP. 
Source Statement 
Corporate The process is driven by the overriding need to shed organizational principles, policies 






The transformation mission of SANP is to transform an established system for 
managing the natural environment to one which encompasses cultural resources, and 
which engages all sections of the community. 
SANP is striving to transfer power and control of resources from the minority that had 
been appointed and privileged by an undemocratic system, to the majority that 
participates in the new democratic process. It is also directing benefits of its activities to 
all South Africans, rather than the wealthy and privileged sections of society. 
In September 1998, the magazine Timbila (named after a musical instrument) replaced 
Custos, with its first issue praising the SANP for 'entering a new era'. Unconvinced, 
the Board insisted on the involvement of local communities (Dladla 1998). Vaguely, 
Msimang (1998:13) saw transformation as a 'defining characteristic and motivational 
force in contemporary post-1994 South Africa', adding that: 
In a nation that has, through its Constitution, committed itself to democracy, 
freedom of association and the protection of human rights, it is a moral and 
business imperative that the SANP, as the country's leading conservation and 
environmental agency, be at the forefront of this transformation. 
However, Msimang (1998:13) shirked the responsibility to the SED, stating that: 
In the SANP the engine for transformation is the Social Ecology Department, 
which was established to develop and nurture good relations with communities 
adjacent to national parks. 
With such managerial neglect, park managers increased resistance to the SED, forcing 
Mr Msimang to rescind his decision. As a result, Mr Msimang half-heartedly took 
charge of the transformation process, and the SED was forced to re-focus on its initial 
strategic plans (Table 7.4). The re-focus meant going back to the Board approved 
corporate plan, which also vaguely described SE as: 
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A strategy and process that conveys the philosophy and approach of the SANP to 
neighbouring communities by establishing mutually beneficial dialogues and 
partnerships with these communities. The process ensures that the views of the 
communities are taken into account to the largest possible extent and are acted 
upon, that the park's existence is a direct benefit to neighbouring communities 
and that, in turn, communities adjacent to parks welcome the conservation efforts 
oftheSANP. 
Naively, Msimang (Timbila 3 (5» thought that he epitomised change, stating that 'the 
newness of SANP' related to his appointment, adding: 'I am not a conservationist by 
training, and I'm black'. However, the 'Employee attitude survey' (see Kiwiet 2000), 
revealed that most employees were unhappy that head office was not following the 
'corporate plan' and that transformation was vague. Realising that his view of change 
was incongruous with that of his employees, Mr Msimang stated that change was an 
ongoing process, but that he preferred 'to see it as affirmative action positively applied 
rather than simply as a matter of transformation for transformation's sake' (Africa -
Environment & Wildlife, August 1997). When Dr Anthony Hall-Martin, then Director 
of Conservation Development retired from SANP in June 2000, he further exposed the 
tensions in the leadership of the SANP by stating that his priorities had always been 
purely biological, and that he was 'not particularly concerned about communities and 
people and all that stuff' (Getaway, September 2000:55). Although Mr Msimang was 
disappointed with the article, he later accepted that Dr Hall-Martin echoed deep-seated 
sentiments of other senior managers who had opposing views on transformation in the 
SANP (Supplement to Financial Mail, November 2000). 
To implement the SE strategy, DANCED (the Danish Cooperation for Environment 
Development) provided a three-year grant, from 1998 to 2001, of R12 million (US$2 
million) for 'capacity building' which was based on: 1) South Africa's impressive 
network of 20 national parks and their popularity especially the Kruger and Table 
Mountain; 2) the government's support for community orientated and integrated 
approaches to conservation; and 3) the rapid growth of tourism in the country that 
offered a window of opportunity for socio economic development at local community 
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levels. Against, the DANCED project as originally conceived had all the ingredients 
for speedy and successful implementation. However, during the implementation of the 
project, unforeseen constraints became apparent at both corporate and park levels. At 
the park level, SE was called a fad, and at corporate level Dr Dladla felt the pressure 
and resigned in mid 1999. The resignation was welcomed by downgrading the SED 
back to SEU, but left it without a head until April 2000 when I appointed the head of 
the SEU. Finding myself in an invidious position, and not wanting to polarise either 
side, I arranged a 'best practice conference' (Magome 2000; SANP 2000), followed 
by an audit of SEU as part of DANCED's midterm review. The conference report 
concluded that SEU was 'vulnerable' because of conceptual flaws (Box 7.1). 
Box 7.1 Lessons learnt from the Social Ecology capacity building programme. 
The DANCED learnt that: 
• In transfonning organisations, building relationships with undeveloped local people is slower 
than anticipated as the road is usually paved with many unforeseen obstacles and setbacks; 
• Creating viable business partnerships with underdeveloped rural people is an exceptionally 
slow and unpredictable process that wiJl often have little chance of succeeding if attempts are 
made to speed up the process by short circuiting the foundation oflaying steps; 
• Economic empowennent projects are likely to be sustainable after a foundation of trust and 
goodwill has been established between each national park and its neighbouring people. Thus, in 
the initial project design phase more effort should have been put on building relationships of 
mutual trust, goodwill and respect before attempting to establish economic pilot projects; and, 
• SANP should not attempt to take full responsibility for socio-economic development of local 
people neighboUring its national parks. Rather SANP should merely playa facilitatory role in 
fonning synergistic linkages between neighbouring local people, and other local actors such as 
NGOs, government departments, and private sector dealing with socio-economic development. 
In fact, this facilitatory role must only focus on issues or projects that are directly related to 
potential socio-economic opportunities emanating from national parks. 
Source: DANCED (2000). 
The review concluded that despite the SANP's international reputation, transformation 
was shackled by a legacy of ineffective and outdated management practices that 
lurked beneath the thin veneer of outwardly projected success (DANCED 2000). Thus, 
the objective of establishing mutually beneficial partnerships with local communities 
neighbouring national parks was not achieved (Box 7.2). With ongoing and declining 
morale, the last two senior social ecologists resigned (Kiewiet, June/July 2002). 
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Box 7.2. Main findings from the DANCED midterm review report. 
Key conclusions of the review team: 
• Although there seems to be a clear vision of and commitment to support the SE concepts at all 
levels in SANP, this awareness has still not materialised in significant practical support and 
reallocation of SANP resources required for establishing sustainable partnerships with 
neighbouring communities. 
• A recent survey undertaken by the DANCED project of two thirds of the social ecologists in the 
parks has revealed that in reality only very little time (about 8% of total work time) is devoted 
to community facilitation. Park managers have indicated that they find that social ecology staff 
spends too much time on community facilitation and too little time on environmental education 
and interpretation for tourists further aggravate this discouraging impression. 
• The review team's main conclusion on this aspect is that in reality it will probably take 
considerably much longer time and competent staff to obtain the project's immediate objective 
than was anticipated in the 'Project Document'. 
Source: Adapted from DANCED (2000). 
The review team argued that (Box 7.3) that the strong inertia was caused mainly by 
management problems, inter alia: 1) a strong resistance to change amongst staff and 
ignorance of participatory approaches, both within the organisation and neighbouring 
communities; 2) a limited "know how" for cross functional work demanded by the 
SANP mission generally and the SE plans specifically; and 3) a lack of understanding 
and experience in other areas of strategic management. 
The DANCED (2001) midterm review was a bad indictment on the top management 
SANP, and concluded that the SANP had failed: 1) to transform its corporate plan into 
actions and results; 2) to align and integrate departmental and park plans with the 
corporate plan; 3) to align and integrate plans between parks and other departments 
within the organisation; and 4) to integrate the commercial strategies of SANP with 
the SE strategies. Despite many unrealistic assumptions, unforeseen disruptions, and 
obstacles, there was a broad support for both the concept and relevance of SE within 
SANP, but much work remained to be done to translate visions and plans into reality, 
and to articulate the means of achieving these roles (DANCED 2000). Consequently, 
the Danish government refused to extend funding to SANP. 
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Box 7.3. Managerial dilemmas that scuppered the implementation of SE. 
Other factors that also exacerbated the SANP's weaknesses were: 
• The strong and independent personality of the now departed SE Director, which resulted in the 
SE division becoming alienated from the rest of the organisation. 
• A strong reJecdon of tbe eoncept of SE by a large seedon of "old sebool staff''', wbo feared 
and resisted transformadon and viewed SE as being synonymous with transformation. 
• Severe cuts in state funding to directing management focus and resources away from SE 
towards money-making activities such as interpretation for tourists. 
• A paucity of base-line date on socio-economic profiles and attitudes of local communities. 
• The scattered geographic location of national parks together with very poor communication 
(organisational channels and technology) between parks, and between parks and Head Office. 
• The very small number of mostly inexperienced and untrained staff operating at park level -
together with a lack of "buy in" to SE by park managers. 
Source: DANCED (2000). 
The challenge facing the SANP, now with its acronym tweaked to SANParks because 
Mr Msimang felt that the acronym 'SANP' could also be applied to the South African 
National Police, was how to redeem itself. Given all these problems and resistance to 
SE, the key challenge facing me as head of the downgraded SE was how to change the 
prevailing negative mindset. Since the SEU fell under the relatively powerful CSD 
(Conservation Services Department), I simply waited to be appointed the Director of 
CSD. Knowing full well that park managers were using legislation to resist change, I 
started an analysis of the National Park Act, 57 of 1976 (the Act). 
Logically, transformation in SANParks should have started with a review of the Act, 
the legal mandate of the organisation. Since 1982, the Act had been amended 12 times, 
but there had been no amendment that provided for the post-apartheid era. Amending 
the Act had been ad hoc, and since 1990 had involved tweaking those sections that 
hampered SANParks from achieving its selected objectives (see Table 7.7). Being 
responsible for policy research and formulation, I obtained approval to assess the 
extent to which the Act complied with the provisions of the 1996 Constitution, and its 
relevance for SANParks in the post-apartheid era. The review showed that the Act that 
enabled SANParks to manage 20 national parks had left the organisation hamstrung by 
apartheid legal provisions, and out of kilter with its new challenges. 
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Table 7.7. Amendments to the National Parks Act, 57 of 1976 since 1990. 
Introductory amendment of the National Parks Act: No. & Year 
• So as to amend certain definitions; to further regulate the establishment of parks 23 of 1990* 
by the Minister of Environment Affairs and Water Affairs; to change the name 
of the National Parks Board of Trustees; to delete references to 'provincial 
council"; to further regulate the powers of the board; 
• So as to insert certain definitions; to further regulate the establishment of parks 52 of 1992* 
by the Minister; to grant the board the power to purchase land or a mineral right 
to land for purposes of a national park. 
• So as to make further provision for payment of moneys into the National Parks 91 of 1992 
Land Acquisition Fund; 
• Substitute definition of "Minister"; and to provide for the reconstitution of the 38 of 1995 
National Parks Board; 
• Substitute the definition of "Board"; to change the name NPB to South Aqican 70 of 1997* 
National Parks (SANP) to regulate anew its power to borrow money; 
• So as to allow the of SANP to accept and receive any land or mineral rights in 106 of 1998· 
respect of donated or bequeathed to the board for purposes of a national park; 
• So as to bring the SANP within the ambit of the definition of "association not 54 of 200 1 
for gain" contained in section 1 of Value-Added Tax Act ofl991. 
Note: For complete wording of amendment with asterix C*), refer to the statutes. 
By envisaging the governance of national parks in isolation from the rest of society, 
the Act severely restricted the autonomy of SANParks to carry out its core statutory 
competencies, and to extend them in order to achieve good social responsibilities 
(Erasmus & Magome 2001). While the 'object' of a national park (section 4) in the 
Act was irreconcilable with the National Environmental Management Act of 1998, the 
corporate structure of SANParks did not allow for effective management of national 
parks (sections 5-11) because the Act restricted the powers and functions of SAN Parks 
as corporate entity (sections 12, 13, 14, 14A, 15,23). The study concluded that the Act 
was out of kilter with provisions of South Africa's 1996 Constitution, the country's 
major international environmental obligations, and post 1994 policies (Table 7.8). 
Accordingly, Erasmus & Magome (2001) concluded that: 
Apart from the practical implications of a defective Act, SANParks will remain 
politically, developmentally and operationally vulnerable unless its enabling Act 
is brought in line with both the new framework for environmental governance 
and the transformation activities of its Board of Trustees. 
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Table 7.8. Key findings of a 2001 study into the constitutional provisions of the National 
Parks Act of 1976. 
Tbe study (ound tbat tbe Act did not: 
• Reflect SANParks as the only organisation tasked with managing national parks; 
• Define the relationship between SANParks and provincial protected areas; 
• Adequately protect land identified to become part of the national parks system; 
• Make explicit or enable the developmental role of SAN Parks; 
• Provide for the establishment of enforceable mutually beneficial relationships with 
disadvantaged neighbouring local communities; 
• Adequately provide for all types of contractual national parks, in particular land 
belonging to black people; 
• Reflect the obligation of the government to international treaties such as Agenda 
21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity. 




(2a, b, & d) 
While the Board comprised 18 persons, the quorum required only four members to 
make decisions valid. Under apartheid, four members of the Board were appointed to 
represent the four provinces of the repUblic. With nine provinces under post-apartheid, 
four members were simply extended to nine, but the quorum of was carried over 
unchanged, thereby making a mockery of the principle of rep resenti veness under good 
governance. However, democracy did not bring increased funding for the SANParks, 
either from government or from the fickle tourism industry. The pressing demands on 
the public exchequer for providing basic services to those who previously did not have 
access to housing, water, electricity, and land, were the priorities. 
The viability of SANParks as a semi-independent statutory organisation still depends 
on sound funding. Although the core business of SANParks was stated as biodiversity 
conservation, the organisation needed money to sustain itself. While Mr Msimang's 
ANC profile had improved the political image of SANParks, he was reluctant to lobby 
government to increase funding for SANParks. Within three years of Mr Msimang's 
tenure, the liquidity of SANParks deteriorated to the extent that political opposition 
parties called for government intervention. Mr Msimang somehow withstood most of 
the criticisms, and strategically blamed the historic February 2000 floods in Kruger for 
cash flow problems. When the finances deteriorated to the extent that the banking 
facility was overdrawn to its limit of SAR30 million (US$lO million), ABSA bank 
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warned that it was unlikely to honour salary payments for December 200 I. The top 
management devised knee-jerk strategies to 'save' SANParks, and asked Mr Msimang 
to secure a government bridging grant of SAR30 million including re-instatement of 
the 'roads subsidy' of SARI2 million a year. 
Concerned about the causes of liquidity problems experienced by SANParks, the 
Minister instructed auditors 'to assess to what extent these causes are cyclical in nature 
or whether they are of a more permanent nature' (Deloitte & Touche 2001 :2). The 
analysis reviewed income statements, balance sheets, and the underlying cash flows 
for a five-year period, 1996 to 2001 (Box 7.4). When Dr Robinson resigned at the end 
of 1996, the SANP's investments amounted to SAR95.5 million (US$15.8 million) 
with positive cash flow of about SAR23 million or US$3.8 million (see NPB Annual 
Report 1995-96). Consequently, the auditor focused on Mr Msimang's tenure and its 
effect on the financial stability of the organisation. 
The audit report was a bad indictment on the leadership of SANParks, and implicated 
incompetence or 'shortage of staff with the require skill or experience' (Deloitte & 
Touche 2001). Faced with this indictment, the management of SANParks convinced 
the government that they could tum the organisation around. Cost cutting measures 
included reducing numbers of employees from over 4,000 to fewer than 3,000 during 
'Operation Prevail', meaning survival. Except for key tourism activities, all operations 
were frozen for eight months with severe restrictions on all travel, maintenance of 
infrastructure and capital expenditure. With bridging finance from government, cash 
flow was improved. However, SANParks remained exposed and therefore financially 
vulnerable (Moore & Masuku van Damme 2002). 
Having followed media reports, McKinsey & Company (McKinsey) approached me 
and offered to assist SANParks on a pro bono basis. McKinsey found that except for 
human resources policies, SANParks lacked common corporate biodiversity strategy, 
revenue generation, and broader constituency support. For example, of the tourists that 
visited Kruger in 2001, black South Africans only accounted for 4% suggesting that 
black people did not choose national parks in the range of their leisure activities. 
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Box 7.4. Findings ofa financial review ofSANParks in 2001. 
Key summaries of the general income and expenditure at SANP between 1996 and 200 I. 
• Until March 1996, income exceeded expenditure and an operating profit of SAR6,217 million 
was realised. 
• Since the 199617 financial year, operating expenditure has exceeded operating income. These 
operating losses, which have varied between RI2 and R25 million, average SARI9 million 
over the last four years, amounting to SAR89,43I million since 199617. This trend appears to 
be firmly entrenched and Is likely to persist If no action Is taken to normalise the situation. 
• Up to the 1999 financial year, the SANP were given a road subsidy by the Department of 
Transport. The loss of the Road Subsidy (approximately SARlO to SARI2 million per annum) 
in 1999 is not the primary reason for poor financial health of SANP as expenditure had already 
exceeded income before this loss of revenue occurred. The loss has compounded an already 
financially weak situation. 
• Finance costs have remained relatively static (average finance cost over the period is RI2 
million) and are not a significant cost driver. However, with continued operational losses this 
may well become a problem if these are financed from borrowings or continued use of the bank 
overdraft. 
• The change from an operating profit In 1995/6 of SAR6,217 million to a loss of SAR12,S9S 
million the very next year Is primarily the result of a significant Increase In labour costs 
over this period, which increased from R126,749 to R1S7,873 (an Increase of R31,124 
million or 24%). 
• "Other Expenses" which includes "Depreciation", "Office and Operating", Electricity and 
Water", and "Subsistence and Travel, have Increased by 177% over S-year period, from 
SAR34,965 million to SAR97,096 million. 
• We have analysed "Other Expenses" in great detail in an attempt to explain the significant 
increase in this cost and have found that it is primarily as a result of an increase in "Office and 
Operating" expenses. This category has increased by more than 300% over the S-year period, 
and now accounts for 18% of total SANP cost. ''Office and Operating" expenses are those that 
cannot be readily be classified and do not clearly fit into any other cost category. What this 
trend indicates is that SANP appear not to have sumclent cost control mechanisms In 
place, or that these do not work as Intended or that they may have a shortage of staff with 
the required skill or experience. 
Source: Adapted from Deloitte & Touche (2001:3-6). Note: lUS$ averaged SAR6.5. 
The vague SE concept was changed to a long-term strategy of 'constituency building' 
(Figure 7.1), which was also changed to 'people and conservation' (PaC) because Mr 
Msimang felt politicians could misconstrue 'constituency building'. In mid 2003, a 
Director with extensive experience in environmental education was appointed to head 
PaC. By end of September 2003, Mr Msimang was 'hand-picked by government to fix 
SITA, State Information Technical Agency' (Financial Mail, March 2004:22). Front 
paged as 'Mr fix it' for supposedly 'fixing' SANParks, Mr Msimang was somehow 
expected to 'fix' the multi-billion Rand SITA. 
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Figure 7.4. Constituency building as a primary component of the SANParks mission. 
Mission component 
Protection of biodiversity through a 
network of national parks 
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In August 2003 SANParks released a book I had commissioned ostensibly to review 
its key strategic achievements (Hall-Martin & Carruthers 2003). In line with the theme 
benefits beyond boundaries for the 5th World Parks Congress in Durban in 2003, SE 
was supposed to be a stand-alone chapter in the celebration book. Although SANParks 
had notable progress on some aspects of biodiversity management (Biggs & Novellie 
2003; Carruthers 2003; Fearnhead & Mabunda 2003; Hall-Martin 2003; Hall-Martin 
& van der Merwe 2003; Hall-Martin et a12003; Knight & CastIey 2003; Randall et al 
2003a-b), the draft chapter on SE was so weak that it had to be abandoned. Since hope 
is the essence of humanity, the book concluded that SE remained the future challenge 
for SANParks (Moosa & Morobe 2003). Sadly, failure to make progress on SE only 
exposed inherent weakness in the leadership of SANParks (Magome 2003a) rising all 
the way to the level of its Board (Deloitte & Nkonki 2004). 
7.3.3. Transformation attempts, 2003-2008 
In November 2003, Dr David Mabunda, the first black person to manage Kruger from 
1997, replaced Mr Msimang. Dr Mabunda believed that directing Kruger was like two 
baptisms: first with water and second with fire. Kruger was 'drowned' by the February 
2000 floods, and then 'burnt' by the September 2001 fires that killed, inter alia, 23 
people and four elephants. Some critics argued that had Dr Mabunda not retrenched 
experienced white staff; the fire might have been stopped. Despite this, Dr Mabunda 
was credited with transforming Kruger to reflect the racial profile of the post-apartheid 
era. Immediately after his appointment, Dr Mabunda re-introduced the khaki uniform. 
Coincidentally, the staff newsletter Kiewiet, the Afrikaans name for the noisy plover 
(now renamed lapwing), was replaced by Go Wild, perhaps a sign of returning to 
order. While it is too early to assess Dr Mabunda's performance, he is the first Chief 
Executive of SANParks to state that transformation must address 'gender equality, 
affirmative action, and equal opportunities (Mabunda et al. 2003:14). With a PhD in 
tourism management, Mabunda (2004) is rethinking the wisdom of 'if it pays it stays' 
by asking if 'it is realistic to expect conservation agencies to be self-supporting 
without forcing them to go out begging' (Eartbyear 2004:46). 
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7.4. Discussion 
The success or otherwise of attempts to transform SANParks is strongly linked to the 
politics of making a transition from a revolution. During any such transition period, 
the length of which is often determined by the new elites, or the 'inner circle' of the 
leading political party, transformation is entrusted with certain key positions (Lenin 
1918). In the Lesson of this century, Popper (1997:2) re-quoted Karl Marx's post-
revolutionary statement that: 
It is necessary that the productive powers already acquired and the existing 
social relations should no longer be capable of existing sided by side. 
While Marx implied 'total revolution and heralded the end to all antagonism' (Popper 
1997:2), South Africa did not experience a 'total revolution' but a negotiated political 
compromise (Lee 1997). Indeed, the former ANC Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism, Dr Pallo Jordan, reminded the elite South African public that the anti-
apartheid struggle is 'an unfinished revolution' (The Star, 3 September 1997) because 
instead of seizing total power, the ANC negotiated its partial transfer, and instead of 
transforming the government, the ANC 'found itself assimilated into it' (Marais 
1998: 12). To circumvent this quandary, the ANC appoints its senior public servants 
who understand its political agenda and are unreservedly committed to it (Bernstein 
1999). However, the ANC has a responsibility to govern for the interests of all South 
Africans, including the former oppressors (ANC 2001). 
Entangled in struggles for power, the leadership of SANParks could not resolve the 
conflict. For example, although Dr Robinson had pioneered change in SANParks, his 
perceived association with the apartheid regime implied that the new Board could not 
trust him to carry out their mandate. However, while the Board wanted to transfer 
power from the previously advantaged minority of white citizens to the previously 
disadvantaged black citizens, how the power was to be transferred, remained unclear 
even to the ANC-aligned Mr Msimang. The strained relation between the Board and 
its executive directors made strategic implementation of policies a daunting task, and 
this ultimately compromised the financial health of the organisation. 
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As suggested by Bernstein (1999:41), it might be appropriate to ask: 
Has the ANC in government thought through the differences between a public 
service that reflects the population of the country (a desirable goal) and one that 
actually does itsjob competently and honestly? 
While this question can only be answered by time, the challenge facing the ANC is the 
choice between political expediency and economic stability. For SANParks, part of the 
answer can be inferred from the experience of two key liberal board members who 
served in the first post-apartheid Board (Cock & Fig 2002: 152): 
However, in several respects, transformation [in SANParks] has been supplanted 
by a restructuring that reflects the incorporation of the liberation movement into 
institutions serving the elites. 
Since 1994 transformation in SANParks reflected 'a shallow restructuring rather than 
a fundamental transformation' (Cock & Fig 2002). While Dr Robinson's 'shallow 
restructuring' could be attributed to his perceived association with the 'old order', Mr 
Msimang's 'shallow restructuring' reflected his inability to fully understand processes 
of effecting meaningful change in a highly bureaucratic state agency. In this context, 
the quote from Nelson Mandela (in Sparks 2003:29) is relevant: 
We were taken from the bush, or from underground inside the country, or from 
prisons, to come and take charge. We were suddenly thrown into this immense 
responsibility o/running a highly developed country. 
The complexity of SANParks overwhelmed Mr Msimang who indeed asked: 'how do 
you transform a Cinderella?' (Msimang et al. 2003). In the United States National 
Park Service (USNPS) showed that efforts to transform an established oligarchy were 
incidental, and as such were not accommodated in by its management in the mission 
of the agency (Foresta 1984). Part of the problem is that wildlife managers have a 
unique professional culture (Kennedy 1985) that makes them reluctant public servants 
when it comes to transformation (Magill 1988). The Vail Agenda of 1993 concurred; 
stating that USNPS 'will not be transformed quickly or easily because confronting 
challenges that were long-standing' meant addressing problems that a reluctant UNPS 
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had never confronted wholeheartedly (Sellars 1997). The parallels are instructive 
because South Africans often compare SANParks with its US counterpart in terms of 
history (Beinart & Coates 1995), visitor experience (Cock & Fig 2002), and scientific 
management (Mabunda et al. 2003). Despite these parallels, comparisons beyond park 
boundaries are hardly explored. To understand the daunting task of transformation 
SANParks, and the ineptness of its leadership to effect successful change, it is 
important that the experiences of corporate organisations are revisited so that the 
pitfalls that confronted SANParks can be fully appreciated. 
On why transformation efforts fail, Kotter (1998:3) points out that: 
The change process goes through a series of phases that, in total, usually require 
a considerable length of time. Skipping steps create only the illusion of speed and 
never a satisfying result '. 
Organisations that enjoy enduring success have a core purpose and core values that 
remain fixed while their strategies and practices endlessly adapt to a changing world 
(Collins & Porras 1998). In this context, the failure of SANParks becomes apparent 
because both the core ideology and envisioned future were not identified. Although 
SANParks had a Transformation Task Team (TTT), the TTT first reported to the SEU 
and the to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). As suggested by Duck (1998), the TTT 
should have comprised established managers from within SANParks who should have 
committed all their time and energy to managing change. Consequently, the success or 
otherwise of transformation in SANParks reflected leadership weakness. 
Had both Dr Robinson and Mr Msimang known that 'reinvention is not changing what 
is, but creating what isn't' (Gross et al 1998:85), they could have aggressively used 
the 'sink-or-swim' strategy. Instead of creating the right conditions for the 'caterpillar' 
(the NPB) to become a 'butterfly' (new SANParks), both Dr Robinson and Msimang 
created more of a caterpillar. Hence, the 'caterpillar' was not given the opportunity to 
make the transition to a butterfly. However, their inability to act decisively could have 
been hampered by a belief that the organisation was already a 'butterfly'. Even if it 
was indeed a butterfly, evolutionary biology dictates that butterflies and moths should 
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adapt to their changing environments. The peppered moth is a good example. In the 
corporate world, successful agencies invent and re-invent themselves. Perhaps Dr 
Mabunda has the opportunity to do what Martin (1998: 117) advises: 
The collective leadership of the company needs first to look back, to find out the 
good reasons why they have come to act the way they do. They get control of 
their future by examining their past. They change by looking in, not out. 
The coUective leadership of SANParks must understand why employees resist change, 
and must find ways to change this. To executive managers, change means opportunity; 
both for the business and for themselves, but for many employees change is seen as 
disruptive and intrusive (Strebel 1998). Finally, SANParks must avoid the pursuit of 
activities that sound good, look good, and allow managers to feel good, but contribute 
little or nothing to bottom-line performance (Schaffer & Thomson 1998). 
7.5. Conclusion 
The instructive book South Africa: the limits to change contains the quote: There is 
nothing unanimous about social transformations; its meaning depends on the meaning 
it is assigned by the various actors involved (Marais 1998:1). The debate on whether 
SANParks is, or is not, transformed, wiH always be the preserve of various elites, both 
within and outside the organisation who, irrespective of race and creed, will review 
transformation from their own perspective. While one view holds that 'transformation 
has not been sufficiently quick and the legacy of apartheid remains too vivid' (Beinart 
2001 :290), another asserts that transformation serves 'elite interests' (Cock & Fig 
2002). The strength of the conservation movement in the 20th century was its capacity 
for criticism, to pick over the past, and derive lessons from it (Adams 2004). However, 
the conservation movement is stilI not wen structured to adapt to change (Child 
2004a). The challenge on how PAs can adapt is the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Law reform, protected areas, and rural development: 
implications for policy guidelines 
8.1. Introduction 
Unlike much of colonial Africa, South Africa was first influenced by colonial laws 
(1652-1912), and thereafter by apartheid laws (1913-1993). Of the two political eras, 
apartheid's racist laws and policies had by far the most negative impact on the psyche 
of all South Africans irrespective of their race and creed. Following the post-apartheid 
elections of 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) led government of national 
unity (GNU) had to revisit and reform apartheid's racist laws, policies, rules, and 
regulations. As South Africa's first black president, Nelson Mandela put a great thrust 
on nation building by creating the 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission' (TRC). 
The TRC was a major step in healing an extremely racially divided nation. According 
to the chair of the TRC, Nobel Prize winner Reverend Desmond Tutu, 'in order to 
speed up the healing process the festering racial wounds had to be opened to expose 
the puss, cleanse the wounds, and apply healing balm'. However, the perpetrators of 
apartheid were allowed to apply for amnesty and, if their acts were proven to have 
been politically motivated, they were legally exonerated. With an evil system like 
apartheid, there was a thin line between political and criminal acts. In fact, some legal 
and political scholars argued that apartheid was a criminal act in itself and attempts to 
separate political and criminal acts are a non sequitar and border on the absurd. 
The importance of the TRC cannot be overemphasised. Two years after the democratic 
elections there was concern that 'South Africa's breezy post-apartheid self-confidence 
has crumbled' (The economist, October 12th_18th 1996:27). Despite his iconic status, 
President Mandela was often criticised by non-ANC aligned liberation parties for 
taking reconciliation too far (Venter 1998). Some senior ANC members shared similar 
152 
sentiments, but it was unwise for them to disagree publicly with President Mandela 
(Bernstein 1999; Sampson 1999). because of both his extraordinary statesmanship and 
unique role in bringing a spirit of reconciliation to a country on a brink of anarchy and 
civil war (Dubow 2000). Strategically, drastic refonn measures were left to Mandela's 
hands-on successor, President Mbeki. Having returned from exile in 1990. President 
Mbeki was relatively unknown to the vast majority of black people, and his political 
career partly depended on wining their support by providing basic social services. 
To provide social services, the government has followed two macroeconomic policies 
(Schoeman 1998:297): 1) the RDP (the reconstruction and development programme) 
that focuses on the demand side of the economy by dealing with how black people 
expect wealth to be redistributed by the government; and, 2) the GEAR (growth, 
employment and redistribution strategy), which deals with the supply side of the 
economy by stimulating growth in order to provide the services envisaged by the 
RDP. Although mixing the socialist-based RDP (ANC 1994) with the market-based 
GEAR was supported by big business, it was also seen as readiness by 'ANC leaders 
to catch up with the finer tastes of their fonner masters' (Adam et af. 1998: 165-6). 
Mbeki (1998), was aware of these criticisms, including being accused of emphasising 
'the need for white South Africans to share their wealth with blacks' (The Economist, 
June 12th -18th 1999:80), President Mbeki knows that while fonner President Mandela 
was credited with triumph, he will blamed for mistakes (Sampson 1999). Nonetheless, 
market-led development is seen as the only way to improving livelihoods (CDE 2001). 
In the post-apartheid era, catch phrases like 'unbundling assets', 'speeding up black 
economic empowerment', 'fast-tracking development', and 'vivifyingS, change, have 
been popularised by the new elites (Magome & Murombedzi 2003). Such jargon is 
durable because high expectations were also of concern to fonner President Mandela 
who warned his constituency against having unrealistic expectations. However, fully 
aware of the necessity to improve livelihoods, fonner President Mandela had on many 
occasions called for the creation of 'jobs, jobs, and jobs' (Parsons 1999). 
5 Derived from 'vivid'. 'Vivifying' is the act of making things vivid. 
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South Africans are reminded that President Mbeki was called to (Parsons 1999:80): 
Achieve economic growth; improve quality of life of ordinary South Africans and 
in short to effect transformation. How well he will succeed will no doubt depend 
on many factors, some of them not even remotely under his control, others 
perhaps a direct result of his personal and professional qualities and abilities. 
Under the short-lived (1994-1996) power sharing arrangement between the ANC and 
the National Party (NP), the environment portfolio was allocated to the NP. Giving the 
NP such a key portfolio suggested that it was not a priority to the ANC. Following the 
departure of the NP, the ANC re-allocated the portfolio to Dr Pallo Jordan, previously 
removed from the Ministry of post and telecommunications. Unenthused with the 
environment portfolio, Dr Jordan did little to reform environmental laws. After the 
1999 elections, Mr Valli Moosa replaced Dr Pallo Jordan. Although environmental 
governance in the post-apartheid era comprised patchwork of inherited, interim, and 
intended legislation and policy (Glazewiski 2000), Valli (as affectionately known) and 
his Director General, Dr Crispian Olver, started a law reform programme (LRP) that, 
within two years, swpassed even the efforts of the apartheid government. 
In this Chapter, I outline how the LRP: 1) affects the management of state PAs in the 
post-apartheid era; 2) links state PAs with rural development; and 3) as a result, policy 
guidelines, and study recommendations ought to be formulated. 
8.2. The Constitution and environmental protection 
As previously mentioned (Chapter 7), the South African Constitution of 1996 (the 
Constitution) states that nature conservation should remain a dual mandate between 
national and provincial governments. This duality has translated into uncoordinated 
efforts to effect terrestrial conservation (Table 8.1). Except for consolidating the nine 
provincial conservation agencies, the split mandate between national and provincial 
departments was carried over, as it was, from the apartheid era. Hence, a profusion of 
new laws and lack of co-ordination between government departments has continued to 
hamper effective management of PAs. 
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Table 8.1. Government agencies responsible for managing PAs in South Africa. 
Agency in charge 
Ministry of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism 
Legal mandate 
Administers sites under the World Heritage Act 49 of 1999, 
RAMSAR, and the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989. 
• Administers Marine Reserves and Marine Protected Areas. 
• The Minister ultimately oversees both South African National 
Parks and National Botanical Institute. 
South African National Parks An independent statutory board established under the National 
Parks Act 57 of 1976. 
National Botanical Institute 
National Heritage Resources 




• Manages 22 NPs including Kruger and Cape Peninsula NPs. 
• Co-manages transboundary parks affecting its NPs. 
An independent statutory board established under the National 
Forest Act 84 of 1998. 
• Manages 7 national botanical gardens, including Kirstenbosch 
Botanical Garden in Cape Town, and 4 Flower Reserves. 
• Undertakes biodiversity planning. 
Managed by various agencies created under the National Heritage 
Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
• Responsible agency is the South African Heritage Resources 
Agency (SAHRA). 
• Affects the management of cultural and historic sites in PAs. 
Operate in 9 provinces under nature conservation ordinances. 
• Some are statutory boards, e.g., Mpumalanga, North West and 
KwaZulu-Natal. 
• However, some Homeland Nature Conservation Acts have not 
been repealed e.g., Bophuthatswana (Bop) Parks. 
Establish and administer a variety of PAs ranging from green or 
open spaces to nature reserves. 
Note: This table excludes protected forests, watersheds, and land under the National 
Defence Force. 
The first attempt to address uncoordinated mandates was by gazetting the 1997 While 
Paper on Environmental Management Policy ostensibly to create: I) an effective, yet 
properly-resourced, and harmonised framework for environmental management; 2) an 
integrated system of laws; and, 3) capacity at all levels of government to implement 
the environmental management policy. The second attempt to address institutional 
arrangements for managing the country's 70,000 km2 of PAs was by commissioning 
an inquiry led by Judge Kumleben in 1998. The Kumleben Commission (as it was 
known in the country) investigated appropriate legal arrangements for managing both 
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PAs and biodiversity in South Africa (Box 8.la). Despite this broad mandate, the 
Kumleben Commission recommended that the existing mUltiple-management of PAs 
should not to be replaced by one central authority or converted to an entirely 
decentralised provincial structure (Box 8.lb), and this was interpreted as advocating 
for the status quo. Consequently, many South African environmentalists consider the 
Kumleben Commission as a non-event in terms of shaping the institutional landscape 
in the post-apartheid South Africa. 
Box 8.1a. Tenns of reference for investigating the management of South Africa's PAs. 
To investigate and make recommendations on the: 
• Management of national parks as part of the State's responsibility of nature conservation. 
• Functionality of the division of administrative competencies between the SANP and the 
provincial conservation authorities and its effect on service provisions. 
• Future management of South Africa's system of national parks and other PAs with specific 
reference to bringing decision-making and benefits closer to local communities. 
• Role of provinces and the SANP in the management of existing national parks and in the 
identification and proclamation of future national parks. 
• Constitutionality (if any) and institutional arrangements as weIl as legislative and financial 
measures required for the most appropriate alternatives. 
• Application of existing criteria for the classification of PAs in South Africa in the light of 
current constitutional dispensation, present and intemational trends. 
Source: Adapted from Kumleben et al. (1998). 
Box 8.tb. Key recommendations of the Kumleben Commission. 
The Commission recommended that: 
• There be a scientific appraisal of all existing PAs to determine those that qualify for national 
protection, and such areas be known as Nationally Proclaimed Protected Areas (NPPAs). 
• The state bears ultimate responsibility for the welfare and preservation of NPP As and such 
areas be properly and specifically funded. 
• The existing multiple management networks of the PAs is not to be replaced by one central 
authority or converted to an entirely decentralised provincial structure. 
• The involvement of local communities in the management of, and the sharing of economic 
benefits from PAs is essential for their well-being and is in the interest of conservation. 
• There is merit in the establishment of statutory boards in the provinces to assist in the 
management of PAs and nature conservation generally. 
Source: Adapted from Kumleben et al. (1998). 
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In 2001, SANParks initiated the process of replacing its National Parks Act of 1976 
and regulations, both of which still reflected apartheid-style views (Chapter 7). Since 
national parks were managed despite the Act, rather than in terms thereof, a new Act 
with new regulations was required (Erasmus & Magome 2001). Accordingly, a draft 
framework was presented to the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, so 
that he could approve the formulation of a new Act. In the meantime, the Department 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) had started an environmental LRP into 
which the preparatory work of SANParks was to be accommodated. DEAT's LRP was 
the first in the country to envisage a single integrated governance of PAs in which the 
national parks featured as an integral part of the overall conservation landscape. 
The first version of the draft bill that emerged from DEAT was, however, not what 
SANParks had expected. Instead of reaffirming SANParks as the national authority for 
managing national parks, the LRP focused on biodiversity conservation and proposed 
the virtual disappearance of SANParks in a new dramatically changed institutional 
arrangement - from a flexible statutory body to a bureaucratic state department, 
managed by DEAT. SANParks was under siege, and this forced the Board to appeal to 
Minister Moosa for a meeting in December 2001. Following the meeting with the 
Minister, I was formal1y appointed to help DEAT draft a Bill that accommodated the 
corporate needs of SANParks. By using: A guide to legislative drafting in South Africa 
(Burger 2001) and legal advice, I secured significant changes in the draft Bill such as 
sections that recognised the role and national status of SANParks. Between January 
2002 and May 2004, I helped DEAT and SANParks to craft a Bill that could 
ultimately legally justify the transformation efforts of SANParks (Chapter 7). Since 
the protection of both fauna and flora enjoyed historical support within the country, 
my top priority was to ensure that the Bill legitimised the rights oflocal communities. 
The Bill eventually accommodated most of the legal sections that were needed to 
make SANParks functional. However, DEAT's bullish crafting of the initial Bill 
escalated into unmanageable conflict with aU the provinces. Ultimately, the original 
Bill that was envisaged to provide the legislation for biodiversity conservation was 
later split into two Bills. One dealt with biodiversity, and the other with PAs. After 
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parliamentary approval of the new Bills and subsequent signing into law by the State 
President, environmental governance then comprised a range of overlapping laws that 
view national parks part of a broader system of PAs that collectively form the core of 
the country's coherent environmental conservation strategy. The challenge facing 
DEAT is to ensure that the new acts are implemented. In SANParks, processes are in 
place to acquaint the managers of national parks with the new Acts. 
To be relevant in the post-apartheid South Africa, SANParks must comply with the 
provisions of the amended National Environmental Management Act of 1998, 
including both its new Protected Areas Act of 2003, and the Biodiversity Act of 2004. 
Simultaneously, SANParks must manage its finances and assets in line with the Public 
Finance Management Act (PFMA) of 1998, and the Local Government Municipal 
Structures Act of 1998, read together with the Local Government Property Rates Act 
of 2004. Accordingly, it is imperative that national state agencies and nine provincial 
agencies must first understand all these new Acts, and thereafter incorporate them in 
their policies and strategies. 
8.3. National Environmental Management Act of 1998 
NEMA, the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (Box 8.2), is the 
cornerstone and the "umbrella" law that establishes principles applicable to all aspects 
and sectors of environmental governance including specific legislation such as recent 
acts such as the Biodiversity Act of 2004 and the Protected Areas Act of 2003. In the 
event of conflict, the provisions of NEMA supersede those of other environmental 
laws. As a result, all the various sectors of the country are now obliged to observe the 
provisions ofNEMA and its subsequent amendments. 
The purpose ofNEMA is to provide for: 
Co-operative environmental governance by establishing principles for decision-
making on matters affecting the environment,' agencies that will promote co-
operative governance; procedures for co-ordinating environmental junctions 
exercised by organs of state; and, to provide for matters connected therewith. 
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Box 8.2. The principles governing all national environmental management in South Africa. 
The principles set out in this section apply throughout the Republic of South Africa to the actions of 
all organs of state that may significantly affect the environment and-
(a) shall apply alongside all other appropriate and relevant considerations, including the State's 
responsibility to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the social and economic rights in Chapter 2 
of the Constitution and in particular the basic needs of categories of persons disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination; 
(b) serve as the general framework within which environmental management and implementation 
plans must be formulated; 
(c) serve as guidelines y reference to which any organ of state must exercise any function when 
taking any decision in terms of this Act or nay statutory provision concerning the protection of 
the environment; 
(d) serve as principles by reference to which a conciliator appointed under this Act must make 
recommendations; and 
(e) guide the interpretation, administration and implementation of this Act, and any other law 
concerned with the protection or management of the environment. 
Source: National Environmental Management Act, 108 of 1998. 
NEMA provides a legal framework for environmental governance that is intended to: 
• Redefine the environment in development-centred terms. This focus enforces a 
paradigm shift in which the exclusive promotion of the natural non-human 
environment is replaced by promoting a balance between the needs of the 
natural environment and the human needs that impact thereon; 
• Establish a set of principles for environmental management in South Africa; 
• Link environmental governance in South Africa to the international agreements 
such as Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity; and 
• Demarcate the arena within which PA authorities can carry out their statutory 
obligations as the country's viable conservation agencies. 
Based on the amendment, environmental management inspectors (EMls) will carry out 
environmental law enforcement by ensuring that different kinds of law enforcement 
officers such as field rangers, law enforcement officials, and key special investigative 
officers, have appropriate legal powers, NEMA requires that each EMI have a specific 
mandate on appointment. From SANParks' operational perspective, the governance 
issues that flow from the NEMA amendments are: 1) facilitating delegation of powers 
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to appoint EMIs from the Minister to the Board of SANParks, and from Board to park 
management; 2) development of appropriate mandates for all categories of EMIs; 3) 
training of EMIs in respect of the new statutory framework; and, 4) securing statutory 
authority in order to deal with emergency incidents in terms ofNEMA, section 30(1). 
Overall, NEMA emphasises that environmental management must: 1) place people 
and their needs at the forefront of its concern; 2) serve their physical, psychological, 
developmental, cultural and social interests equitably; and, 3) that all developments 
must be socially, environmentally and economically sustainable. As a result, managers 
of provincial PAs and SANParks will have to do more than just meeting the basic 
legal requirements of the law. As a national agency, SANParks is expected to provide 
a good example by showing leadership. 
8.3.1. NEMA: Protected Areas Act of 2003 
The Protected Areas Act, 57 of 2003 repeals the National Parks Act, 57 of 1976, and 
its regulations, by establishing an integrated typology of national, provincial, and local 
PAs, with SANParks designated the national agency for managing its current national 
parks. The power to make regUlations now vests in the Minister or the provincial MEC 
(Member of the Executive Council, equivalent to national deputy Minister) and not 
SANParks or provincial conservation agency. However, all the management 
authorities of the state are empowered to make internal rules for PAs under their 
management in order to regulate day-to-day operational matters. 
The new PAs Act (Table 8.2) provides a framework for what matters a management 
plan may contain -
(a) development of economic opportunities within and adjacent to the protected 
area in terms of an integrated development plan framework; 
(b) development of local management capacity and knowledge exchange; 
(c) financial and other support to ensure effective administration and 
implementation of the co-management agreement; and 
(d) any other relevant matter. 
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To ensure compliance, section 43 (1) of the Act states that 'the Minister may establish 
indicators for monitoring performance with regard to the management of national 
protected areas and the conservation of biodiversity in those areas', and that-
(2) The MEC may establish indicators for monitoring performance with regard to 
the management of provincial and local protected areas and the conservation 
of biodiversity in those areas. 
(3) The management authority of a protected area must-
(a) monitor the area against the indicators set in terms of subsection (1) or 
(2); and; 
(b) annually report its findings to the Minister or MEG. as the case may be, or 
a person designated by the Minister or MEG. 
(4) The Minister or MEC may appoint external auditors to monitor a management 
authority's compliance with the overall objectives of the management plan. 
Failure to manage according to prescriptions can lead to termination of the mandate to 
manage PAs which is provided for by section 4(1), stating that if the management 
authority of a protected area is not performing its duties in terms of the management 
plan for the area, or is under-performing with regard to managing the area or its 
biodiversity, the Minister or the MEC, as the case may be, must-
(a) notify the management authority in writing of the failure to perform its dUties 
or of the under performance; and 
(b) direct the management authority to take corrective steps set out in the notice 
within a specified time 
Since the new PAs Act repeals the National Parks Act of 1976, the main governance 
issues for SANParks that flow from the PAs Act are: 
• Finalisation of regulations and internal rules. So far, SANParks has developed 
a draft set of new regulations in consultation with DEAT and these will be 
presented to the Board and thereafter submitted to the Minister. 
• Ensuring that the key employees of SANParks at all levels are adequately 
acquainted with and trained in the working of the new laws and regulations 
and how they relate to each other. 
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Table 8.2. Key provisions of the Protected Areas Act, 57 of 2003, with specific reference to 









Relevant sections of the Ad 
2. The objectives of this Act are-
(a) to provide within the framework of national legislation, including the 
National Environmental Management Act, for the declaration and 
management of protected areas; 
(b) to provide for co-operative governance in the declaration and management of 
protected areas; 
(c) to effect a national system of protected areas in South Africa as part ofa 
strategy to manage and conserve its biodiversity; 
(d) to provide for a representative network of protected areas on state land, 
private land and communa1land; 
(e) to promote sustainable utilisation of protected areas for the benefit of people, 
in a manner that would preserve the ecological character of such areas; and 
(f) to promote participation of local communities in the management of 
proteded areas, where appropriate. 
39. (I) The Minister or the MEC may make an assignment in terms of section 38(1) or 
(2) only with the concurrence of the prosp-ective management authority. 
(2) The management authority assigned in terms of section 38(1) or (2) must, 
within 12 months of the assignment, submit a management plan for the 
protected area to the Minister or the MEC for approval. 
(3) When preparing a management plan for a protected area, the 
management authority concerned must consuit municipalities, other 
organs of state, local communities and other affected parties, which 
have an interest in the area. 
(4) A management plan must take into account any applicable aspects of 
the integrated development plan of the municipality In which the 
protected area is situated. 
41. (I) The object of a management plan is to ensure the protection, conservation and 
management of the protected area concerned in a manner which is consistent with the 
objectives of this Act and for the purpose it was declared. 
(3) A management plan must contain at least-
(a) the terms and conditions of any applicable biodiversity management 
plan; 
(b) a co-ordinated policy framework; 
(c) such planning measures, controls and performance criteria as may be 
prescribed; 
(d) a programme for the implementation of the plan and its costing; 
(e) procedures for public participation, including participation by tbe 
owner (if applicable), any local community or otber Interested 
party; 
(f) wbere appropriate, tbe Implementation of community-based 
natural resource management; and 
(g) a zoning of the area indicating what activities may take place in 
different sections of the area, and the conservation objectives of those 
sections. 
Source: National Environmental Management Act: Protected Areas Act, 57 of 2003. 
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8.3.2. NEMA: Biodiversity Act, 2004 
The Biodiversity Act, 10 of 2004, is of major importance to SANParks as it provides a 
framework for biodiversity conservation planning and benefit sharing. If the principal 
pUrpose of PAs is to protect biodiversity, then the Biodiversity Act can be regarded as 
a key piece of legislation for achieving this. The Act lists "restricted activities" which 
constitute criminal offences such as the illegal harvesting of protected species. These 
restricted activities will have to be policed by all organs of state including SANParks. 






Law enforcement implications of ''restricted activities" are now listed; 
The proactive development and championing of norms and standards; 
Integration of requirements for biodiversity management plans into planning 
and management frameworks of all national parks; 
Implementation of invasive species management and reporting requirements; 
Delegation of powers and functions to ensure that SANParks is appointed an 
"issuing authority" for permits for restricted activities in national parks. 
8.4. Financial Acts 
Section 213, and sections 215 to 219 of the Constitution lay the foundation for good 
fiscal management of national and provincial governments. Furthermore, sections 151 
and 155 of the Constitution provide for local government and the funding thereof. As 
a result, general treasury measures instruct organs of state against 'fruitless and 
wasteful, unauthorised and irregular expenditure' (section 76 (2)(e)). Accordingly, 
managers of PAs must avoid unsustainable spending, as it may constitute 'fruitless 
and wasteful' expenditure. As a national agency adhering to constitutional guidelines 
and provisions, SANParks must manage its finances and other associated state assets 
according to the procedures and standards set by the Constitution. The managers of 
PAs including SANParks must, within constitutional mandates, establish which rural 
development activities it is allowed to fund so that there is no overlap of mandates, 
which can easily lead to duplication and wasteful expenditure. 
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8.4.1. Public Finance Management Act of 1999 
The PFMA or Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 gives effect to sections 213, 
215 and to 219 of the constitution, by adopting a financial management approach that 
focuses on outputs and responsibilities, rather than the rule-driven approach of the old 
Exchequer Acts. The PFMA is part of a broader strategy to improve fiscal discipline 
in the public sector. In terms of the PFMA, the Board of SANParks, as a juristic 
person, is accountable for the financial management of the organisation. However, the 
Board meets only four times in a year, and so the efficiency of SANParks could be 
severely compromised and constrained should the Board hesitate to act in a timely 
manner. However, the Chief Executive of SANParks as an ex-officio Board member, 
can be delegated some of the management responsibility while the Board retains full 
statutory accountability. 
8.4.2. Local Government: Property Rates Act of 2003 
The recently adopted Local Government Property Rates Act has enormous financial 
ramifications for the all PAs including SANParks. In each instance, these will have to 
be negotiated with the municipality concerned. In terms of Section 17(2)(e) of that 
Act, a prohibition is placed on the rating of all land in national parks except those 
parts that have been developed or are used for residential, agricultural or commercial 
purposes. Each municipality is required to develop a rating policy and to generate 
revenue through this process, but a municipality is entitled to grant rebates and 
exemptions. As a result of this, all PAs could be required to pay property rates for 
such areas at a tariff to be determined by each municipality. 
The Property Rates Act does, allow municipalities to determine differentiated rating 
tariffs, to give rating rebates and to exempt certain categories of landowners or certain 
categories of land from the payment of rates. The major difficulty is that there is no 
single overarching rating policy applicable to all municipalities. Therefore, SANParks 
will have to engage each of the municipalities covered by parts of a national park, on a 
basis that is appropriate to that particular authority and the local community it serves. 
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Municipal rates are the key mechanism through which local authorities can generate 
revenue. The main reason for levying rates is to provide municipalities with steady 
income to provide social services including rural development. In some instances, the 
national parks within such municipalities may constitute one of few reliable sources of 
revenue and there are certain elements in the municipalities wishing to maximize this 
opportunity. Consequently, it will be necessary for SANParks to develop an integrated 
and multi-faceted approach that will ensure that the impact of rates on the organisation 
generally and on individual national parks in particular is minimised. This will have to 
include engaging all levels of government, comprising national, provincial and local 
and will require a fairly broad range of expertise. The process of developing rating 
policies is envisaged in the Property Rates Act to take place over 4 years, and this 
should provide sufficient time to rationalise all land holdings. 
For each of the national parks, a park specific presentation/position must be developed 
indicating: 1) the extent of the national park's contribution to the local and regional 
economy; 2) the impact that rating would have on the financial viability of the national 
park and conservation generally; and, 3) motivating why exemption ought to be 
granted. Issues that come into play in this regard include the extent to which a national 
park does, or does not, make use of bulk services provided by the local authority, the 
extent to which the national park renders services on behalf of the local authority, the 
number of direct and indirect jobs created, and so on. 
In the past SANParks was exempt from property rates and taxes. Apart from the 
financial implications, the biggest challenge of Property Rates Act for SANParks lies 
in dealing simultaneously with 13 different municipalities (Table 8.3) spread across 
the country because each municipality will is legally allowed to develop its own rating 
policy after valuation surveys, and to negotiate rebates. This provides SANParks and 
organs of state the opportunity to negotiate rates payable. The situation in terms of the 
applicable laws is straightforward. All national parks and provincial PAs fall within 
either metropolitan or district municipalities and will not only be subject to the rating 
policy of such municipalities, but will also be required to pay rates unless exemptions 
can be negotiated. 
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Municipality with legislative authority 
Namaqua District Municipality (DC 6) under the DMA: NCDMA 406. 
Siyanda District Municipality (DC 8) under DMA: NCDMA 08. 
Siyanda District Municipality (DC 8) under the DMA: NCDMA 08. 
Namakwa District Municipality (DC 6) and has not been declared a DMA. 
Namakwa District Municipality (DC 6) and has not been declared a DMA. 
Frances Baard District Municipality (DC 9) under OMA: NCDMA 09. 
--Weste~D -Cape-------. ---------- -----_. ------------_. --------- ---------------_. -_. ---------.- -_. ---_. _. ----. 
Agulhas Overberg District Municipality (DC 3) and has not been declared a DMA. 
Bontebok Declared a DMA and fonns part of Overberg District Municipality (DC 3) in 
Karoo 
West Coast 
which De Hoop Nature Reserve has been declared a DMA: WCDMA03. 
Central Karoo District Municipality (DC 5) under DMA: WCDMA S. 
Part of a DMA (WCDMA02) and falls within the "West Coast District 
Municipality" (DC I). 
Wilderness Eden District Municipality (DC 4) and has been declared a DMA. 
Knysna Eden District Municipality (DC 4) and has not been declared a DMA. 
__ T~~I_~M'!~!l_~!l ___ .~~_I,!~_~~~lj~_M~I!!<?~~(tr.~_~J!~_~~!_~~~~<?~~~~~.l!.I?~_. ____ . __ . ___ . 
Eastern Cape 
Mountain Zebra Chris Hani District Municipality (DC 13) under DMA: ECDMA 13. 
Addo Elephant Cacadu District Municipality (DC 10) under DMA: ECOMA J o. 
_I~!~(~~~~ ______ .~l!~~~'!.I?!~!Jj~_M~,!i_~ip'~!i!Y_(R<;_J_~~~'!~~_R~:~fR~.!9: .. ________ . __ ._. ____ _ 
Free State 
__ 9_~!~~_~~!C? _______ II!~~M<?~~~~~_Ri.s_f!'!~!M'!~!~!1?!'!!txf~}~)_'!!I~~P~:_~~I?~!?: _____ ._ 
Limpopo 
Marakele Waterberg District Municipality (DC36) but under the Thabazimbi Local 
----------. ___________ M~~!<?ip'~!i_tr. ~~~! ) ______ . _________ . ________________ . _____ . _________________________ . 
Gauteng 
Groenkloof City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and has not been declared a DMA. 
- K"ruger - - - - B~I;bcla Di~ct MtIDicipiIity (CBOC 4)," ;hkb is ~r~s';'b;rd-;: district - - -
municipality. The Kruger fonns part of district management area CBDMA 4. 
Note: Municipalities are political structures and are indeed themselves still in transition. In 
fact various political constituencies often contest their boundaries. 
Accordingly, managers of national parks are expected to keep track of all changes that may 
include: 
1) Ministerial pronouncement of new demarcations. For example, the Minister of Local 
Government has announced possibilities of scrapping cross border district 
municipalities, and this is likely to affect Kruger National Park. 
2) Depending on the status of a municipality, an affected national park may quality for 
financial assistance. A case in point is Table Mountain National Park. Accordingly, 
GroenkloofNational Park may quality for subsidy from the Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality. 
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8.5. Constitutionality of rural development 
The post-apartheid era brought with it fundamental changes to the form and function 
of the governance such as the restructuring of intergovernmental relations and the re-
alignment of responsibilities between all the three spheres of government, namely 
national, provincial and local (Chapter 3 of the Constitution). According to section 40 
(2) all spheres of government must observe and adhere to these principles and must 
conduct their activities within the parameters of this chapter. 
In terms of governance principle, section 41 (1) of the Constitution states that all 
spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must -
(f) not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of 
the Constitution. 
(g) exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not 
encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government 
in another sphere. 
The constitution promotes co-operation between all the three spheres of government. 
Describing the different levels of government as 'spheres' rather than 'tiers' was a 
conscious attempt to move away from notions of hierarchy with all the connotations of 
subordination (Levy & Tapscott 2001). The constitutional provisions of municipalities 
in co-operative government are very clear. According to section 154 (1), the national 
and provincial governments must use legislative and other measures to support and 
strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to exercise their 
powers, and to perform their functions in terms of the Constitution. 
Under the constitutional provision, if a municipality fails to implement its socio-
economic development function, pro-active managers of PAs could help it to build its 
capacity, but not take over its functions. Based on good governance, an overview of 
how the South African Constitution views the issue of rural development is important 
so that confusion in terms of who ultimately takes responsibility for this function is 
reduced once and for all. Chapter 7 of the Constitution deals with Local Government, 
and clearly states that its object or major functions (Box 8.3). 
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Box 8.3. Local government and its responsibility for rural development 
Local government is the elected government body: 
• that takes ultimate responsibility for service delivery; 
• with which Community Based Organisations (CBOs), representatives and other stake-holders 
• 
consult for the purpose of assessing needs and priorities; 
that mediates competing interests in resource management, project planning or the provision of 
services (this role falls to the district level, i.e. Category C, where the priorities for the district 
are set and funding negotiated); 
• that sets Land Development Objectives under Section 27 of the Development Facilitation Act 
(67 of 1995) that bind all land development decisions and policies in their area of jurisdiction; 
• whose function it is to coordinate the work of the different departments and follow through 
requests for funding or implementation to the appropriate provincial and national bodies - the 
most important will be the Provincial Interdepartmental Committee, chaired by the Provincial 
Director General; 
• with responsibility for ensuring that the needs of poorly organized local people are taken into 
account. 
Source: Adapted from DLA (1997). 





provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 
provide social and economic development; 
promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
• encourage involvement of communities and community based organisations 
(CBOs) in the matters of local government. 
It follows, therefore, that local government is constitutionally charged with providing 
rural development for their local communities. To achieve this, local government now 
has municipalities, which must strive, within both their financial and administrative 
capacity, to achieve the objects set out in Chapter 7 of the Constitution. According to 
Chapter 7 of the Constitution, a municipality must: 
• structure and manage its administration, budgeting and planning processes to 
give priority to the basic needs of the community; 
• promote the social and economic development of the community, and; 
• participate in national and provincial development programmes. 
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According to the Department of Land Affairs (OLA), the government's framework for 
rural development emphasises the constitutional responsibilities of both the national 
and the provincial governments as follows (OLA 1997: 10): 
• help local government to recognise and define the needs of local people; 
• to encourage local government to involve local people in planning and in the 
actions necessary to satisfy their needs; and, 
• to enable local people, to be suitably organised to access national programmes, 
so as to assume increasing responsibility for these actions. 
Given the constitutional provisions on who is responsible for rural development, it is 
now appropriate to set the context in which PAs in the post-apartheid era can be linked 
to local government in order to contribute to rural development. 
8.6. PAs and rural development 
~uring the apartheid era, PAs were rigorously policed in order to preserve spectacular 
landscapes and some populations of large mammals (Botha & Huntley 1989). Equally, 
rural development during apartheid South Africa was neglected because black people 
did not have the political vote. It is now broadly accepted that PAs do not exist in 
isolation because they are nested within heterogeneous social, economic, and political 
matrixes that influence their origin and development (Pollard et al. 2003). In the post-
apartheid South Africa, environmental policy initiatives are attempting to balance the 
pressing needs and aspirations of the previously disenfranchised, but now politically 
powerful majority of black people, and the requirements of the highly politicized, but 
equally powerful global environment (Magome & Murombedzi 2003: 1 08). 
The role of PAs in terms of involving local communities and also of contributing to 
local economic development has been articulated (sections 8.3 & Table 8.2). EquaUy, 
the key question of who is responsible for rural development has been sufficiently 
addressed (section 8.5 & Box 8.3). Therefore, the major challenge facing PAs in the 
post-apartheid South Africa is how to design 'refonned' policies that can merge with 
those oflocal government, in order contribute to rural development (Atkinson 2003). 
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8.7. Policymaking 
Having provided the legal framework for organs state under the post-apartheid refonns 
(Sections 8.2-8.6), I now focus on policy guidelines for linking South African PAs 
with rural development. Applied policy research, as with the present study, must strike 
a balance between theory (the ideal) and practice (reality). However, such a balance is 
difficult to achieve because policy implementation depends on factors that are often 
outside the control of policy makers. In the context of the present study, policy 
guidelines flow from both the legal context and study results. Policy could be 'any 
course of action adopted as expedient and advantageous' (Oxford Dictionary). In the 
public arena, technocrats or elites write policy (Bell 1984a). Indeed, policy often 
reflects the prevailing views of the elites (Dye 1992), although it may be viewed as a 
response by the state to socio-economic demands (Anderson 1997; Hill 1997). In fact, 
there can be no politics without policy (Booysen & Erasmus 1998). 
While policy statements are often regulatory, they may also be symbolic. In the post-
apartheid era, policy guidelines flow from the Constitution that commits all organs of 
the state to: 1) redressing historically received inequalities; 2) committing to the 
reconstruction and development of the country as a whole, and; 3) to the eradication of 
poverty. Against this background it needs to be stated that poverty is the single largest 
threat to good environmental management in South Africa. With some few exceptions, 
notably the departments offinance, transport, trade and industry, welfare, and housing, 
the government's policy design has been enthusiastic but weak (Bernstein 1999). 
For the post-apartheid government to overcome the view that PAs are playgrounds of 
the affluent few, it will require more than enthusiasm. The relationship between the 
country's PAs and the local communities is still exclusive and adversarial. The major 
challenge facing the country's PAs is to create and sustain good relationships with the 
adjacent rural local communities. It is often stated that local communities will embrace 
PAs only if they contribute to sustaining their livelihoods. However, from a symbolic 
perspective, PAs must first be removed from their racist, exclusive past and be located 
within the post-apartheid's landscape of developmental organisations. 
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8.8. Policy guidelines 
The South African Constitution is supreme to all the country's laws. While there is no 
direct legal obligation for PAs to assume responsibility for rural development, the 
preamble to the Constitution calls on organs of state to heal the racist divisions of the 
past, and to create a society based on democratic values, social justice, and respect for 
human rights. With emphasis on social justice, the post-apartheid South Africa 
provides 'microwindows' for policy innovation (Keeler 1993) that drastically affect 
the content and direction of policy (Booysen & Erasmus 1998). During apartheid era, 
local government mainly served the interests of white people (Figure 8.1). However, 
section 20(1)(d) of the PAs Act of 2003, requires all PAs to contribute something 
towards local economic development efforts of the government. 
Figure 8.1. The uncoordinated role of local municipalities during the apartheid era. 
~---------------I I Local Municipalities I 
Only served the needs of white people in I 
~ ___ the~a!!eld.!~tl0!!i~ ___ J 
Local Health 
Care Centre 
In the post-apartheid era local government is charged with service delivery for all 
South Africans. The challenge facing PAs is how to work with the local government 
without assuming sole responsibility for social development (Figure 8.2). In engaging 
local communities and other organs of state, particularly local authorities, managers of 
PAs must define and develop the management policies of PAs in resonance with the 
pwpose for which their were created. As previously explained, the management plans 
for PAs must now form part of lOPs (integrated development plans) of their local 
municipalities. Equally, all local municipalities are required to produce IDPs. 
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Figure 8.2. The developmental role of local municipalities in post-apartheid South Africa. 
PAs 
Can now contribute to 






Jointly participate fn developfng IDPs 
By combining efforts, duplication can 
be significantly reduced and the 
different role players can enhance one 
another's capacity. 
Acne on meeting conservadon and 
development goals 
Draw up measurable indicators of 
success in order to jointly evaluate 
progress made towards the goals of 
local economic development. Where 
necessary, jointly lobby for political 
support and for fund raising. 
J 
lAK:aI municipality 
Can now contribute to 
long-term support for PAs 
.oIL 
"" 
While a key feature of policy is the scope and intent of legislation (Clarke & Bell 
1984), policy guidelines tend to be used as blue prints rather than as tools for learning 
new skills for best practice. Thus, the key issue for design and evaluation of policy is 
how to cope with the uncertain, the unexpected, and the unknown (Holling 1978). As 
a result, policy should be used as experiments that planners and implementers can 
learn from (Lee 1993). Similarly, a guideline or framework is a set of assumptions or 
fundamental principles (Popper 1994b). Within current political, social, and economic 
situation in post-apartheid South Africa, policy guidelines for a11 PAs are proposed 
(Table 8.4), but these should not be seen as a blue print. Ultimately, what works and 
what does not, can only be determined by practice. 
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Community members and organizations accept some responsibility for 
environmental management and biodiversity conservation, as well as for the 
success of mutually beneficial partnerships. Local people are assisted to make a 
real contribution to park management, local knowledge is incorporated into 
management activities, and beneficial business partnerships are facilitated. 
Managers ofP As drive the collaborative management process, guide community 
project planning and management, spearhead local baseline studies, develop 
collaborative management plans, and promote mutually beneficial business 
activities. They promote linkages between PAs and other government, private 
sector and NGO role players, manage and guide monitoring, and provide technical 
advice. 
Policies are made, funds are solicited, lobbying is done, social ecology is 
promoted as a way of working, and research programmes are developed. 
Top management supports community projects as one of the cornerstones of the 
organization, and builds this into the performance criteria of all staff. 
Source: Adapted from Magome & Fabricius (2002). 
8.8.1. POlicy framework for all PAs 
Building a constituency for PAs should be the primary function of top management in 
all PAs in order to gain support from the broader South African popUlation. Linking 
PAs to local communities should redress unjust historical racial policies and practices 
in line with national development efforts. Such initiatives should incorporate both long 
term and short-term benefits. Alliances with other organizations should be explored 
and used to the fullest, and should ultimately promoting economic empowerment, 
environmental education, cultural heritage, restitution of land rights, and resource use. 
8.8.2. Policy framework for SANParks 
The importance of extending the impact of national parks beyond their boundaries 
without simultaneously increasing the financial load on the organisation is critical for 
their long-term survival. A framework for SANParks is suggested based legislative 
mandates and trial and errors of the last decade (Table 8.5). 
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In terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994, communities that have 
reclaimed land in national parks such as Kruger, Kalahari, Tsitsikamma, and 
Vaalbos, have different legal agreements that have to be implemented. 
Each national park is unique, and is located in a unique political economy, but 
the common thread is the need to heal relationships and to build rapport with 
local communities. The approach here is based on building relationships with 
ordinary local people who do not have de jure claims on national parks. 
SANParks must initiate projects that seek to alleviate the high levels of poverty 
prevalent among some communities living adjacent to its national parks. 
SANParks now accepts that national parks can make a significant contribution 
to rural development, and in some instances they are the only engines of rural 
development. In many rural situations, national parks are the only major 
productive land use option, which can be harnessed to contribute to rural 
livelihoods. In terms of govemment policy, local governments are the organs of 
state that have the statutory responsibility to plan, facilitate, and co-ordinate all 
development efforts in their areas of jurisdiction. 
In 2002. McKinsey & Company revealed that only 4% of visitors to Kruger 
National Parks were black South Afiicans, suggested that NPs are not part of 
their preferred destinations or are not part of their culture. Furthermore most 
black South Afiicans cannot afford the luxury of visiting NP. 
Source: Adapted from Magome (2003b). 
8.9. Conclusion 
PAs can contribute to local planning initiatives, and such an effort could be a major 
important element in ensuring that their operations result in environmental justice for 
neighbouring communities. However, the success or otherwise of such effort requires 
that clear and measurable outcomes should be in place. Most importantly, progress 
must be monitored with specific focus on whether SANParks can attain objectives of 
environmental justice rather than mechanical assistance to local communities. 
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Chapter 9 
Recommendations and conclusions 
9.1. Introduction 
Recommendations from socio-political studies can be the most difficult part of policy 
studies because: 1) managers of operations are either unaware of recommendations, or 
where they are aware, they often tend to ignore them, opting instead for to do business 
as usual; and, 2) the political ecology of human-environment systems is that they tend 
to change from the time 'snap shot' results were analysed. The major challenge is to 
reduce uncertainty, while being relevant to different stakeholders involved at different 
levels of influencing the outcomes of PAs. In the quest to reduce uncertainty, Holling 
(1978:9) advises as follows: 
But if not accompanied by an equal effort to design for uncertainty and to obtain 
benefits from the unexpected, the best of predictive methods will only lead to 
larger problems ariSing more quickly and more often. This view is the heart of 
adaptive environmental management - an interactive process using techniques 
that not only reduce uncertainty but also benefit from it. The goal is to develop 
more resilient policies. 
By 'resilience', Holling (1978) meant treating interventions as 'experimental probes' 
(Lee 1993) or the ability of a system, natural or human-made, to absorb and to use 
change (Mitchell 1997). 
9.2. Recommendations 
In tenns of the South African legislative functions, most statutes delegate power to 
officials (usually Ministers) to make further legislation in the fonn of regulations 
(Kidd 1997). The key success factor here is for all state officials involved with PAs to 
champion or to drive key process of integrating PAs with local communities. 
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9.2.1. Recommendations to DEAT 
Having championed the LRP, the responsibility lies with DEAT in terms of ensuring 
compJiance from all the state-owned PAs. However, there is already evidence that the 
provincial conservation agencies are not readily embracing the PAs Act of 2003. Such 
'revolting against change' (Blackwell & Seabrook 1993) might lead to implementation 
difficulties. Experiences elsewhere with the USNPS showed that managers of PAs 
resist change. Elsewhere, The Vail Agenda of 1993 showed that such reluctance could 
continue, particularly in the light of the USNPS's ''refusal to adhere to the National 
Environmental Policy Act, considered by many to be the keystone environmental 
legislation" (Sellars 1997:278). While initially reluctant to embrace the PAs Act of 
2003 partly arose from the non-consultative approach of DEAT, other reasons for 
further remaining resistance should be investigated. In the case of the USNPS, overt 
resistance was caused by entrenched culture and tradition, which was grounded in the 
often overstated 'legislative mandates' (SeHars 1997). 
9.2.2. Recommendations for managers of PAs 
The various new environmental management acts bring challenges and opportunities, 
but this because life requires problem solving skills (Popper 1999). Thus, any teething 
problems that arise should be seen in terms of reforming the socio-political landscape 
of the post-apartheid South Africa. For SANParks, integral to effective environmental 
and corporate governance within the organisation is the promotion and attainment of 
environmental justice particularly for the disadvantaged local communities. Despite 
successful claims for the restitution of land, claimant communities have not benefited 
significantly from restitution, implying that environmental justice has not yet been 
fully served. While policy makers have a range of options to choose from in managing 
public problems including the option of doing nothing (Grindle & Thomas 1991), the 
aims of the Constitution are to resolve conflict and to base development on principles 
of democracy, social justice, and respect for human rights (Scheepers 2000). Finally, it 
is the willingness of managers to embrace changes that wiIl ultimately improve the 
relationship with local communities based on adaptive management (Figure 8.2). 
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What have we done right 
and how can we ~ve? 
7. Evaluate 
Are goals being 
achieved? 
6.M. nltor 
Use the instruments in (4) to collect data 
at regular intervals. 
5. Collect beneh-mark data 
Use the instruments below to collect 2003 
bench-mark data. 
i 
4. Develop Instruments 
Develop a 'measuring tool' for each ofthe 
indicators defined in 3, e.g., a visitor's 
surveyor monthly data sheet of illegal , 
activities. 
I 
3. Define Indleators 
Draw up indicators to evaluate progress 
towards goals set in I, e.g., the number of 
disadvantaged local communities visiting 
PAs, relative to the 2003 bench-mark or 
mean monthly number of snares collected, 
and relative to the 2003 bench-mark. 
t 
..... 2. Formulate actions and aetlvltles 




I. Spedfya 'desirable future' 
Set measurable social goals specific for 
PA, e.g., within 2 years, 20% of 
historically disadvantaged local people 
must visit or illegal activities must 
decrease by 10% per annum in 5 years 




What has gone wrong? 
How can we rectiJy? 
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9.2.3. Recommendations for further research 
South Africa is still a country in which historically disadvantaged communities view 
development and conservation as two diametrically opposed options, because of a 
long history of alienation from environmental issues (Khan 2002). Therefore, the 
chalIenge for post-apartheid South Africa wilI be how to further the transformation of 
PAs that builds on the basis of environmental justice (Cock & Fig 2002). While the 
law can be seen as a system of rules and prescribed procedure,justice cannot be bound 
to a system (Malan & Cilliers 2003). By developing a strategy for environmental 
justice aimed at assisting local communities, PAs are likely to gain their support and 
thereby be able to achieve their core functions. Therefore, further research should look 
into environmental justice in all PAs including SANParks, and how it relates to each 
of the local communities under the restitution of land rights such as the Makuleke, the 
Nama ofRichtersveld, the San and the Mier. 
Table 9.1. Proposed research framework for environmental justice. 
Proposed metbodology 
• Designing a framework for environmental 
justice within PAs; and 
• Using case studies of local communities 
based on original field research. 
9.3. Conclusions 
Key outputs from the project would be 
• A strategy for attainment of environmental 
justice; and 
• Framework within which the needs of the 
communities can be assessed and addressed. 
During apartheid South Africa, homelands, provincial governments, and national line 
departments including parastatal agencies provided social welfare services in rural 
areas. As autonomous and representative structures with capacity to provide essential 
social services, local government only existed in the country's towns and cities 
(McIntosh 1996). In reality, white people mostly enjoyed social services of local 
government. In the post-apartheid South Africa local government have relatively weak 
constituencies and, as a result, cannot be expected to have the political authority to 
pursue local developmental priorities (McIntosh 1996). 
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It is now accepted that PAs must be viewed within the regional context within which 
they are situated (McCabe et al. 1992). During apartheid era, local municipalities were 
isolated from the sphere of black people. However, in the post-apartheid era, local 
municipalities are expected to provide social services and to coordinate economic 
development (Figure 8.1 b). Unfortunately most local municipalities lack the both the 
capacity and skills to effectively produce IDPs. The government is fully aware of this 
Situation, and is trying to rectify it. In terms of good will, managers of PAs can 
facilitate the production of IDPs, and this could be a huge cost saving mechanism for 
local authorities. However, in some rural areas effective local government has yet to 
be established, and this creates a gap in terms of rural development. A major effort is 
needed to provide the training, capacity building and the resources needed for local 
government to function. Such training and capacity building is the prime responsibility 
of the Department of Constitutional Development and the provinces. 
The new framework for environmental governance for PAs is a huge challenge for all 
state agencies, and is made all the more daunting by the short time-frames envisaged 
for the transition. One of the keys to successfully meeting this challenge is ensuring an 
appropriate understanding of, and response to, all the new laws and their implications 
throughout SANParks as quickly as possible. If SANParks wants to retain its national 
leadership, it must manage its national parks beyond meeting the minimum prescripts 
of the LRP. Within the confines of the law, SANParks must be innovative and 
adaptive (Magome 2003c). The King Report 2002 emphasises the importance of 
balancing 'performance', taking decisions and actions designed to ensure the creation 
and protection of value, and 'conformance', demonstrable adherence to due process in 
coming to such decisions and taking such actions. 
In a cOIporate context, this means that the exercise of management's skill, expertise 
and flair in running business operations and creating shareholder value should be 
encouraged, but must be subject to appropriate checks and balances that allow the 
Board to ensure that management is at all times acting in the interests of the 
organisation and its shareowners. After the abolition of the apartheid system based of 
the concept of race, South Africa remains a 'very ordinary country, one which has 
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come very late to the table of comity of nations' (Alexander 2002:1). It is, therefore, 
the responsibility of all role players in the South African landscape to ensure that the 
country becomes prosperous. As South African enters the global community, Cooper 
(2002:194) emphasised that: 
The unsettled question in post-apartheid South Africa is not whether the country 
will remain capitalist or not. It is whether capitalism will be dynamic, growing, 
and open to inclusion of new capitalists, rather than insular, parasitic, and 
exclusive. 
The exercise of public power in modem states depends fundamentally on discretionary 
deciSion-making by state officials at all levels of government (Corder & Van der 
Vijver 2002). It is in this context that the notion of 'administrative justice' assumes its 
importance. This inherent power is regulated by the doctrine of ultra vires, which 
recognises that those to whom parliament delegated powers do not exceed or abuse 
them (Breitenbach 2002). Since the constituencies of PAs are multiple and dynamic, 
any policy that ignores the dynamic dimension of these constituencies will be sterile in 
its ability to deal with unknown future changes (Murphree 2004), and will therefore 
only perpetuate bureaucratic hurdles for marginalised local communities (Jones & 
Murphree 2004). Finally, only experience in the field can improve learning and by so 
doing refine practice (Child 2004b; Cumming 2004). 
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Appendix 1. Reflections upon my sometimes independent, and sometimes intertwined, 
roles as researcher in this study, aud my employment by South African National 
Parks (SANParks) during the various phases of the development of the study, 
requires reflection. These roles are documented by time line below. 
1994 I was asked by Dr Anthony Hall-Martin, then Executive Director of Southern Parks for the 
then National Parks Board (NPB) of South Africa, to consider joining the NPB as a senior 
manager in order to assist the NPB implement strategies for linking national parks to their 
neighbouring local communities (see Robinson 1994). At the time I was approached, I was 
Chief Executive of the former Bophuthatswana Parks Board (popularly known as 'Bop 
Parks'), which had led efforts in South Africa to integrate communities with conservation. 
1996 I joined the NPB in February as General Manager responsible for Park Planning and 
Development. My initial responsibility was to assist in developing policies that would link 
national parks to local communities in order to enable NPB to fall in line with the changing 
political landscape of post-apartheid South Amca. However, soon after my appointment, it 
also became clear that the NPB had appointed me as part of capacity building plan for its 
human capital requirement to engage more black people in senior managerial positions. 
Consequently, NPB agreed to my request to use my work towards a higher degree. The 
NPB encouraged me to register for the present doctoral study at the Durrell Institute of 
Conservation and Ecology at the University of Kent in September. Funding for my PhD 
tuition fees and living allowance was gained through independent sources, from the 
Charlotte Fellows Program of the African Wildlife Foundation in Washington, USA. NPB 
gave me paid leave to study full time for this PhD over three years. 
1997 Parallel to my field study of communities outside protected areas in South Africa (Chapters 
to 3 to 6 of this thesis), the NPB started a series of initiatives that were funded by the Danish 
1999 government as part of a capacity building project aimed at enabling the South African 
National Parks (SANP) to implement strategies that would involve local people living 
adjacent to national parks. The strategy became popularly known as Social Ecology. The 
strategy gained directorate status within SANP, and Dr Yvonne Dladla was appointed its 
first Director in 1997. During her tenure, Dr DIadla gave me support and encouragement to 
pursue this independent study. 
2000 In March, upon returning to South Africa, following my 'draft' analyses of the research 
data, I was appointed to manage Social Ecology, a vacancy created by the resignation of Dr 
Dladla, in mid 1999. However, the position was lowered to its former status of a unit and 
was made part of Conservation Development Directorate headed by Dr Hall-Martin. In 
September, I was appointed as the Director of Conservation Services, following the early 
retirement of Dr Hall-Martin. As Director of Conservation Services, I still retained overall 
responsibility for Social Ecology alongside other policy and ecological functions. 
2001 From my enhanced position within SANP, it became apparent that it was nearly impossible 
to to implement the results of my independent study, because of the lack of an enabling legal 
2003 framework. As a result, I initiated a study (see Erasmus & Magome 2001) into the National 
Parks Act (Act 57 of 1976) which revealed that SANParks was out of kilter with both the 
constitutional and the changing political landscape of South Africa (Chapter 7 of this 
thesis). This study was soon followed by the recommendations of McKinsey & Company 
(2002), and law reform which I had spearheaded for SANParks (Chapter 8 of this thesis) 
2004 I started to complete the write up of my research, which by now included the ~ork I had 
completed both on transformation and legal reform, which finally led to the creation of new 
sets of Acts that now govern SANParks (Chapter 8 of this thesis). 
2005 Following the creation of new Acts and policies, I have been re-contracted by SANParks to 
oversee the implementation of these policy initiatives (Chapter 9 ofthis thesis). 
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Appendix 2. Conservation objectives for PAs. 
Sample ecosystems To maintain large areas as representative samples of each major biological 
region of the nation in its natural unaltered state for ensuring the continuity of 



















To maintain examples of the different characteristics of each type of natural 
community, landscape and land from for protecting the representative as well 
as the unique diversity of the nation, particularly for ensuring the role of 
natural diversity in the regulation of the environment. 
To maintain genetic materials as elements of natural communities, and to 
avoid loss of plant and animal species. 
To provide facilities and opportunities in natural areas for education and 
research, and the study and monitoring of the environment. 
To maintain and manage watersheds to ensure an adequate quality and flow 
of fresh water, and to control and avoid erosion and sedimentation, especially 
where these processes are directly related to downstream investments that 
depend on water for transport, irrigation, agriculture, fisheries, and recreation, 
and for the protection of natural areas. 
To maintain and manage fishery and wildlife resources for their vital role in 
environmental regulation, protein production, and as the base for industrial, 
sport, and recreational resources. 
To provide opportunities for outdoor recreation for local residents and foreign 
visitors, and to serve as poles for tourism development based on the 
outstanding natural and cultural characteristics of the nation. 
To manage and improve timber resources for their role in environmental 
regulation and to provide a sustainable production of wood products for the 
construction of housing and other uses of high national priority. 
To protect and make available all cultural, historic and archaeological 
objects, structures and sites for public visitation and research purposes as 
elements of the cultural heritage of the nation. 
To protect and manage scenic resources which ensure the quality of the 
environment near towns and cities, highways and rivers, and surrounding 
recreation and tourism areas. 
To maintain and manage large areas of land under flexible land-use methods 
that conserve natural processes and ensure open options for future changes in 
land use, incorporate new technologies, meet new human requirements, and 
initiate new conservation practices as research makes them available. 
To focus and organise conservation activities in order to support int~grated 
development of rural lands, giving particular attention to the conserva~?n and 
utilisation of "marginal areas" and provision of emplOyment opportunIties. 
Source: Adapted from Miller1980 (in McNeely et al. 1994). 
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Can legally safeguard knowledge 
• Can legally safeguard 
knowledge. 
• More traditional knowledge 
may be protected than lDlder 
patent 
• Compared to patents, these are 
less expensive. The application 
procedure is shorter and is also 
less stringent than patents 
• Available in most cOlDltries 
• Long period of protection. 
• Easy to obtain 
• Inexpensive 
• Indefinite period, although 
may have to be renewed 
periodically. 
• May attract more customers to 
products of indigenous trading 
and their trading organisations 
• Can be used to protect 
traditiooal knowledge with 
commercial application. 
• Can protect more knowledge 
that the other types of IPRs. 
• Can be traded for economic 
benefits by contract 
• Inexpensive to protect 
• Less expensive than patents. 
• Many folklore varieties may be 
eligible 
Dfsadvantage 
Limited tenn of protection. 
• Application expensive and 
require legal advice 
• Protects ideas but not knowledge 
itself 
• Protection period not indefinite. 
• Subject matter must be in a 
physical fonn 
• Does not protect knowledge per 
se 
• A vailable in few cOlDltries than 
patent rights 
• Only available in the Union for 
the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants convention signatory 
countries, which are few in 
number. 
• Difficult to demonstrate 
eligibility criteria. 
Note: Petty patents are less stringent than patents. Trade secrets are practical infonnation that gives 
owners competitive edge as long as few people know them. 
Source: Posey & Dutfield (1996). 
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Appendix 4a Location of biodiversity "hotspots" and the number of endemic species. 
Region Plants Mammals Reptiles Swallowtail 
ButterOies 
South Afiica (Cape region) 6 000 15 43 0 
-~~~~i~~~~~-------------~~-----4~------ir-------~----' 
Madagascar 4 900 86 234 II 
Philippines 3 700 98 120 23 
Malaysia & Indonesia (Northern Borneo) 3 500 42 69 4 
Nepal, Bhutan & India (Eastern Himalayas) 3 500 20 
South-western Australia 2 830 to 25 0 
Western Ecuador 2 500 9 2 
Colombian Chaco 2500 8 137 0 
Peninsular Malaysia 2 400 4 25 0 
USA (California Floristic) 2140 IS 15 0 
India (Western Ghats) I 600 7 91 5 
Central Chile I 450 
New Caledonia I 400 2 21 2 
Tanzania (Eastern Arc Mountains) 535 20 3 
South-western Sri Lanka 500 4 2 
South-western Cote d'Ivoire 200 3 0 
Total 49955 375 892 59 
Source: Adapted from Johnson (1995). 







• 25% (B.3? million) of children under the age of five suffer from stunting as 
a result of chronic malnutrition. 
• Nearly 25% of African households do not have access to piped water while 
over 99% of all white and India households have water laid on. 
• 45% of Afiican households do not have access to grid electricity. 
• Nearly million households live in shacks while over 500000 live in hostels. 
• Life expectancy: 73 years for whites & 60 years for Afiican. 
• Nearly all white and India households have toilets; 
• 88% of coloured households have toilets; 
• 34% of African households have flush toilets; 
• 41 % of African households have pit latrines; 
• 6.5% of African households have bucket toilets; and 
• 16% of African households have no form of toilet. 
Souree: Adapted from Deegan (1999). 
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Appendix 5. Study questionnaire. 
Date: 
Province: _____ Agency in charge: _____ Name of village: 




Do you live in this village? Yes [ J No [ J 
Are you currently earning a wage/salary? Yes [ J No [ J 
2.1. If Yes, indicate the range of your gross monthly salary ? 
Less than RSOO[ JRSOI - Rl000[ 1 RIOOI- R2000[ J 
R200 1- R3000[ ] R300 1- R4000[ ] R400 1- RSOOO[ ] 
RSOOI- R6OOO[ ] R6001- R7000[ ]R7001- R8000[ ] 
R800 1- R9OOO{ ] R9OO1- R I OOOO[ JAbove R I OOOO[ J 
2.2. If No, do you receive income from other sources, e.g., from a husband/wife or 
relatives or from selling produce/cattle? Yes [ ] No [ ] 
Have you visited the PA? Yes [ 1 No [ 1 
3.1. If Yes, for what purpose? 
Look at wildlife (plants, animals & landscape) [ ] 
Stay in accommodation [ ] 
Look for work [ ] 
I work there [ ] 
Visit friends in the park [ ] 
Other, (specify) ____________ [ ] 
3.2. If No, why not? Not interested [ J Too expensive [ J 
Other, (specify) ____________ [ ] 
4. After each statement, state whether you are against or in support of the proposed action. 
4.1 If the land in the PA was to be used for mining, agriculture or industrial development, 
would you vote against such action? YesINo 
4.2. If the animals were removed from the P A and the land re-distributed to people would 
you vote against such action? YesINo 
5. Should government fund this P A ? Yes [ ] No [ ] 
6. Does P A contribute to your livelihood, e.g., by bringing visitors that create employment or 
economic opportunities? Yes [] No[] Don't know [ 1 
7. Specify how you, or your community, currently benefit from the PA? 
8. Specify any other benefits that you, or your community, would like to get from PA? 
9. After each statement, circle your answer as agree or disagree. 
9.1. P A protects biodiversity. 
9.2. Local people should collect firewood freely from P A. 
9.3. Some PA land should be given to the landless. 
9.4. Managers protect PA for our benefit. 
9.5 Fences protect wildlife and people. 
9.6. PA should be kept for posterity. 









Appendix 6a. The participative resource management continuum. 
Full control by tbe agency 
fn cbarse 
Share control by tbe agency in charge and 
other stakeholden 












Sharing authority and 
responsibility in a 
formal way (e.g., via 




No interference or contribution 
from stakeholders 
No interference or contribution from the 
agency in charge 
Increasing expectations of stakeholders 
Increasing contributions, commitment and 'accountability' of stakeholders 
Source: Adapted from Borrini-Feyerabend (1997). 




















People being told what is going to happen or has already happened. Unilateral 
announcement without any listening to people's responses. The information being 
shared belongs only to external professionals. 
People answering questions, questionnaire surveys or similar approaches. People 
do not have the opportunity to influence proceedings; findings are neither shared 
nor checked for accuracy. 
People are being consulted and external agents listen to views. External agents 
define both problems and solutions; may modify these in the light of responses; do 
not concede any share in decision making; and professional is under no obligation. 
People provide resources - for example, labour - in return for food, cash or other 
materials incentives. Much in-situ research and bioprospecting falls in this 
category. 
People form groups to meet predetermined objectives; can involve externally 
initiated committees. Occurs after major decisions have been made. Initially 
dependent upon external initiators and facilitators; may become self-dependent. 
Joint analysis, leading to action plans and the formation of new local groups or the 
strengthening of existing ones. Involves interdisciplinary methodologies, mUltiple 
perspectives and learning process. Groups take control over local decisions; people 
have a stake in maintaining structures. 
Initiatives taken independently of external institutions. May challenge existing 
inequitable distributions. 
Source: Adapted from Pimbert & Pretty (1995) 
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Success criterion or 
perfonnance 
measure 
PropertY or characteristic of an attribute 
A conditional action pattern that indicates what to do in which circumstances 
A material resource that has definite location and can respond to the actions of 
agents. 
A collection of properties (especially location), strategies, and capabilities for 
interacting with artifacts and other agents. 
A collection of agents or, in some situations, collections of strategies. 
A larger collection, including one or more population of agents and possibly 
artifacts. 
All the agents (or strategies) in a population that have some characteristics in 
common. 
The diversity of types within a population or system. 
The recurring regularities of contact among types within a system. 
The location in geographical space and time of agents and artefacts. 
The 'location' in a set of categories structured so that' nearby' agents will ten 
interact. 
Processes that lead to am increase or decrease in the frequency of various types 
of agents or strategies. 
A 'score' used by an agent or designer in attributing credit in the selection or 
relatively successful (or unsuccessful) strategies or agents. 
Emergent properties Properties of the system that the separate parts do not have. 
Designer An external actor that introduces new artifacts, strategies or agents. This is 
related to a policy maker who might deliberately alter the consequences of 
available strategies 
Attribution of credit Use of a perfonnance criterion by an agent to increase the frequency of 
successful strategies or decrease the frequency or unsuccessful strategies. 
Adaptation The outcome of a selection process that leads to improvement according to 
some measure of success 
Complex Adaptive A system that contains agents or population that seek to adapt. 
system 
Source: Adapted from Ruitenbeek & Cartier (200 1). 
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Optimisation of quality of 
services and hospitality 
Gender 
Language policy: 
Land claims policy and 
strategies 
Cultural resources and 
heritage management 
Ratiooale 
To transform cummt negative relations between employees of South 
African National Parks, encouraging staff to be positive, productive and 
supportive of the mission and strategic objectives of South African 
National Parks. 
To facilitate the identification of people who have the potential for 
growth. 
To ensure that business opportunities and contracts are also open to 
black entrepreneurs, manufacturers, consultants and suppliers of goods 
and services. 
To correct the imbalance of the past by recruiting and creating 
opportunities for blacks, women and the disabled. 
Which hinder the implementation of the mission and values of South 
African National Parks. 
So that it affirms and confirms the mission and values of South African 
National Parks. 
To address the overall visual corporate identity of South African 
National Parks (the name ofthe organisation, parks and camps, the 
logo, the uniform and publications). 
To develop strategies that will maximise income generated from high 
quality services provided by South African National Parks. 
To develop a comprehensive gender policy to address issues that affect 
men and women at the workplace, for example. policies and procedures 
on maternity and patemity leave and sexual harassment. 
To address the question of an official language. 
To facilitate reconciliation and increase the legitimacy and credibility 
of South African National Parks amongst communities who in the past 
have been forcefully removed from their land to create parks. 
To formulate policies and strategies to ensure that historical sites and 
cultural resources within the parks are developed to promote cultural 
sensitivity, accurate recording and interpretation of their cultural 
significance. 
These values were guided by the Board's transformation vision statement (Custos 1998: 14): 
South African National Parks is striving to transfer power and control of resources from the 
minority that had been appointed and privileged by an undemocratic system, to the majority that 
participates in the new democratic process. It is also directing the benefits of its activities to 
providingfor all South African, rather than the wealthy and privileged sections of society. 
Source: Adapted from Tema (1998). 
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SANParks facilitates and implements initiatives that contribute to the quality of life of 
local communities. Such initiatives must, however, be clearly and visibly linked to 
conservation, and must benefit both parks and local people. SANParks is, however, 
not a development OJganization and cannot be expected to take the lead in rural 
development that bas no spin-offs for biodiversity conservation. 
SE is one of SANParks' cornerstones, and is adopted as a new way of working 
throughout the organization. To compensate for the shortage of SE staff in all the 
departments and divisions in order to contributes to the success of social ecology. 
SANParks forms alliances with government organizations, NOOs, community-based 
organizations and the private sector at international, national and local levels to 
promote social ecology. It participates in, and initiates, collaborative projects 
wherever this is feasible and acts as facilitator, linking local people to the most 
appropriate development agency. National parks are managed in the context of 
integrated local and regional development; SANParks participates in and contributes 
to integrated planning and implementation processes at the local and regional level. 
SANParks experiments with different approaches to social ecology in a focused and 
goal-directed manner, and adapts its strategies to suit each park's context. It judges 
short-term successes and failures in social ecology with caution. Errors and successes 
are seen as opportunities for learning, and all role players accept that social ecology 
involves covering new ground, risk taking and experimentation. Realistic, 
measurable goals are set and constantly monitored to evaluate outcomes, and 
strategies and actions are adapted accordingly. 
SANParks facilitates the development and enhancement of the capacity of its staff and 
that of local communities, to enable them to meaningfully engage in social ecology 
activities. All those working in SANParks are capacitated to have a working 
understanding of the core business of the organization: biodiversity conservation, as 
well as an understanding of the underlying policies and principles of the social 
ecology approach. SANParks contributes to local capacity development, and 
appropriate divisions participate in such initiatives. Links with other organizations 
who have training as their primary mandate are established and developed. 
SE initiatives are ecologically, institutionally, and economically sustainable. The rate 
of use of natural resources (where appropriate) is renewable; lasting institutions and 
management structures that are correctly managed and administered are developed; 
initiatives become independent of external financial contributions and donations; and 
the management and administrative capacity of local structures to contribute to park 
management, deal with conflicts and enforce rules is sufficiently developed. 
SANParks promotes the participation of local people in park management. Each park 
has a management committee, which provides a basis for sound working relations. 
The level of participation varies from park to park, depending on the capacity of local 
role players to participate and contribute, the capacity of SANParks staff to engage 
with local role players, the history of interactions between the park and neighbouring 
people, and local political and economic agendas. 
Source: Adapted from Fabricius (2002). 
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Appendix 9b. Constituency building for SANParks should be driven by capable. 
Position 
Director of constituency 







• Manage national awareness, 
environmental education and 
local programme coordination 
• Liaise with senior government 
officials and potential donol'S 
• Improving national demographics 
of park attendance 
• Improving national awareness 
and image of SANParks 
• Liaise, collaborate and coordinate 
with marlc:eting division 
• Develop national environmental 
education curriculum in 
conjunction with other agencies 
• Liaise with national education 
agencies, groups, etc. 
• Develop strategy/policy for park 
education programmes for 
schools 
• Coordinate national system of 
parle: school programmes 
• Develop policies towards visitor 
interpretation and education 
centres, cultural sites, etc. and 
advise park management 
• Develop best practice sharing 
process among parks 
• Advise park managers on 
programmes, issues 
Source: Adapted from McKinsey & Company (2002). 
Skill requirements 
• Background and skills in 
either educational policy 
or marketing·/public 
relations· 
• Political experience an 
advantage 
• Background and skills in 
marketing, public 
relations· 
• Experience in logistics 
or event coordination an 
advantage 
• Educational background 
and skills 
• Experience in national 
education policy making 
an advantage 
• Social ecology 
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